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This is the third edition of Ideas from IDS, our publication featuring 
student essays, now from the 2018/19 academic year. This is 
the first time this publication has a thematic focus: food.
Food is a prominent development issue that concerns hunger, 
malnutrition, inequality, environmental sustainability, power and 
politics, social justice, and cultural identity. It is about the trade-offs 
that this era of globalisation has brought about, such as ensuring 
food security for all, while protecting the environment. It is about 
striking paradoxes such as the concurrence of under and overnutrition, 
sometimes in the same country or region, which reflects pervasive 
social inequalities and power imbalances in the food system.
Food is central to the pursuit of sustainable development and aspects 
related to food are relevant to most, if not all, United Nations Global Goals 
for Sustainable Development – beyond Goal 2 which focuses specifically 
on reducing hunger. Food is a key dimension of poverty and inequality; it 
concerns responsible production and consumption in the economy; it is 
related to the management of natural resources and preservation of the 
environment, on land and in water; it is a gender issue that relates to social 
roles such as care and cooking, and to children’s health and development.
As this publication illustrates, postgraduate teaching at the Institute 
of Development Studies (IDS) and the University of Sussex reflects the 
significance of food in global development and its relevance across 
disciplines and fields of study. This publication compiles a selection of 
ten essays written by students undertaking six different postgraduate 
courses: MA Development Studies; MA Gender and Development; 
MA Globalisation, Business and Development; MA Poverty and Development; 
MSc Climate Change, Development and Policy; and the new MA Food and 
Development. The latter, specifically, encapsulates the growing significance 
of food studies in research and teaching at Sussex. This new course, which 
has just celebrated the graduation of its first cohort of students, has recently 
been listed by Devex amongst the top 20 unique courses and programmes 
in global development.
The selection of essays in this issue was based both on their thematic 
focus and analytical content. We also sought to capture the different 
interests and ways of thinking and writing of our diverse student 
community, which this publication gives us an opportunity to celebrate. 
We also ensured a balanced representation of gender and nationalities. 
The ten essays gathered here were submitted by our students as part 
of the assessed work of nine modules taught at IDS: Aid and Poverty; 
Business as a Development Actor; Climate Change and Development; 
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Climate-Resilient Development; Debating Poverty and Vulnerability; 
Food Politics and Development; Nutrition; Public Financial Management; 
and Sustainability and the Policy Process. These essays, through their 
attention to the sociocultural and political dimensions of food, in their 
demonstration of the interrelationships between interventions and social 
process, and in their examination of the complexity and multidimensionality 
of food and sustainability issues, affirm the importance of considering 
food as a fundamental dimension of development studies.
The first two essays tackle aspects of nutrition. Suzuki links nutrition 
to care and argues that addressing the basic causes of malnutrition 
demands a gender perspective. His proposed framework for 
understanding care, gender, and nutrition is applied to the case of 
Zambia’s Realigning Agriculture for Improved Nutrition programme, 
which assists farmers and provides support related to behaviour 
change communication (for improved hygiene and food utilisation). 
This programme’s disappointing impact on nutrition is explained by 
the lack of attention to women’s workload and lack of empowerment. 
Suzuki argues that context-specific gender norms, violence, and HIV 
prevalence affecting women are key in explaining the pervasiveness of 
malnutrition and concludes that a stronger focus on gender is needed.
Sharma also considers aspects of care and malnutrition. She takes us 
to Odisha, India, where child undernutrition is pervasive, to discuss why 
government interventions to improve sanitation have failed to tackle child 
undernutrition. In order to be successful, she explains, sanitation needs to 
be combined with other interventions related to hygienic behaviour and 
cultural practices. Like Suzuki, Sharma highlights the social and cultural 
dimensions of nutrition – she notes, for example, how open defecation is a 
culturally embedded practice. She also emphasises the intersectionality 
of exclusion, where caste and gender add up to challenge access to 
clean water and sanitation by vulnerable groups, such as dalit women.
Government intervention challenges are also the focus of two further 
essays in this issue. Lo looks at school-feeding programmes for food 
and nutrition security, focusing on the context specificities facing fragile, 
conflict, and violence-affected states. She critically examines two school-
feeding interventions in the conflict-affected Northern and Eastern 
Provinces of Sri Lanka, and highlights the contextual barriers hampering 
effective implementation. She concludes that, given the peculiarity of 
post-conflict settings, in order to maximise the effectiveness and ensure 
the sustainability of school-feeding programmes, it is imperative to build 
in community engagement and adopt a holistic programming approach.
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Jacobs too considers government intervention but this time in relation 
to the taxation of agriculture in China. Moving on from the focus on food 
security and nutrition, her paper draws attention to the significance of 
agriculture in internal state bureaucracy and in state–citizen relations. 
The abolishment of a regressive agriculture tax (based on land area 
and grain production) may be welcomed from an inequality viewpoint, 
but this policy intervention is, according to Jacobs’ analysis, also about 
bureaucratic politics, central state control over local public finances, 
and social stability in rural areas where farmers are a key constituency.
The politics of food come up again strongly, in a different guise, in the 
essay by Hopson. He discusses popular mobilisation around food, 
looking at modern food riots and the backlash to neoliberalism. Hopson 
considers specifically the influence of the transnational peasants’ 
network La Via Campesina and how it has mobilised global support 
in opposition to the dominant ‘corporate food regime’. He argues that 
‘policies that undermine the basic rights of the population to provision 
themselves at a culturally and nutritionally acceptable level have 
provided a touchstone for the global solidarity we see today’. This 
globalised action for justice is likely to endure for as long as the corporate 
regime continues to generate inequalities in the global food system.
Three essays engage with different aspects of environmental sustainability 
related to food. Moosa takes issue with the claim made by policymakers 
and climate activists that climate change will increase the incidence 
of violent conflict. Equipped with a political ecology approach and 
using the case of water scarcity in post-war Northern Uganda, as 
experienced by the Acholi people, he argues that the relationship 
between climate change, scarcity, and violent conflict is neither 
straightforward, nor unidirectional. He discusses how climate-related 
water scarcity is one of many causes of armed conflict and calls for a 
focus on multiple vulnerabilities to climate variability and uncertainty, 
as experienced by the Acholi’s subsistence economy. He concludes that 
it is imperative to explore how conflict influences scarcity in the context 
of a changing climate, with a focus on vulnerability, and to remain 
wary of simplistic causality relations between complex variables.
Fanani unpacks and critiques the notion of climate-resilient development. 
She focuses on Ethiopia, a country where climate change is visible 
in the recurrent extreme weather events that directly impact food 
production and the livelihoods of the poorest. She considers government 
initiatives to address climate change, supported by international aid 
agencies, and how resilience is framed under these. She argues that 
these initiatives are top-down and driven by international experts, 
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rather than people’s experiences on the ground. They therefore 
fail to capture social, religious, cultural, and political aspects of 
climate change adaptation and resilience, which compromises 
their effectiveness. People’s understandings of resilience in farming 
communities concern access to land, and ownership of livestock and 
means of transportation, which contrasts with the ‘scientific’ perspectives 
highlighting issues such as climate-smart irrigation technology and 
crop switching. She concludes that different understandings of 
vulnerability result in different views on climate-resilient development.
The third essay engaging with environmental sustainability reviews the 
biofuel debate in the context of Sierra Leone. Compton draws on policy 
process literature and the ‘pathways to sustainability’ framework to 
consider the positions of different stakeholders in the debate, interests 
at stake, and narratives deployed. She argues that the dominant, 
government-led narrative on biofuels fails to consider the complex 
livelihood dynamics and the needs of the local farming population. Its 
primary assumption is that biofuels will encourage growth and promote 
jobs and that these gains will gradually ‘trickle down’ to the population. 
This, she claims, ignores ongoing evictions of smallholder farmers and 
job losses and reinforces a singular vision of agricultural progress. The 
dominant narrative also overlooks the struggles of local populations 
over land and conflict with local elites and biofuel investors.
Moving the focus down to southern Africa, Coupland engages with 
the notion of value chain upgrading, in relation to small-scale maize 
production in Zimbabwe. She characterises the structure of this value 
chain and finds that upgrading is unlikely to lead to income increases for 
small-scale farmers, as they are captive suppliers in a quasi-hierarchical 
chain structure, with the government’s buying entity as the single buyer. 
Coupland analyses different upgrading options, related to the product 
(e.g. using alternative maize varieties; milling) and process (e.g. planting 
later; mechanising). She concludes that some product upgrades might 
help farmers create new products for new markets, such as livestock 
feed. She notes, however, that this will not necessarily result in more 
robust and resilient livelihoods, because of economic uncertainty, lack 
of cash liquidity, and rapid currency devaluation in Zimbabwe.
The final paper in this issue engages with the notion of South–South 
cooperation, considering its discursive nature, geopolitics, and competing 
interests, for providers and recipients. Focusing on agricultural cooperation 
between Brazil and African countries, Murayama argues that while the 
Brazilian government emphasises the moral dimension of its South–South 
cooperation, geopolitics and economic interests drive agricultural projects. 
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He illustrates the dualistic nature of this cooperation in terms of 
agrarian models (commercial agribusiness versus small-scale family 
farming) on offer from Brazil, with their inherent contradictions. 
Unless African governments draw on these models in a balanced 
way, the outcome may be unjust distribution of resources, 
aggravating underdevelopment and poverty in rural areas.
The diversity of themes, analytical frames, geographical foci, and levels 
of analysis represented in this issue reflect the multidimensional nature 
of food as a development topic. This is an encouragement to engage 
further with students and the wider academic community across IDS and 
Sussex on debates, studies, and research on food and development.
Lídia Cabral 
Research Fellow and co-convenor of MA Food and Development 
Institute of Development Studies
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1. Introduction
Malnutrition has been considered as an international issue to be 
solved as it is mentioned in the set of nutrition-related goals within 
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs); SDG target 2.1 to end 
hunger and SDG target 2.2 to end all forms of malnutrition (FAO et al. 
2018). With the efforts of many actors, improvements have been seen, 
such as in the reduction of stunting among children in a global context 
(UNICEF and WHO 2017). However, severe malnutrition status still remains 
globally and mainly in developing countries; for example, about 149 
million and 49 million children under five years of age respectively still 
face stunting and wasting (UNICEF, WHO, IBRD and WB 2019). In order 
to improve the situation, it is necessary to understand the combinations 
of the complex causes of malnutrition as the United Nations Children’s 
Fund (UNICEF) has identified (UNICEF 1990), and understanding these 
causes will lead to a better understanding of nutrition overall.
Regarding the causes of malnutrition, gender and care are crucial 
factors, and care is deeply related to gender; therefore, understanding 
gender will lead to a better understanding of nutrition. Current research 
has examined the correlations between gender and immediate and 
underlying causes including care (Smith et al. 2003; UNICEF 1990; van 
den Bold, Quisumbing and Gillespie 2013). However, there is not much 
empirical research on the influence of gender factors on the basic causes. 
Therefore, this paper will comprehensively review the current concept 
of the causations of malnutrition and the relationship between gender, 
care, and nutrition. By examining the existing concepts, this paper will 
formulate a conceptual framework using the intra-household approach.
Regarding the case study, the paper will analyse an agricultural 
intervention programme to explore the process of its impact on women’s 
empowerment, care, and nutrition. Consequently, the study will pinpoint 
the potential reasons for poor impacts on nutrition outcomes by exploring 
the gender factor in relation to the basic causes of malnutrition such 
as the social and cultural context. In conclusion, the paper will point 
out the importance of the gender factor in understanding nutrition, 
and will propose that gender dynamics regarding the basic causes of 
malnutrition could be preventing improvements in malnutrition outcomes.
© 2020 Takeshi Suzuki © Institute of Development Studies
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2. Literature review
Malnutrition is a serious physiological condition caused by deficiencies 
or excess of energy and/or nutrient needs such as micronutrients 
(e.g. vitamins and minerals) and macronutrients (e.g. proteins, 
carbohydrates, and fats) (FAO 2015; Pridmore and Hill 2009). Major 
symptoms of malnutrition are over-nutrition, undernutrition, and 
micronutrient deficiencies. Over- and undernutrition are basically 
caused by either excessive or too little food intake against nutrient 
requirements. Micronutrient deficiency is caused by an inadequate 
intake of it (FAO 2015). Consequently, these symptoms can lead to 
‘wasting (low weight-for-height), stunting (low height-for-age), 
and underweight (low weight-for-age)’ (ibid.: 4). More specifically, 
child malnutrition is a severe problem because it threatens a child’s 
entire life by influencing their brain development and cognitive skills, 
and can lead to weak immunity or even death (UNICEF 2013).
2.1 The UNICEF conceptual framework
In order to analyse the causation of malnutrition, UNICEF (1990, 2013) 
developed its own conceptual framework by dividing causes into three 
types: immediate causes, underlying causes, and basic causes. The 
framework illustrates the process and causation of child undernutrition. 
Based on this conceptual framework, Ruel (2008) combines the 
necessary interventions to address the immediate and underlying 
causes, and suggests the necessity of tackling these causes from 
a long-term perspective rather than a short-term perspective (see 
Figure 2.1). UNICEF’s conceptual framework has been acknowledged 
as an important factor to help aid understanding and effectively 
address the causes of malnutrition (Pridmore and Hill 2009).
© 2020 Takeshi Suzuki © Institute of Development Studies
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual framework for 
child malnutrition
Source: Ruel (2008). © United Nations Standing Committee on Nutrition.
2.2 The relationship between care and nutrition
As can be seen in the UNICEF conceptual framework, maternal and 
childcare practices can be considered as a core explanatory factor for 
malnutrition because it affects both immediate causes. In addition, the care 
factor is heavily affected by women’s status in terms of nutrition (Engle, 
Menon and Haddad 1999; UNICEF 1990). Care is the practice of caregivers 
which affects the nutrition, health, and cognitive and psycho-social 
development of children (Engle et al. 1999). Care consists of six activities 
which are practised by their caregivers such as: care for women; feeding, 
including breastfeeding; psycho-social stimulation of the children and 
support; food preparation; hygiene practice; and care for children during 
illness (ibid.). These care availabilities depend on the available resources in 
the household such as the caregivers’ education, time, income, and so on 
(ibid.). It is also reported that the main caregivers are still usually women, 
especially in the most developing countries (van den Bold et al. 2013). 
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However, it is acknowledged that there are different resource availabilities 
due to the gender factor. Therefore, gender will be a crucial factor to improve 
care which is an immediate cause of malnutrition.
2.3 The relationship between gender and 
malnutrition
Based on the previous discussion, women’s availability of resources is 
crucial for the care factor. In order to make more resources available for 
women, it is noted that improvements in women’s status are necessary 
because it leads to improvements in children’s nutrition with both direct 
(childcare practice) and indirect (women’s nutrition status) improvement 
(Smith et al. 2003). Smith et al. (2003) define women’s status as a power 
relative to men in the household, such as ‘weaker control over household 
resources, tighter time constraints’ (xi). Based on this definition, improving 
women’s status can be thought of as women’s empowerment (Kabeer 
1999). Although there is no universal definition of women’s empowerment, 
generally the proxy measurement considers factors such as women’s 
household decision-making, control over resources, mobility, being 
subject to violence from partners, level of education, and paid 
employment (van den Bold et al. 2013). These proxy are summarised as 
women’s bargaining power which is a power to make decisions on intra-
household resource allocation (Allendorf 2007; Beegle, Frankenberg and 
Thomas 2001; Doss 2013). This intra-household approach will be used to 
capture the process of women’s empowerment within the case study.
As has been discussed, a clear linkage can be seen between care 
and gender factors and the importance of women’s empowerment 
for malnutrition. This paper will examine the process of impact of the 
agricultural interventions aimed at improving nutrition status by improving 
care practices and women’s empowerment. By considering the case 
study, this paper will explore the impact of the gender factor on the 
basic causes of malnutrition to shed light on its dynamic influence.
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3. Analysis of the case study
3.1 Lens to look at the case study
The lens used in this study is an adapted and developed UNICEF (1990) 
conceptual framework in order to see in more detail the relationship 
between care and nutrition outcomes (Bhagowalia et al. 2012; UNICEF 
1990) (see Figure 3.1). It breaks down the necessary resources to improve 
care such as education, social support, and empowerment, and it 
puts importance on the availability of those resources. In order to 
make clear the relationship between women’s status and care (Smith 
et al. 2003), the concept will be highlighted in Figure 3.2. As illustrated, 
improvements in women’s status potentially affect care for women, 
women’s health and nutrition status, and care for children respectively. 
Each factor is also interconnected and therefore improvement in any one 
of these factors could lead to synergetic changes. In addition, the intra-
household approach helps to understand that an increase in women’s 
status makes it possible for women to use more resources for care.
Accordingly, current concepts and approaches illustrate the process 
by which women’s empowerment leads to an increase in available 
resources for women, as well as improvements in care and malnutrition. 
However, there is not much research on the gender dynamics regarding 
the primary cause, although the primary cause is the concept illustrated 
in Figure 3.2. Therefore, this essay will try to analyse the gender dynamics 
within the primary cause through analysing the following case study.
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Figure 3.1 Conceptual framework showing linkages 
between care and nutrition outcomes
Source: Bhagowalia et al. (2012). © IFPRI.
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Figure 3.2 Conceptual framework showing linkages 
between women’s status and care for children
Source: Smith et al. (2003). © IFPRI.
3.2 Case study: the Realigning Agriculture for 
Improved Nutrition (RAIN) programme in Zambia
3.2.1 Programme description
It has been acknowledged that agricultural interventions can result in 
positive contributions to the underlying causes of malnutrition (Black et al. 
2013). In this section, therefore, the focus will be on one such agricultural 
intervention programme: Realigning Agriculture for Improved Nutrition (RAIN) 
which was implemented in Mumbwa District in Zambia from 2011 to 2015 
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(Kumar et al. 2018). The RAIN programme aims at improving malnutrition in 
Zambia with two components: an agricultural component and a behavioural 
change communication (BCC) component by targeting households with 
pregnant women and/or children below two years old (IFPRI 2016). The 
former component includes both distribution (vegetables, seeds, and 
chickens along with agricultural tools) and training on home gardening 
and animal husbandry in order to promote a diverse diet for better nutrition 
status (Kumar et al. 2018). It is delivered through programme-created 
women’s groups consisting of either pregnant women or those women 
with a child below 18 months, and it is led by a female Smallholder Model 
Farmer (SMF) who receives the initial distribution and training (ibid.).
The latter component is a provision of the BCC session which aims at 
the promotion of breastfeeding and complementary feeding practices, 
and which is led by the existing government Community Health 
Volunteers (ibid.). The session is based on infant and young child feeding 
(IYCF) guidelines and materials which include messages on optimal 
hygiene practices and health-seeking behaviours. In addition, it aims 
at an improvement in the norms around gender equality and women’s 
empowerment through group activities in each component (ibid.). The 
Theory of Change (ToC) is as follows (ibid.; see Figure 3.3). As illustrated, the 
programme expects the intervention to improve nutrition status through 
women’s empowerment and direct intervention in their care practice.
Figure 3.3 Theory of Change when applied to the 
RAIN project
Source: Kumar et al. (2018), CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.
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3.2.2 Result of the programme
Based on the conceptual framework defined in the previous section, the 
RAIN programme is supposed to improve malnutrition by empowering 
women, such as by providing agricultural resources and increasing 
knowledge of IYCF because these make more resources available for 
women, which leads to an improvement in the care practices of women. 
Kumar et al. (2018) conducted a cluster-randomised controlled trial to 
assess the programme impact on child nutrition outcomes by formulating 
three randomly assigned groups: (1) an agriculture, gender, and women’s 
empowerment group (Ag-G group); (2) an Ag-G with BCC intervention 
group (Ag-G-BCC group); and (3) a control group (receiving existing 
government services which target male farmers with antenatal care 
visits and growth monitoring for children under five years old). The impact 
evaluation report assesses the impacts on women’s empowerment, 
child IYCF practices based on World Health Organization (WHO) 
indicators (WHO 2008), IYCF knowledge, child morbidity, height-for-age 
z-scores (HAZ), and weight-for-height z-scores (WHZ) (WHO 2010).
3.2.3 Analysis of the influence of the gender factor on the basic causes
The evaluation report finds several positive impacts on women’s empowerment 
and care practices. Therefore, it seems that it succeeded in improving both 
care and available resources for women (underlying causes). However, the 
crucial point is that there are no statistically significant impacts on children’s 
nutrition outcomes in contrast to the ToC (see Table 3.1). Only the Ag-G 
group shows a positive impact on WHZ in comparison to the control group. 
It can be said that this programme addresses the underlying causes (care) 
and availability of resources to women as stipulated in the conceptual 
framework. Nevertheless, it does not impact positive nutrition outcomes. 
This could mean that there are other factors which are affecting the results; 
therefore, in the next section, these potential factors will be analysed 
through gender-related and cultural perspectives.
There could be two main reasons as to why positive nutrition outcomes are 
not shown. First, the inadequate impact on women’s empowerment is a 
reason for the lack of linkage between women’s empowerment and nutrition. 
Kumar et al. (2018) prove that women’s asset access scores, and financial 
and agricultural empowerment scores are statistically improved, while there 
is no significant impact on decision-making power scores (see Table 3.2). 
It shows that this intervention empowers women’s access to assets, but it 
fails to enhance their decision-making ability. As a result, women were not 
empowered enough to allocate the available resources on child nutrition.
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There is a need to examine further why there is little improvement in 
women’s empowerment. The gender factors derived from the social 
and cultural context in Zambia could be a potential reason. For example, 
there is a gender-based division in the role of men and women in 
Zambia. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO 2018) reports 
that men are generally considered to be the decision-makers in society 
and they tend to engage with cash crops which generate income, 
while women tend to engage with staple food crops. Therefore, men 
are expected to make decisions and have control over income-generating 
resources, while about 60 per cent of women are more engaged with 
domestic work, as opposed to about 20 per cent of men (ibid.). 
These social expectations of their gender roles could be preventing 
women’s empowerment.
In addition, gender violence could be another factor preventing the 
increase in women’s empowerment. Mabsout and Staveren (2010) point 
out that violence against women overrules women’s bargaining power. 
In fact, 47 per cent of women experience a variety of forms of violence 
such as sexual abuse and rape. Moreover, 54 per cent of women have 
suffered from spousal or partner abuse in physical, emotional and sexual 
ways (FAO 2018). Seventy per cent of married women report physical 
violence from their husbands or partners (ibid.). Therefore, these high rates 
of violence towards women could lead to a lack of improvement in the 
bargaining power score.
The second reason for the lack of impact on the nutrition outcome 
can be explained by the lesser impact on care practices. As a result of 
the programme, there has been an increase in the practice of the early 
initiation of breastfeeding (see Table 3.3). However, an improvement 
in women’s status through providing new knowledge did not lead 
to improvements in long-term care practices, in opposition to the 
conceptual framework. For instance, exclusive and continued breastfeeding 
practice does not show a statistically significant positive improvement 
(see Table 3.3).
This could be explained by the workload of women. After the programme 
finished, it was shown that women tended to spend more time on 
agricultural work while the time on domestic work and leisure decreased 
(see Table 3.4). This means women spend more on income-generating work 
at the expense of domestic work, including taking care of their children 
and their leisure activities, so there is no impact on nutrition outcomes.
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Behind the increase in women’s workload, there is a gender-specific 
perspective regarding agricultural production, as derived from the social 
and cultural context in Zambia. In Zambia, maize is the main crop and 
women are the primary producers and net buyers, although they are 
not sellers because the market is dominated by men (FAO 2018). Women 
spend much of their labour in the maize field as well, while they spend 
about 60 per cent of their time on domestic work (ibid.). Therefore, women 
play a key role both in agricultural production and domestic work.
Furthermore, 70 per cent of the labour in the production and post-
harvest of vegetables, one crop provided in the programme, is 
provided by women (ibid.). This suggests that the RAIN programme 
could provide additional work to women, leading to a reduction in 
women’s time spent on childcare because women need to work at 
cultivating and harvesting the vegetables. These facts suggest the 
possibility that women initially have a heavier workload than men.
Moreover, HIV prevalence could affect women’s time usage. The HIV 
rate in Zambia is higher among women (15.1 per cent) than men (11.3 per 
cent) (ibid.). Where HIV prevalence is high, caregivers, mainly women, 
need to use their time to take care of sick family members or orphan 
children of their relatives (Doss and SOFA Team 2011). Since Zambia 
experiences a comparatively high HIV prevalence (UNAIDS 2019) (see 
Table 3.5), women have severe time constraints due to taking care of 
others in addition to their children. As has been highlighted above, 
these are potential reasons why women cannot follow appropriate 
care practices, even though they have enough knowledge to do so.
The analysis on the impact of the agricultural intervention shows the 
influence of a gender related social and cultural context on women’s 
empowerment and care. The RAIN programme could not improve nutrition 
outcomes significantly because it failed to capture the gender specific 
basic causes of malnutrition. This proves that gender dynamics is a key 
determinant in the causes of malnutrition. Further, this means that an 
understanding of gender dynamics is key to understanding nutrition.
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Table 3.1 Programme impact on nutrition outcomes
Indicator Impact before and after the programme
Ag-G-BCC vs control Ag-G vs control
HAZ, mean -0.18 -0.33
WHZ, mean 0.22 0.38*
Stunting (%) 4.80 2.70
Wasting (%) -3.50 -3.40
Note: *Statistically significant: either p-value <0.001, <0.01 or <0.05. Source: Kumar et al. (2018), 
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.
Table 3.2 Programme impact on women’s 
empowerment
Indicator Impact before and after the programme
(Ag-G-BCC + Ag-G) vs control
Decision-making power -0.02
Asset access score 0.06*
Financial empowerment score 0.04*
Agriculture empowerment score 0.06*
Note: *Statistically significant: either p-value <0.001, <0.01 or <0.05. Source: Kumar et al. (2018), 
CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.
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Table 3.3 Programme impacts on women’s care 
practice
Indicator Impact before and after the programme
Ag-G-BCC Ag-G Control
Early initiation of BF 31.12* 23.63* 25.14*
Exclusive BF 7.54 8.32 6.04
Continued BF at one year 1.17 -2.52 3.90
Note: BF = breastfeeding; exclusive BF means BF at six months after birth. *Statistically significant either 
p-value < 0.001, < 0.01, or < 0.05. Source: Kumar et al. (2018), CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.
Table 3.4 Programme impact on women’s time 
usage per day
Activities Difference-in-difference after the programme (minutes)
(Ag-G-BCC + Ag-G) vs control
Agricultural work +37
Leisure activities -25
Domestic work - 14
Source: Kumar et al. (2018), CC BY-NC-ND 4.0.
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Table 3.5 Adults aged 15–49: 
HIV prevalence rate in eastern and southern Africa
Rank Country Rate
1 Eswatini 27.4
2 Lesotho 23.8
3 Botswana 22.8
4 South Africa 18.8
5 Zimbabwe 13.3
6 Mozambique 12.5
7 Namibia 12.1
8 Zambia 11.5
9 Malawi 9.6
10 Uganda 5.9
11 Kenya 4.8
12 Tanzania 4.5
13 Rwanda 2.7
14 South Sudan 2.4
15 Angola 1.9
16 Ethiopia 0.9
17 Eritrea 0.6
18 Madagascar 0.3
19 Comoros 0.1<
Note: Data are not available for Mauritius and Seychelles. Source: © UNAIDS (2019).
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4. Conclusion
This essay has attempted to highlight the importance of the gender factor 
in understanding nutrition by showing its dynamic effect on the causes 
of malnutrition. Comprehensive literature reviews show the causation 
of malnutrition and the linkages between women’s empowerment, care 
practices, and malnutrition. In the conceptual framework, it makes the 
mechanism clear, which connect the process from women’s empowerment 
to an improvement in malnutrition through improving care practices. This 
conceptual framework captures both care practices and gender as the 
key causations of malnutrition, and show that women’s status is crucial 
to improving care practices and nutrition. In addition, it uses an intra-
household approach to show the mechanism of women’s empowerment.
This paper has analysed the RAIN programme which is an agricultural 
intervention aimed at improving nutrition with women’s empowerment and 
BCC components. While it was expected to result in a positive impact on 
nutrition based on the conceptual framework, there were no statistically 
significant impacts on nutrition outcomes. This paper has analysed and 
explained the potential reasons for this, given the social and cultural 
context regarding the basic causes. Firstly, it has highlighted inadequate 
outcomes for women’s empowerment. Secondly, it has discussed the 
lack of improvements in care practices due to the workload of women. 
The analysis concludes that both reasons are derived from the gender-
related social and cultural context in Zambia, such as the role of women, 
the pervasiveness of violence against women, and HIV prevalence.
In sum, this essay shows, through the analysis of the RAIN agricultural 
intervention, that gender dynamics may be a cause of malnutrition. It proves 
that gender plays a very important role because its influence can be seen 
in all three causations and it can be the factor which prevent improvements 
in malnutrition. Therefore, it can be said that understanding gender factors 
can lead to a greater understanding of nutrition. Further, empirical research 
on gender factors, especially regarding the basic cause, may be necessary 
so as to improve future nutrition-related intervention programmes.
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1. Introduction
Undernutrition results from inadequate food intake or nutrient absorption 
and infectious diseases and manifests as stunting, wasting, and 
micronutrient deficiency. Globally, almost half of child deaths under the 
age of five are the result of undernutrition (Black et al. 2013). In 2014, globally 
at least 159 million children were stunted and nearly 16 million children 
were severely wasted (UNICEF, WHO and World Bank Group 2015). In India, 
the National Family Health Survey 4 (NFHS-4) (International Institute for 
Population Sciences 2016) shows that 38.4 per cent of children are stunted 
and 21 per cent wasted. In the 2018 Global Hunger Index, India was ranked 
103rd out of 119 countries and had some of the most poor performances 
with regard to child malnutrition numbers (von Grebmer et al. 2018).
In this paper, I will be discussing the need for nutrition-sensitive 
interventions to reduce levels of undernutrition in the state of Odisha. 
Odisha is among the poorest states in India where a sizeable number 
of people live below the poverty line. Undernutrition remains a matter 
of serious concern among children and women. According to the 
United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 45 per cent of children in 
Odisha are stunted owing to faulty infant and child-feeding practices 
along with poor sanitation behaviours. With one of the poorest 
indicators on sanitation in India, only 22 per cent of all households 
have access to toilets (UNICEF, WHO and World Bank Group 2015).
While a change in individual behaviours and practices is critical to reduce 
malnutrition, a community-driven approach can help accelerate the 
process. For instance, despite the Government of India’s Clean India 
Mission’s objective to make India a 100 per cent open-defecation-free (ODF) 
country, efforts to target both individuals and the community are crucial for 
its wider success. Therefore, behaviours such as exclusive breastfeeding, 
handwashing habits, and the construction of more individual and community 
toilets to curb open defecation are all linked and crucially reduces morbidity, 
most importantly among children (UNICEF, WHO and World Bank Group 
2015). Thus, my research question is: how can multisectoral sanitation 
interventions solve Odisha’s problem of undernutrition? Further, how can 
these interventions be designed and delivered in a way to optimise their 
impact on undernutrition? To reduce Odisha’s heavy burden of malnutrition, 
evidence-based, multisectoral policies are most important. In this paper, I 
will be drawing the links between sanitation and undernutrition in children 
in the state of Odisha, with a focus on nutrition-sensitive intervention with 
regard to sanitation through a lens of intersectionality and social inclusivity.
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2. Undernutrition trends in Odisha
Improving nutrition, especially child nutrition, has remained a global priority 
over many decades, especially in the public health discourse. While the 
right to water and sanitation is a human right (UNGA 2010), the World Health 
Organization (WHO) estimates that nearly 50 per cent of undernutrition is linked 
to infections as a result of unsafe water, inadequate hygiene, or sanitation 
(Prüss-Üstün et al. 2008). A few studies show that a third of the world’s 
population have no clean drinking water, hygiene, and sanitation at home 
(Exley et al. 2015). Sustainable Development Goal 2 recognises the need for 
improved nutrition with goal 2.2 aiming to end all forms of malnutrition by 2030 
in order to achieve the agreed targets on stunting and wasting in children. 
Thus, ending hunger and malnutrition requires continuous efforts in designing 
interventions, especially in Asia, so as to end the so-called ‘Asian Enigma’.
There exists a consensus now that nutrition-specific interventions cannot 
alone have an impact on stunting and wasting. This has directed the 
focus of policies, programmes, and academics on various nutrition-
sensitive approaches with wider sectoral actions and involvement. The 
determinants of optimal nutrition are multifaceted, which are summarised 
as immediate, underlying, and basic (UNICEF 1990). Various enabling factors 
– social, economic, and political – also contribute towards improved 
nutrition (Gillespie et al. 2013). Despite India’s impressive strides in the 
improvement of some health indictors, progress remains uneven to reduce 
child malnutrition (Pati et al. 2018). For instance, according to the NFHS-4 
(2015–16), the number of children below five years with wasting has risen from 
19.8 per cent to 21 per cent and this remains a common indicator of severe 
acute malnutrition (International Institute for Population Sciences 2016).
While nutrition-specific interventions are crucial to target the direct causes of 
malnutrition, nutrition-sensitive interventions pave the way for multisectoral 
approaches to sustain better nutrition. Development economist, Dean 
Spears, argues that poor sanitation that includes, for instance, open 
defecation, becomes a crucial inhibiting factor for children’s growth (Haddad 
2015). Thus, poor sanitation is associated with infectious diseases that 
include diarrhoea and soil-transmitted infections. Diarrhoea is the topmost 
cause of sanitation-related mortality and morbidity and is responsible for 
causing 8 per cent of deaths of children under five globally (UNICEF 1990). 
Therefore, improved water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH) and sanitation 
interventions have the potential to decrease child undernutrition.
With the prime objective of making India an ODF country, the Government 
of India launched a sanitation programme in 2014 called the Swachh 
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Bharat Mission/Clean India Campaign. The campaign called for the 
construction of individual and community toilets to bring about a 
behavioural change and generate awareness about the importance 
of improved sanitation. While each state in the country has a sanitation 
target to achieve by 2019, the state of Odisha in eastern India has its 
own challenges in fulfilling these. Odisha is one of the most backward 
and poorest states despite its available natural resources and human 
potential. High levels of poverty along with the challenges of widespread 
social disparities and natural calamities aggravate the problem of 
malnutrition in the state (Kohli et al. 2017). Despite such challenges, Odisha 
has shown some improvements in nutrition outcomes in the past few years. 
For instance, rates of stunting among children under five years declined 
from 45 per cent to 38 per cent between 2006 and 2014 (ibid.: 38).
2.1 Drawing the links between WASH and 
undernutrition
I will be using the WASH and undernutrition framework by Exley et al. (2015) 
to understand the complex relationship between WASH and nutrition, 
drawing links between the two through three major pathways. First, a 
result of poor sanitation is diarrhoea which is globally the leading cause 
of deaths of children under five. It hinders the absorption of nutrients and 
thus contributes to poor nutrition. Undernourished children are further at 
a greater risk of suffering more frequently from diarrhoea, thus creating a 
never-ending vicious cycle (Mara et al. 2010). Further, The Lancet analysis in 
2013 has shown that one quarter of cases of stunting can be a cause of five 
or more episodes of diarrhoea before two years of age (Walker et al. 2013).
Second, in the absence of proper sanitation and hygiene, soil-transmitted 
helminths are transmitted via contaminated soil that comes into contact with 
human faeces which contain worm eggs. Children in rural areas mostly go 
out in the open to play, often under unhygienic conditions and bring home 
with them a host of diseases. Infections caused as a result of this can lead 
to poor growth and anaemia along with impaired cognitive development. 
Recent studies show that improved sanitation can potentially decrease the 
risk factors of infection by an estimated 50 per cent (Ziegelbauer et al. 2012).
Third, poor WASH conditions also lead to environmental enteric dysfunction 
or environmental enteropathy which affects both the structure and function 
of the gut, leading to growth faltering owing to nutrient malabsorption and 
systemic inflation (Lin et al. 2013). Such conditions aggravate poor sanitation 
and make children vulnerable to the potential risk of diarrhoea and other 
health concerns. Figure 2.1 illustrates the links between WASH and poor 
nutrition status.
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Figure 2.1 Links between WASH and poor nutrition 
status
Source: Author’s own, based on Exley et al. (2015).
Therefore, interventions that shield against the exposure to such diseases should 
be introduced along with improved sanitation practices and services. In the next 
section, I will highlight the Odisha Health Sector and Nutrition Plan (OHSNP).
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3. Multisectoral interventions in 
Odisha to reduce undernutrition
In this section, I will highlight the literature on drivers of change in 
nutrition and health outcomes in Odisha by examining changes 
in outcomes (e.g. stunting, wasting). Here, I will discuss the Odisha 
Health Sector and Nutrition Plan (Odisha Technical and Management 
Support Team 2015) implemented by the Government of Odisha 
(April 2008–March 2015) gathering technical support and funding 
from the UK Department for International Development (DFID). The 
plan focused on quality and equity merged with decentralisation 
and evidence-based health, nutrition, and WASH programmes.
The plan was based on four main objectives. First, improving access 
to WASH services in the underserved areas. According to the Census 
of 2011, out of a total of 40 million people, 17 per cent belong to the 
scheduled caste and 23 per cent to the scheduled tribes. Nearly 83 per 
cent of Odisha’s population live in rural areas (Census 2011). Therefore, 
a focus was laid on the underserved areas of the state. Second, 
strengthening public management systems: for instance, the Public 
Distribution System (PDS) and the National Rural Employment Guarantee 
Act (NREGA), along with sanitation departments in the state.
Third, behavioural change in the communities and generating awareness 
about nutrition, hygiene, and improved health. Behavioural change 
has been one of the objectives of the Clean India Campaign and 
progress in generating heightened awareness to end open defecation 
began towards the end of the Plan. This progress was made due to 
the fact that the new national government formed in 2014 started the 
nationwide campaign to make India clean. Fourth, evidence-based 
planning and delivery of equitable nutrition and WASH services.
Therefore, the progress of the plan was met by strengthening delivery 
mechanisms and the response of services on the supply side, along 
with having innovative community-based interventions on the 
demand side. Some positive results from a survey commissioned by 
the Technical Management Support Team included improvements 
in the coverage of maternal and child health services, increased 
coverage of women belonging to scheduled tribe communities, 
and the provision of nutrition services and practices targeting 
adolescent girls. Despite the aforementioned progress, the 
coverage of sanitation and hygiene practices remained low.
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Undernutrition in Odisha requires greater attention to the approaches 
that address the underlying causes, along with nutrition-specific 
interventions such as healthy food, the prevention of infections, washing 
hands with soap, and improved feeding practices which include 
exclusive breastfeeding for six months and complementary feeding for 
two years and beyond (Prüss-Üstün et al. 2008). With the four previously 
mentioned main objectives of the OHSNP, I will focus on the first objective 
of improvement in WASH and nutrition through a nutrition-sensitive and 
multisectoral approach in Odisha. According to a study by Kohli et al. 
(2017), the appointing of well-qualified bureaucrats and some political 
stability for the political party in power provided space for several 
reforms in nutrition programmes to function in continuation. Assurance 
of adequate tenure allowed the bureaucrats working in the state to 
amass knowledge and work towards programme implementation.
Further analysis of the same study (Kohli et al. 2017) showed that between 
2005 and 2015, various changes took place in the Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS) programme. During this decade, at least 
three bureaucrats were heading the Department of Women and Child 
Development (DWCD), where each had been serving for four years. Increase 
in the national financing (in 2004/05) for social sector programmes and 
direct financial support to Odisha from DFID helped in securing funding 
for the implementation of programmes to strengthen support to nutrition 
programmes in Odisha (Kohli et al. 2017). Expanding ICDS under the 
National Rural Health Mission (NRHM) through frontline workers (accredited 
social health activist workers, auxiliary nurse midwives, and anganwadi 
workers) and increasing the number of women’s self-help groups increased 
the delivery mechanism for various health, nutrition, and sanitation 
programmes. Under the OHSNP, nutrition coverage has been similar across 
different groups in the state which indicates that targeted benefits have 
been achieved. Though the gap in stunting, wasting, and micronutrient 
deficiency has not been covered, the plan paves the way for a future 
course towards formulating sanitation and nutrition-friendly policies.
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4. Analysing nutrition interventions 
through the lens of social 
inclusivity and intersectionality
Odisha is one of the most underdeveloped states in India and is among 
the worst performers in terms of sanitation coverage. Thus, a majority 
of people in Odisha are denied their basic human right to water and 
sanitation. Poor infrastructure, poverty, and negative attitudes and 
behaviour towards open defecation have resulted in poor sanitation 
status. Therefore, to accelerate elimination of stunting, efforts that 
tackle the underlying determinants of undernutrition are necessary. The 
OHSNP shows that when supply-side and community- based models 
work together to improve sanitation services, levels of undernutrition can 
potentially go down. Therefore, I argue that a multisectoral approach with 
various community actors involved can scale up interventions to improve 
WASH which can have an impact on better and improved nutrition.
For instance, in the case of the OHSNP, to achieve better outcomes, 
government departments – the DWCD, the Department of Health and 
Family Welfare, and the Rural Development Department – must work in 
collaboration with departments responsible for agriculture, education, 
scheduled castes (SCs), and scheduled tribes (STs), which can together 
help in implementing strategies to reduce undernutrition. The Census 
of 2011 found that only 14 per cent of rural households have access 
to sanitation facilities, while 85 per cent practise open defecation 
(Census 2011). Sadly, Odisha has witnessed severe poverty relative to 
national and global standards, and disparities in health and nutrition 
indicators are a major concern amongst the socially disadvantaged and 
marginalised groups, especially ST communities. Therefore, I argue that 
an ‘intersectionality lens’ can help in the improvement and functioning 
of multisectoral programmes and initiatives to prevent undernutrition.
For instance, in 2013, notable differences in stunting rates between STs 
(46.1 per cent) and other populations (25.3 per cent) (Ministry of Women 
and Child Development 2015) were recorded. Added to this are the inter-
district differences; that is, between coastal and northern as well as southern 
districts that exist among underweight children below five years of age. 
For example, in 2014–15, the prevalence of underweight children in the 
coastal district Jagatsinghpur was 24 per cent while in the northern district 
Mayurbang it was 53.6 per cent (Odisha Technical and Management 
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Support Team 2015). The Census of 2011 revealed that less than a quarter of 
households in Odisha have water sources available within close proximity 
while the rest have to fetch water from over half a kilometre away.
Frequently reported water-borne diseases have been a cause of poor 
health of children in rural areas. A big number of habitations of poor and 
socially marginalised groups, for instance, SCs and STs and other minorities 
living in rural and tribal areas, are deprived of safe and clean drinking 
water and sanitation. The dalit communities are discriminated against 
when they go out to fetch water in some multi-caste villages (Jena 2014). 
Access to sanitation facilities by different people often reinforces various 
intersections of caste, class, gender, location (rural or urban), and so forth. 
Many dalit women in villages still have to wait for their turn to collect 
water from the wells until the turn of their caste comes (which is almost 
always at the end). Therefore, many people belonging to lower castes 
still have to face social humiliation and indignity in their daily lives.
According to the daily newspaper The Pioneer, out of the government 
data of 85,600 SC and ST habitations in Odisha, only 56 per cent 
have rural drinking water (ibid.: 1). Therefore, my argument is that 
intersectionality can help bring about a vital change in sanitation 
coverage in Odisha by taking into account the various needs and 
requirements of people belonging to different sections of the state. 
The marginalised communities should, thus, get the protection and 
support from the state to increase access of these communities to 
drinking water and sanitation facilities. Thus, social inclusivity must be a 
guaranteed condition to allow services to reach every individual, which 
surely will make a huge positive impact on the nutrition of children.
Though there is a significant association between improved sanitation 
and a reduction in undernutrition, any causal relationship has so far 
not been identified. While studies by Hammer and Spears (2013) and 
Pickering et al. (2015) have reported significant effects of improved 
sanitation on stunting, some studies show that clean sanitation produces 
less of an impact on improving child undernutrition (Cameron, Shah and 
Olivia 2013; Patil et al. 2014). A possible reason for the failure of these 
studies to show links between sanitation and reduced undernutrition 
and stunting could be a result of drawing misleading links between the 
construction of toilets and their use. Therefore, despite building over 
3.3 million individual household toilets (Singh 2018) since the launch 
of the Clean India Campaign in 2014, more than a third of villages 
had no toilets even after the intervention (Clasen et al. 2014).
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Owing to poor behavioural change and caste barriers, people still continue 
open defecation which increases exposure to faecal pathogens. Another 
possible reason for poor sanitation outcomes could be contamination of 
hands owing to poor handwashing (with soap) habits. Caste barriers in 
schools expose children without access to a clean water supply to open 
defecation. This puts them at a greater risk of ingesting bacteria, viruses, 
or parasites which may cause intestinal infections and inflammation in 
the gastrointestinal tract. This in turn can lead to stunting in children 
and makes them vulnerable to poor childhood development.
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5. Conclusion
The case of Odisha shows that nutrition-sensitive programmes 
should be a focus for policymakers and health professionals so as to 
improve sanitation services to promote equity in health and nutrition. 
Social protection programmes such as the PDS and the Midday Meal 
Scheme merged with sanitation programmes such as the Clean 
India Campaign should be made more nutrition-sensitive in order to 
achieve better nutrition outcomes. While the tenure of the Clean India 
Campaign is about to end (as at October 2019), efforts to maximise 
sanitation coverage must continue. To achieve this, sufficient funds 
must be provided to Odisha to continue its nutrition programmes 
(with regard to safe sanitation) along with policy support, good 
leadership, trained frontline workers, well-informed civil society, and 
service delivery mechanisms all geared towards the targeted goal.
Further, in this paper, I have shown why intersectionality can be a solution 
to dealing with undernutrition in Odisha. Thus, all sanitation and nutrition 
programmes should be all-inclusive and not limited to certain sections 
of society. An integrated approach of initiating WASH and nutrition 
interventions speeds up the progress, while addressing the intervention 
needs of both urban and rural areas separately. While improved sanitation 
alone cannot tackle child undernutrition, innovative interventions such as 
Shakti Varta’s in Odisha (which harnesses the power of women to generate 
awareness in health and nutrition interventions), along with Community 
Management of Acute Malnutrition, can pave the way for accelerating 
the progress of multisectoral interventions to reduce undernutrition.
While Odisha often gets hit by natural calamities such as cyclones, 
every calamity wreaks havoc and disrupts WASH services. The recent 
Cyclone Fani in May 2019 has led to a lack of safe drinking water, and 
poor sanitation with animal carcasses left in the open, all factors which 
could trigger diseases. Odisha’s vulnerability to natural disasters may 
be harder to control but the fate of the children in Odisha can be 
positively changed with national, local community, and individual efforts 
with the potential to create a clean and nutritionally healthy state.
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1. Abstract
With a view to addressing issues of food insecurity, undernutrition, and 
low level of schooling, school-feeding programmes are increasingly 
prevalent in fragile, conflict-, and violence-affected states (FCVAS). 
Drawing on a case study of two different school-feeding interventions 
in the conflict-affected Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, this 
paper seeks to illustrate the importance of effective social protection 
in FCVAS. It critically examines the programme design and highlights 
the contextual barriers hampering effective implementation. In order 
to maximise the effectiveness and ensure the sustainability of school-
feeding programmes, it is indispensable to incorporate community 
engagement and adopt a holistic approach in the programming.
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2. Introduction
Protracted armed conflicts and political instability continue to expose 
school-aged children to multiple risks and compromise their wellbeing 
and development, driving a high prevalence of food insecurity, 
malnutrition, and child morbidity, as well as low levels of schooling 
(Altare and Guha-Sapir 2013; Justino 2014; Tranchant et al. 2018). In 2018, 
one third of the total 303 million out-of-school children in the world, 
aged five to 17, are living in FCVAS (UNICEF 2018). FCVAS encompass a 
wide array of situations which often involve the state’s failure to meet 
the rudimentary needs of its citizens, coupled with physical forms of 
violence induced by political, economic, or social factors (Green 2017).
In light of the situation, school feeding is regularly used as a social safety 
net during and after the conflict in FCVAS (Holmes 2011). Targeted at 
vulnerable school-aged children, school feeding is deemed to be a cost-
effective response to emergencies in FCVAS by increasing the quantity and 
quality of food consumption (Hidrobo et al. 2018), reinstating the sense of 
normality (Bundy et al. 2018), and bringing long-term benefits of human 
capital (WFP 2013). However, evidence on the impact of school-feeding 
programmes remains inconclusive. The strongest empirical evidence is 
found for improving nutritional outcomes (Carpenter, Slater and Mallet 2012), 
whilst the educational impact remains notably weak (Aurino et al. 2018).
The case of school-feeding initiatives in the conflict-torn Northern 
and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka elucidates the importance of social 
protection in prolonged conflicts. Sri Lanka offers free and compulsory 
universal education from age five to 15, with a primary education net 
enrolment rate of 99.11 per cent in 2017 (UNESCO 2019). However, this 
ostensibly satisfactory national figure may distort the reality in the 
Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces, which endured three 
decades of protracted civil war from 1983 to 2009. These regions were 
the worst-affected in terms of fatalities, damage to infrastructure, and 
deficiencies in food and nutrition levels. An estimated 340,000 children 
aged below 18 were orphaned mainly due to the civil war in Sri Lanka 
(UNICEF 2012), who were vulnerable to the risks of non-schooling and child 
labour. Against this backdrop, two different school-feeding programmes 
were launched, including the government-led Samurdhi programme 
in 2002 and the United Nations World Food Programme (WFP) in 2003, 
to address issues of widespread malnutrition and food insecurity.
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This paper seeks to explore the effectiveness, challenges, and sustainability 
of school-feeding programmes in the conflict-affected provinces of 
Sri Lanka. By comparing and contrasting the two different school-
feeding interventions rolled out in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, it 
critically evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each programme. 
It then highlights the operational barriers to effective school feeding 
and draws implications for future programming. Given the peculiarity 
of post-conflict settings, a holistic approach should be adopted to 
maximise effectiveness and community participation, to ensure the 
sustainability of school-feeding programmes. In the following, Section 
3 provides a brief overview of school-feeding programmes in FCVAS, 
and more specifically in the context of the conflict-affected provinces 
of Sri Lanka. Using a comparative approach, Section 4 looks into two 
distinct school-feeding initiatives in the Northern and Eastern Provinces 
of Sri Lanka towards the end of the protracted crisis. The merits and 
shortcomings in programme design will be identified, followed by a 
discussion on the implementation barriers and their policy implications.
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3. Background
3.1 School feeding in FCVAS
School feeding in FCVAS primarily aims at addressing the issues of food 
insecurity and malnutrition exacerbated by protracted crises or social and 
climate shocks in FCVAS (FAO 2017). By providing a daily ration of school 
meals or snacks, parents are incentivised to send the displaced school-
aged children to attend classes at schools, whereby reducing the household 
burden of feeding the entire family (Meir 2005). In FCVAS, where access to 
schools is often restricted, the connotation of school feeding may differ 
considerably. Schools remaining open and sustained by school-feeding 
programmes, serve a protective function in terms of child safety, integrity, 
and normality during and after the conflicts (Carpenter et al. 2012).
In alignment with the policy objectives of Education in Emergencies (EiE), 
access to food and protection from deprivation are guaranteed by school-
feeding programmes (Sinclair 2001; Hatløy and Sommerfelt 2017). It is thus 
pertinent to highlight protection as the primary goal of school-feeding 
programmes in the context of FCVAS (Harvey and Holmes 2007). The two 
major modalities of school feeding include in-school feeding and take-
home rations (Bundy et al. 2009). In-school feeding refers to the provision of 
on-site meals which is conditional on the student’s attendance at school, 
whilst take-home rations extends the coverage to allow the households of 
school-aged children to receive food rations and thus improve household 
food security (WFP 2013). The past decade has witnessed an unprecedented 
proliferation in the scaling-up of school-feeding programmes in FCVAS 
(Bundy et al. 2018), including the ongoing acute emergencies in South 
Sudan, Syria, and Yemen, and the post-war Afghanistan and Iraq.
However, regardless of the crucial importance of social protection 
in FCVAS, the current scholarship on the impact of school-feeding 
programmes in FCVAS is limited (Drake et al. 2016; Kristjansson et al. 
2016; Tull and Plunkett 2018). While there is some evidence suggesting 
increased enrolment and retention of students in conflict-affected 
schools after participating in the school-feeding programmes (Aurino 
et al. 2018), the overall effectiveness of school-feeding programmes in 
FCVAS remains debatable. On the one hand, most evaluation reports, 
commissioned by the World Bank and the United Nations World Food 
Programme (WFP), tended to present a positive framing of school-feeding 
programmes. Bundy et al. (2009) observed a marked improvement in 
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the micronutrient levels and overall energy increase of school-aged 
children, as well as an improvement in their educational achievements.
On the other hand, scholars from independent research institutes, 
whilst affirming the findings of increased dietary consumption and 
school attendance, reached tentative conclusions of the effectiveness 
as to other nutrition- or education-related outcomes (Lawson 2012). 
For instance, thin impact was seen in cognitive abilities and academic 
achievements (Jomaa, McDonnel and Probart et al. 2011; Tranchant 
et al. 2018). Besides, although school-feeding programmes generally 
increase school enrolment and attendance rates, an exception is 
observed in contexts with high pre-existing school enrolment rates 
(Snilstveit et al. 2016), as observed in Uganda’s internally displaced 
persons’ camps (Adelman et al. 2008), as well as in Sri Lanka (He 2010).
Therefore, it is necessary to refrain from generalising the impact of school-
feeding programmes identified in the literature. The heterogeneity in 
the design, implementation, and evaluation of each school-feeding 
programme has led to variance in outcomes (Masset and Gelli 2013), 
whereas the considerable differences in the operating environment 
preclude any universal model for school-feeding interventions to 
be applied across different countries (Tull and Plunkett 2018).
3.2 School feeding in Sri Lanka’s Northern and 
Eastern Provinces
In the conflict-ridden Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka, the 
civil war between the majority Sinhalese Government of Sri Lanka and 
the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) brought severe casualties 
and massive devastation of physical infrastructure including schools 
and transportation systems, as well as upheaval of livelihoods. Food 
insecurity and malnutrition rates were highest in the country, following 
the protracted conflict and recurrent natural disasters (WFP 2017). A 
majority of school-aged children (82 per cent) in the affected provinces 
reportedly had experienced war-related events (Catani et al. 2008). 
Such traumatic exposure to violence gave rise to school absenteeism 
and adversely impaired the performance and mental wellbeing of school 
children (Siriwardhana et al. 2013). Recurrent fighting prevented schools 
from functioning normally and disrupted children’s continuity in education, 
leading to a drastic drop in school attendance rate (Hart 2002).
The legacies of the long-standing conflict cast a dark shadow over 
the development of the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka. In 
the present day, these provinces remain one of the most educationally 
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disadvantaged regions, with uneven educational resources, poor 
infrastructure, and stark disparities in income and poverty level 
(Fernando and Moonesinghe 2012; Chandrakumara 2015). Despite 
the high primary school enrolment rate of 92 per cent recorded in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces, it does not necessarily reflect school-
aged children’s actual attendance and participation (USDL 2004). 
Children from poor Tamil and Muslim households have much lower school 
participation rates compared to their counterparts in other provinces, 
particularly at the secondary level (Arunatilake 2006). The performance 
of students in Tamil and Muslim schools was reportedly worse off than 
those in Sinhala schools, with stagnation or decline during 2007 to 
2009 (i.e. the final stage of the war) (Little, Indika and Rolleston 2011).
The drop-out rate of 15.8 per cent in the Northern and Eastern Provinces 
is also remarkably high compared to the national average of 3.9 per cent, 
with ubiquity of irregular attendance among displaced children (De Silva 
2003). On the other hand, the alarmingly high undernutrition rates in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces necessitate immediate interventions 
(Vhurumuku et al. 2012). According to the Demographic and Health Survey 
conducted in 2016 (Department of Census and Statistics, Sri Lanka 2017), 
the average malnutrition rates in the Northern and Eastern Provinces 
were recorded at 20 per cent for stunting and 15 per cent for wasting, 
exceeding the national average figures and World Health Organisation’s 
emergency threshold (WFP 2018a), whereas one quarter of children in 
the Northern Province suffered from anaemia (World Bank 2014).
Two school-feeding programmes emerged towards the end of the 
conflict, including (1) the standard school-feeding programme run 
by the WFP and (2) the Samurdhi welfare programme. These two 
programmes share similar goals, but differ in the delivery mechanisms 
and targeting strategies, which will be discussed in detail in Section 4.
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4. Analysis of school-feeding 
programmes in Sri Lanka
4.1 The WFP programme
In 2003, the WFP school meals programme was piloted in partnership 
with the Ministry of Education, targeting at school-aged children most 
affected by the displacement, food insecurity, and chronic poverty in 
the Northern and Eastern Provinces (World Bank 2015). Schools in areas 
prone to food insecurity were targeted, primarily based on the WFP’s 
own vulnerability and needs assessments, as well as in consultation with 
local government authorities and other international non-governmental 
organisations. Blanket distribution was adopted in each targeted school, 
where all students from grade one to grade nine were provided with in-
kind assistance in the form of daily nutritious mid-morning meals of rice, 
vegetables, and lentil porridge or a corn-soya blend (WFP 2003).
With the pre-determined set of food items procured by the WFP and 
distributed by the Ministry of National Building and Development, a group 
of parents, teachers, and local volunteers would then cook and serve on-
site meals in each programme school (He 2010). With a view to rebuilding a 
healthy school environment, the WFP facilitated the construction of school 
kitchens and provided an integral package of nutritional education, de-
worming services, and micronutrient supplementation in collaboration with 
other actors (WFP 2018a). The pilot programme reached 33,000 students 
in four districts in the Northern and Eastern Provinces in 2003. Since the 
programme was well received by students and teachers, it was then 
scaled up in 2005 to cover 400,000 students in 15 provinces including those 
affected by the 2004 Asian Tsunami (WFP 2006). To date, approximately 
158,000 students in 974 schools across five districts of Northern Province 
in Sri Lanka continue to receive daily school meals (WFP 2018b).
4.2 The Samurdhi welfare programme
The Samurdhi programme refers to the national poverty alleviation 
scheme, where the cash-based school meals programme falls under 
the relief component of the Samurdhi programme targeted at rural 
schools with high malnutrition rates in the Northern and Eastern Provinces 
(Tilakaratna and Jayawardana 2015). A per-student subsidy of 22.5 LKR 
(US$0.13) per meal was transferred to Samurdhi recipients in the community, 
who were obliged to cook and provide mid-morning in-school meals to 
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students (Tilakaratna and Sooriyamudali 2017). The Samurdhi recipients, 
most of whom were parents of students participating in the school meals 
programme, then formed Health Promotion Committees with teachers, 
parents, and other community members to manage the preparation and 
distribution of meals. The committee would then follow the recipes devised 
by a team of nutritionists to cook the prescribed nutritious meals at home or 
the school kitchen, depending on the availability of food commodities in the 
local market (World Bank 2014).
Contrary to the blanket coverage used in the WFP programme, the 
Samurdhi programme was targeted at children in different grades in 
different schools (He 2010). School principals were responsible for selecting 
the vulnerable students in their respective schools (World Bank 2014), 
where officials from the Ministry of Education would determine whether or 
not the programme would be scaled up. As well as this, the entire school 
would be entitled to meals if it was located in a highly vulnerable area 
identified by the Ministry of Health or if it was a small school with less than 
100 students. The community-based Samurdhi welfare programme initially 
covered only grade one students in less than 100 schools, which was then 
expanded to serve students across different grades (World Bank 2014).
4.3 Juxtaposition of the two programmes
The introduction of school-feeding programmes in north-eastern Sri Lanka 
yielded some success, in particular the steady increase in food intake and 
school attendance rate (WFP 2018a). It also fostered the return of people 
temporarily displaced by conflicts by restoring the education system 
(Harvey et al. 2010) and provided safe spaces to protect school-aged children 
against threats of recruitment into child labour (Hatløy and Sommerfelt 2017). 
However, the issue of skipping breakfasts at home worsened to some extent, 
where parents perceived that the nutrient intake from the mid-morning 
meals served at school would suffice for their children (Townsend et al. 2015). 
The two programmes are similar at their core, both aiming dually at 
improving nutritional outcomes and enhancing school participation. 
Moreover, the delivery of food to students was conditional on their school 
enrolment and attendance in both programmes. The other similarity lies in 
beneficiary targeting, wherein they were both targeted programmes based 
on the degree of vulnerability of students in poor and conflict-affected areas 
with a high level of food insecurity and nutritional deficits. Geographical and 
vulnerability-based targeting used by both programmes helped to minimise 
both inclusion errors and exclusion errors (Bundy et al. 2009). Nonetheless, there 
are significant differences between the two programmes in terms of the 
transfer modality and delivery mechanisms.
Ideas from IDS: Graduate Papers from 2018/19
Restoring Normality in Chaos: School Feeding in Conflict-Affected Sri Lanka
© 2020 Beryl Lo © Institute of Development Studies
59ids.ac.uk
For the WFP programme, it is a replication of the standard in-kind school-
feeding programme being implemented worldwide, which has proven to 
be systematic and easy to be scaled up in emergencies (Bundy et al. 2009). 
The programme serves as a robust social safety net, providing school-aged 
children with a stable supply of nutritious meals and fostering high rates of 
retention (99 per cent) for both boys and girls (WFP 2018b). However, it adopts 
a top-down approach in the distribution of food (He 2010), where pre-
determined food commodities procured centrally by the WFP are delivered 
to schools. To a large extent, the selection and sourcing of the standard food 
commodities is a non-transparent process which may not necessarily cater 
to the diverse needs arising in different schools. This can be attributable to 
the WFP-driven needs assessments which preclude the active involvement 
of key stakeholders including teachers. Without adequate sensitisation 
for the teachers or parents towards the importance of nutrient intake and 
education, they were merely seen as administrators distributing the meals 
to students and keeping records, instead of key partners who could actively 
get involved in the planning process or shape the operations (Iddrisu 2018).
Furthermore, such in-kind assistance inevitably is subject to delays in 
food delivery, given the reliance on the relatively weak logistics network 
and poor infrastructure in the conflict-torn provinces. Monitoring data 
from the WFP revealed that 26 per cent of schools reportedly either did 
not receive the planned amount of food items nor punctual delivery 
due to difficulties in transportation (He 2010). The amount of time 
spent on regional or international procurement of food commodities 
and the shipping cost for in-kind assistance may be double or triple 
that associated with cash transfers (Hoddinott et al. 2013).
To some extent, it is cogent that the WFP did not mainstream cash-based 
transfers into its school-feeding programme, given the volatile political 
landscape and security concerns amidst the fighting at the inception of 
the programme, as well as the subsequent deterioration of the security 
situation in July 2006 (Sandström and Tchatchua 2010). Ten years after the 
end of the war, the situation in northeast Sri Lanka has altered considerably, 
with a more stable security situation and well-functioning food markets. 
However, cash-based transfers have yet to be incorporated in the WFP’s 
school-feeding programme, notwithstanding its cost-effectiveness 
and the positive impact on food security (Bailey and Pongracz 2015). 
Moreover, the sustainability of the programme is questionable, given the 
dependence on external funding subject to changes in the WFP’s operating 
strategies. If the WFP decides to retreat from the project area, the schools 
would be left without any means to provide food for the students.
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On the other hand, the cash-based Samurdhi programme is a community-
based school-feeding programme which facilitated greater local ownership 
and nurtured grass-roots capacity to be agents of change (Andrews 
et al. 2011). It afforded a higher flexibility in addressing specific dietary 
needs, where community members could tailor the menu to students’ 
preferences by deciding the type and amount of food commodities to 
buy. When community members purchased food commodities in the 
local market, they were supporting the production of local farm produce 
grown by smallholder farmers and indirectly stimulating local agricultural 
production. Concurrently, the timely delivery of meals sourced from local 
production could be guaranteed due to a lower dependence on cross-
province logistics infrastructure. The community-driven Health Promotion 
Committees not only better engaged stakeholders in the decision-
making process, but also enhanced accountability and transparency 
towards the procurement and management of food commodities (Tull 
and Plunkett 2018). Furthermore, the Samurdhi programme provided 
a higher incentive for community members to proactively recruit and 
retain students for the sake of getting more revenue (He 2010).
The Samurdhi programme also demonstrated the government’s commitment 
to include conflict-affected people in national social protection services 
and reconcile the gulf between the marginalised Northern and Eastern 
Provinces and the rest of Sri Lanka. Even with a comparatively smaller scale 
than that of the WFP programme, the Samurdhi programme was widely 
acclaimed by communities in the Northern and Eastern Provinces since it 
granted them access to central government’s funding support and other 
services (CEPA 2006). In addition, the cost of cash-based transfers was 
relatively lower than in-kind assistance, with savings in food delivery costs 
and landside transport, storage, and handling costs (Campbell 2006).
Nevertheless, the discretionary identification of beneficiaries without a 
clear set of guidelines on selection criteria could be a potential problem in 
causing mistakes in targeting (Godamunne 2015). Inclusion errors arose 
where students who may not have needed food assistance received it, 
whilst excluding those who were eligible or in dire need of assistance (ILO 
2008). In addition, the local sourcing of food hinged on the availability of the 
local production of crops, but vegetables and fruits with high nutritional 
quality were not necessarily available in the local market (Townsend et al. 2015). 
In rural Sri Lanka, farmers tended to cultivate profitable crops such as tea or 
even cannabis without paying heed to the nutrition content of crops. In this 
regard, local community actors faced difficulties in acquiring the preferred 
food commodities, which adversely affected the quality of school meals 
served to the students (Andrews et al. 2011).
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4.4 Barriers to effective school feeding in Sri Lanka
In addition to the programme design, the effectiveness of school-feeding 
programmes was largely constrained by the contextual factors affecting 
their implementation, including the supply- side and demand-side barriers. 
Justino’s framework of destruction, displacement, and distributional effects 
(2014: 5) illustrates the obstacles to education in FCVAS, which is equally 
applicable to school-feeding programmes. In the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces of Sri Lanka, there were immense difficulties in maintaining 
school attendance and sufficient nutrition intake amidst the destruction 
of infrastructure and temporary displacement. These raise security and 
protection concerns to keep school-feeding programmes operational.
4.4.1 Supply-side barriers
First and foremost, the prolonged armed conflicts caused extensive 
destruction of school premises and community infrastructure in the 
Northern and Eastern Provinces. At the inception of school-feeding 
programmes in 2003, an official ceasefire had not been reached. The 
appropriation of school premises by armed forces forcibly evicted students 
and teaching staff (Hart 2002), bringing school meals programmes to 
a halt or eventually shutting down schools in the worst case. Schools 
located in the immediate vicinity of fighting or less accessible areas were 
excluded from both school-feeding programmes due to safety concerns 
and operational constraints. Even for those schools which remained open 
during the conflicts, overcrowding in classrooms was common which was 
not conducive to learning (Vermeersch and Kremer 2005; World Bank 2014).
Despite the gradual expansion of coverage in 2005, the resumption of 
brutal fighting between the LTTE and the government forces in 2006 
led to the closure of the A9 Highway, one of the main arterial roads 
connecting the north with the rest of Sri Lanka (Human Rights Watch 
2007). This severely hindered the delivery of food and essential supplies 
to schools in Jaffna District, the capital city of the Northern Province. 
As of September 2007, approximately 261 schools were damaged or 
destroyed during the conflicts, and where students could, they merely 
attended 80 out of 210 school days in the academic year (UNICEF 2014).
The war-inflicted devastation also posed an obstacle to the setting 
up of the school-feeding infrastructure. School meals programmes 
required basic hardware including kitchens with a clean water supply, 
fuel, stoves, storage rooms, and dining areas (Meir 2005). However, 
the inadequate supply of drinking water and sanitation facilities in 
damaged schools proved to be challenging for the preparation of 
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school meals (NIE and UNICEF 2003). Further, as an explicit war tactic, 
the warring parties used famine as a weapon of war by blocking food 
trucks operated by humanitarian actors and depriving people’s access 
to food assistance (Moussa 2002). In Trincomalee District of the Eastern 
Province, the WFP’s food delivery was reportedly suspended for three 
weeks due to the government’s blockage of humanitarian aid.
Added to the above, the conflict-inflicted forced displacement of 
civilians not only weakened the ability of schools to provide education, 
but also adversely affected the delivery of school meals. Teachers 
play a vital part in implementing school-feeding programmes (Iddrisu 
2018), who have rapport with parents and the necessary nutritional and 
educational information on the students. However, shortfalls of teaching 
staff in the LTTE-controlled areas were frequently reported, due to 
insufficient government funding and safety concerns (Hart 2002). During 
armed conflicts, the supply of teaching staff dropped drastically, where 
teachers had fled the schools located in conflict-affected areas and 
any recruitment of new teachers was challenging (Davies and Naylor 
2012). This would put considerable strain on schools in the Northern and 
Eastern Provinces, given their long-standing deficiencies in funding and 
qualified teachers (Levi 2019). Similarly, motivational constraints were also 
reported in the field where teachers felt overburdened with additional 
responsibilities to deliver school meals (Galaa and Saaka 2011). Hence, the 
scarcity of teachers from schools to keep proper records and facilitate 
the delivery posed immense challenges for the delivery of school meals.
4.4.2 Demand-side barriers
Safety and security concerns may deter students from attending school 
despite the incentive afforded by the school-meal programmes. Relative 
security is the pre-requisite to school attendance. However, schools had 
been frequently targeted in violent attacks during conflicts (UNESCO 2011), 
according to various reports on children and armed conflict by the United 
Nations Secretary-General (UNSC 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015). In particular, 
the Vaharai bombing in 2006 was a notorious incident where the LTTE 
and government forces exchanged fire nearby the Kathiravelli School 
where at least 2,000 internally displaced civilians were taking refuge, 
killing 45 civilians and injuring 300 others (Human Rights Watch 2007).
Furthermore, the duration and complexity of armed conflicts obstructed 
access to schools and the mobility of students and teachers. In Jaffna 
District, with heavy military build-up, students were reportedly subject 
to harassment at military checkpoints, raising parents’ concerns about 
their safety. In Vanni Region of the Northern Province and some remote 
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villages of the Eastern Province, due to the ruptured public transportation 
network caused by fighting, students were forced to trek through jungles 
for several hours per day in order to attend schools (Hart 2002). This 
was especially dangerous for the students during the monsoon season 
where they might have encountered flooding and landslides during 
their journey to school. Parents were also perturbed about the forced 
recruitment of their children by the LTTE during the journey or at school, as 
evidenced in the incident where a local school in Vanni Region was burnt 
down by parents in attempt to curb any potential recruitment activities 
(Bush and Saltarelli 2000). On a different note, the psychological trauma 
induced by the exposure to armed conflicts and forced displacement 
would also dissuade school-aged children from attending schools 
and affect their educational achievements (Catani et al. 2008).
In addition, armed conflicts exacerbated chronic poverty and exclusions 
based on ethnicity, religion, and gender, which in turn reinforced exclusion 
from accessing education. Communities in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces, especially the historically marginalised Tamils and Muslims, 
sustained severe economic losses and had limited access to basic social 
services from the lengthy civil war and the corresponding isolation from 
the rest of Sri Lanka in terms of socioeconomic development. Even if free 
food was provided by the school-feeding programmes, poor households 
struggled with the schooling costs including fees for school furniture 
and facilities (Jayaweera and Gunawardane 2007). In this regard, the 
opportunity cost of attending school as compared to engaging in child 
labour activities could hardly be offset by the school-feeding programmes 
(Aurino et al. 2018). Consequently, school-aged children were removed 
from schools to participate in income-generating activities for their 
households (UNICEF 2014). On the other hand, the gendered impact of 
wars was also observed in the case of the Sri Lankan civil war, culminating 
in the immense difficulty of keeping girls in schools. In particular, Tamil 
girls from female-headed households in the Northern and Eastern 
Provinces could seldom attend school since they were obliged to assume 
the domestic responsibilities of their working mothers (Hart 2002).
4.5 Implications
Community support and participation have proven to be pivotal to 
effective and sustainable school-feeding programmes in emergencies 
or post-conflict settings (Bundy et al. 2011), as manifested in South 
Sudan (UNICEF SSEC 2018) and Kenya (Tull and Plunkett 2018).
In the case of Sri Lanka, the high degree of social acceptance towards 
the Samurdhi programme illustrated that strong partnerships among 
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parents, schools, and the wider communities were indispensable to the 
programme’s success. These local actors were empowered to be agents 
facilitating social protection (Haile and Ali 2019), where they gained the 
ability to articulate students’ needs, to organise the relevant response, 
and to contribute to the community. This, in turn, alleviated the burden of 
teaching staff having to take on administrative tasks, and allowed them 
to focus their energy on teaching. Such bottom-up approaches can 
not only enhance the programme outcomes of school feeding, but also 
recognise the agency of community members as active collaborators 
in social protection instead of mere recipients of humanitarian aid.
The need for holistic programming should also be highlighted, in 
order to maximise the outcomes of child-related social protection. 
Currently, education and food security are treated as two separate and 
standalone interventions. The categorical separation of activities under 
the humanitarian cluster approach neglects the interconnectedness 
of programme objectives (Dickinson 2016), resulting in a lack of 
coherence and coordination among school-feeding programmes, 
and health and education programmes. Therefore, humanitarian and 
development actors with different mandates should further strengthen 
their collaboration in fostering the effectiveness and sustainability 
of EiE interventions, in order to prepare for the transition into a more 
child-centred and structured schooling (Hatløy and Sommerfelt 2017). 
School meals should be connected to other education- or protection-
related interventions to address the needs arising from children’s 
experience living through displacement and conflicts (Meir 2005).
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5. Conclusion
School feeding is widely used as a social protection tool in response 
to emergencies, given its effectiveness, affordability, and feasibility. 
The peculiar circumstances in FCVAS present both opportunities 
and challenges to the effectiveness of school-feeding programmes. 
On one hand, the devastating effects of armed conflicts not only 
disrupt livelihoods and food production, but also cause displacement 
of communities and constrain school-aged children’s safe access 
to education. On the other hand, the reconfiguration of dynamics 
allows school-feeding programmes to restore normality to society 
and bring the notion of child protection to the forefront during 
emergencies or in the post-conflict reconstruction phase.
The Sri Lankan experience has amply illustrated the importance of 
effective school feeding in FCVAS. While there are promising results 
in improving both nutritional and educational outcomes in the two 
programmes, the key differences in programme design and transfer 
modality have very different implications to the sustainability and 
local ownership of the programme. Community participation and 
cash-based transfers are especially vital issues to be underscored 
in future programming for school-feeding programmes.
Nevertheless, given the considerable differences in the duration, 
character, and intensity of conflicts in FCVAS, school-feeding 
programmes cannot be replicated without adjustment and adaption 
to local needs. It should also be acknowledged that school feeding 
cannot work as a standalone panacea for addressing multifaceted 
issues arising from protracted crises. In order to restore the normality of 
children’s lives affected by armed conflicts, a holistic and sustainable 
plan of action for school-feeding programmes should be envisioned, 
incorporating food security, nutrition, health, and education.
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1. Introduction
Each year, the Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee and State 
Council of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) publish what is known as 
the ‘No. 1 Document’, outlining the policy agenda for the year. In 2004, 
for the first time since 1980, the CCP gave agriculture the highest priority, 
putting farmers’ fiscal burden at the forefront (Lü and Wiemer 2005: 320). 
Initially started in 2000, the main objective of the Circular on Implementing 
Pilot Project of Rural Taxation Reform (Tao and Qin 2007: 20) was to 
abolish the agriculture tax over the course of a five-year period (Shi and 
Ye 2018: 522). The agriculture tax was previously calculated ‘according 
to land area and amount of grain production per villager’ (Kennedy 
2007: 55). At the time, rural taxation in China was highly regressive,1 
putting the burden of the local fiscal budget almost entirely on already 
poor farmers (Tao and Qin 2007: 26; Imai, Wang and Kang 2010: 407).
The objective with the abolishing of the national agriculture tax was 
on one hand to eliminate this burden of the Chinese farmer, and on 
the other to ‘streamline local revenue collection and establish a more 
transparent and efficient provision of services’ (Kennedy 2007: 43). This 
went hand-in-hand with the central government’s goals to reduce 
the personnel and administrative costs of overstaffed township 
governments2 (Kennedy 2007: 57), hoping the reform ultimately would 
leave more resources to address the deep-rooted regional inequalities 
between the richest coastal provinces and poorer inland ones.3
However, after more than a decade since the agriculture tax was abolished, 
regional differences in China continue to cause income inequality. Even 
though China’s decrease in poverty between 1980 and 2013 was the 
‘most rapid reduction in history’ (Jain-Chandra et al. 2018: 4), regional 
inequality continues to be amongst the highest in Asia and in the world 
(Jain-Chandra et al. 2018: 6). This appears to prove that the abolishing 
of the agriculture tax inherently failed at reducing the peasants’ burden 
in China and to address the regional divide. This paper, however, argues 
1 During the 1990s, the poorest group of farmers with an annual income of less than RMB800 
(approximately £80) experienced a tax rate of as much as 30 per cent, whereas higher income 
groups (RMB4,000 and up) only experienced a tax rate of around 10 per cent (Tao and Liu 2005).
2 China’s administrative units are based on a three-tier system. The first tier divides the country into 
provinces, directly under the central government, the second tier divides the provinces into counties 
and cities, and the third tier divides them into townships and towns/villages (State Council of the 
People’s Republic of China 2014).
3 In 1978, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping implemented the ‘reform and opening up’ policy, 
triggering rapid economic growth in China. However, the investments favoured coastal cities such 
as Shanghai, Nanjing, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou, leaving many of the rural areas much more 
impoverished than their coastal counterparts (Zheng 2018).
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that even though regional inequalities continue to exist, the agriculture 
tax reforms between 2000 and 2005 did succeed at decreasing the 
peasant burden, but did not necessarily do so in favour of township 
governments. This can give valuable learning lessons for how to deal 
with the problems going forward as the government is still struggling 
to close the gap between China’s richest and poorest provinces.
This paper is organised as follows: first, the paper will outline the fiscal 
policy on a regional level prior to 2000, then it will briefly analyse the 
main goals of the agriculture tax reform. The paper will then look at 
the aftermath of the reform and show whether or not the reform can 
be considered a success or not. Lastly, the paper will outline three key 
elements that need to be carried forward for future tax reforms.
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2. Failing the countryside
Today, the PRC’s fiscal expenditures are one of the most decentralised in 
the world (ADB 2014: 1), but the country has made great strides in recent 
years to make the tax code more centralised, transparent, and efficient 
(Gurría 2018). This becomes especially clear when comparing the tax 
system to the mid-1990s and early 2000s when local governments had 
heavy expenditure responsibilities in terms of public services, education, 
and health care (World Bank 2002: 35). This was a result of an industry-
oriented and urban-biased development policy implemented by the 
central government in Beijing in order to ‘extract huge resources from the 
countryside’ (Ye 2015: 322). Under these conditions, ‘central government 
was able to control and collect more revenue from provinces, but local 
government at township level had to rely more on self-raised funds to 
meet local expenditures and provide services’ (Kennedy 2007: 48).
A problem with this urban-biased system was that the central government 
set the same tax rate for every province regardless of how quickly the 
internal industry grew. This means that provinces and townships could 
retain very different amounts of money that would then be reinvested into 
internal service provisions such as health care and education. In order 
to make up for their deficit, rural township governments started to rely 
more and more on informal fees imposed on farmers (Tao and Qin 2007: 
21). What ensued was a vicious cycle where ‘local governments had to 
recruit more staff to ensure tax collection and to manage the resistance 
from farmers’ (ibid.: 20), leaving township governments overstaffed and 
highly inefficient. Tao and Qin (2007) rightfully argue that ‘China’s rural 
direct taxation in the 1990s and the early 2000s failed both in terms of 
income equity and economic efficiency’ (ibid.: 20), making the period 
‘between 1994 and 2002… the worst time for peasants’ (Ye 2015: 322).
Another way the inefficiency of the early 2000s tax system becomes 
clear is the amount of overlapping expenditures (World Bank 2002: 39; 
Kennedy 2007: 47). Known as the tiaokuai maodun (条块矛盾) or ‘town 
and country management contradictions’, many public services such 
as education funds were managed both by the township as well as the 
county, leaving a large problem of accountability. For example, within 
education the county ‘manages the salary and hiring of village elementary 
school teachers, while the township is responsible for the maintenance 
of elementary schools and the standards of living subsidies for the 
teachers’ (Kennedy 2007: 47). The problem with such a system was that 
the subsidies vary greatly depending on how wealthy a township was, 
creating different standards of education depending on the region.
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Furthermore, if a township relies almost entirely on agriculture, all the 
financing would come from taxing farmers that are already struggling to 
survive. This means that under the old tax system, ‘the relatively immobile 
peasants in China bore much heavier fiscal burdens than the capital 
owners’ (Ye 2015: 521). On top of this, ‘local governments and officials [turned] 
to predatory behavior’ (Day and Schneider 2018: 1228), in order to make up 
for the financial shortcomings local departments experienced. Data from 
that time show the amount of ‘rural fees and charges were almost twice as 
large as that of agriculture taxes’ (Imai et al. 2010: 401). These fees were 
often arbitrarily imposed based on local government financial needs and 
‘more numerous than “hairs on an ox” ’ (ibid.: 401). China’s rural farmers 
became increasingly frustrated with this system and ‘rural protest concerning 
taxation in particular soared during this period’ (Day and Schneider 2018: 
1227), so much so that the protests ‘started to threaten social stability and 
even endanger the state’s political legitimacy’ (Tao and Qin 2007: 20). Hence, 
the unrests were one of the main incentives for the central government to 
implement rural tax reforms.
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3. A pro-people approach
In 2000, the first talks emerged about decreasing and potentially abolishing 
the agriculture tax for China’s farmers. This was in order to start shifting 
the responsibility of public services to the central government, relieving 
the pressure on local governments for raising funds. By 2002, the reform 
was in full force, which can mainly be attributed to China’s leader Hu 
Jintao who at the time spearheaded the concept of the ‘Harmonious 
Society’ (hexie shehui – 和谐社会) (Chan 2010: 821). This inclusive vision was 
introduced in order to directly deal with ‘the social disparities and conflicts 
that were induced by rapid economic development in China’ (ibid.: 821).
President Hu’s main theme with the concept was to introduce various ‘pro-
people’ policies (Lü and Wiemer 2005: 321) including, but not limited to ‘rural 
development, regional development, employment, education, medicine, 
and public health, taxation, and fiscal policies’(Chan 2010: 821). Seeing 
that, by 2003, ‘the revenue share of the agriculture tax in China’s total fiscal 
budget remained small [with] just 1.7 per cent’ (Lü and Wiemer 2005: 320), 
it seemed like an easy tax reform to initiate that would also solve an array 
of problems as mentioned above. The central government was eager to 
regain control of the local budget at this point and paired the reform with 
centrally coordinated revenue sharing, which would alleviate the pressure 
on local revenue collection. This should directly improve the lives of the rural 
population and give rise to a ‘new countryside’ as the government coined it.
The implementation worked as follows: during the first phase of the 
reform, ‘local governments were gradually forbidden from collecting any 
agricultural fees because such fees [were] almost entirely outside the 
central government’s control prior to the… reform’ (Shi and Ye 2018: 522). 
In order to compensate for the local revenue shortfalls, in 2002 and 
2003, the central government ‘transferred RMB17.9bn and RMB30.5bn 
respectively’ (Tao and Qin 2007: 21) to agriculture-based regions. By 2004, 
the reform entered into the second phase in which it was made clear that 
the ultimate goal was to terminate agriculture taxation within five years. 
Reforms moved very quickly and by 2005, the tax was already abolished 
in 28 provinces, with heavy reduction in the remaining three provinces. 
By the end of 2005, all provinces officially abolished the agriculture tax, 
which had endured for more than 2,600 years of history (Shi and Ye 2018: 
522). Similarly, compensation continued to increase throughout 2006 in 
order to help rural provinces cope with the reform measures, and township 
governments were heavily downsized in order to cut expenditures.
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4. Success or failure?
Can the rural tax reform be considered a success? On one hand, it is 
now clear that the compensation from upper-level governments to local 
governments ‘could not sufficiently compensate for Chinese county 
governments’ budgetary revenue reduction’ (Shi and Ye 2018: 520). This 
was because before the tax reform, the agriculture tax contributed 
around ‘30 per cent of county revenues’ (Kennedy 2007: 56) in rural areas. 
As an immediate response, local governments found various ways to 
cope with the shortfalls. Two of the most common ways were not to 
transmit the news of the reform to villagers in order to continue as before 
and to create new informal fees with new names (Imai 2010: 402).
This especially affected education, because part of moving public 
service responsibilities to higher government meant that suddenly 
township governments were no longer in charge of providing teachers 
with living subsidies. This further eroded teacher salaries, which were 
already low compared to other professionals (Kennedy 2007: 50). This is 
crucial, because education is an important driver of income inequality 
between China’s urban and rural regions (Jain-Chandra et al. 2018: 8). The 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) found that ‘the share of total income 
inequality accounted for by the rural-urban gap stood at 44 per cent 
in 1995 and increased further in 2007, to then decline to 34 per cent in 
2013’ (Jain-Chandra et al. 2018: 9). In short, income inequality triggered 
through the urban–rural gap did not immediately decrease following 
tax reform; however, the shortfalls of local budget can be seen as an 
immediate aftershock rather than a sign of long-term failure. Today, the 
differences in income inequality accounted for by differences in education 
of the household head declined from 32 per cent in 2007 to 26 per cent 
in 2013, showing moderate success (Jain-Chandra et al. 2018: 9).
As already mentioned, another goal of the abolishing of the tax 
reform was to make township governments more efficient and to fight 
against the perpetual trend of overstaffing. One way to deal with the 
problem was to initiate another policy reform in conjunction with the tax 
reform. The reform was aimed at town merging (Shi and Ye 2018: 523), 
which on one hand helped absorb government employees into other 
government branches and on the other hand to reduce administrative 
units (Kennedy 2007: 44). This reduced administrative costs significantly 
and ‘streamlined local revenue collection’ (Kennedy 2007: 43). Even 
though local governments were suddenly stripped of a major income 
source with the reform, the burden of the peasants fell significantly.
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Tao and Qin (2007) found that between 2000 and 2004 alone, there 
was a 70 per cent decrease in tax burden for the Chinese farmer, so 
the reform did lead to an overall reduction of the rural tax burden. 
This also helped the central government re-establish its political 
legitimacy following growing rural unrest. The problem before lay in 
the lagging ‘governance capacity’ (Bernstein and Lü 2008: 94), which 
was a result of the coercive methods used by local governments to 
extract resources from farmers. This directly ‘undermined the quality of 
governance’ (Moore 2008: 30) and the ‘elimination of the agriculture 
tax marks a fundamental reorientation of relations between state 
and peasants’ (Lü and Wiemer 2005: 322). Not only did the central 
government regain control of public service responsibilities, through 
the reform it was also able to regain control of township governments’ 
fiscal policies. In other words, the tax reforms abolishing the agriculture 
tax were not so much about the actual tax as about the relationship 
between the central state and its rural citizens, which previously had 
been obstructed by inefficient and corrupt local governments.
The understanding that the tax system at that time was too regressive 
started an important change of mentality in central government which 
affected many of the tax reforms that followed suit. In recent years, the 
central government of China has come to understand that ‘adjustments 
in fiscal policy promise to be an important instrument in addressing 
inequality developments’ (Jain-Chandra et al. 2018: 16). Even though the 
change has been modest, China has experienced a decline in income 
inequality since 2008, which definitely cannot all be attributed to the 
tax reforms in the early 2000s, but acknowledging the importance of 
farmers’ livelihoods symbolised an important step in the right direction.
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5. The importance of outcomes 
over inputs
Going forward in addressing regional inequalities, there are lessons to 
be learned from the abolishing of the agriculture tax. There are three 
overall elements which ensure the success of fiscal policies in China. Firstly, 
the fiscal policy has to be re-centralised in order to reform an overly 
complex system with too many government levels involved. It is essential 
to decrease the size of township governments in order to make them 
more efficient and to establish a direct relationship between citizens 
and top-level government. Secondly, public service provisions and their 
access should not solely be the responsibility of townships, because 
government income varies so greatly in China based on the region. Even 
though education was addressed during the early 2000s, the current 
problem lies with access to health care. The 2018 study by the IMF found 
that ‘the disparity in the number of hospital beds per 1,000 people has 
increased significantly between 2004 and 2014’ (Jain-Chandra et al. 
2018: 19). Initial response by the government is to increase funds to poorer 
regions, but oversight has to be ensured in order to guarantee outcomes.
This also relates to the third point, which is to focus on outcomes rather 
than just inputs. Transferring funds to rural regions will not necessarily 
decrease income inequality. For example, the abolishing of the 
agriculture tax has had positive effects on decreasing the peasant 
burden; however, income inequality has only marginally decreased since 
its peak in 2013 when it was among the most unequal countries in the 
world (Jain-Chandra et al. 2018: 20). By being more output-oriented, 
the government can increase the progressivity of the contribution 
every province has to make and this also will decrease the pressure on 
rural governments to catch up with flourishing coastal provinces.
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6. Conclusion
Overall, this paper has shown that the abolishing of the agriculture tax 
between 2000 and 2005 was an important testing ground for the CCP in 
order to regain control of the local budget. This was crucial because the 
Chinese economic boom which started in the late 1970s created enormous 
regional inequalities. On top of this, industry- and urban-biased reforms 
left rural governments stripped for money, yet they were still responsible for 
providing social services such as health care and education. Before the 
reform, the tax system was highly regressive, putting the financial burden 
on the Chinese farmer in terms of contributions that had to be made to the 
government. Not being able to make ends meet, rural township governments 
in China started to use coercive methods to extract money from farmers, 
triggering widespread rural unrest in China. The tax reforms introducing 
the abolishing of the agriculture tax successfully addressed this peasant 
burden and managed to re-establish a positive relationship between the 
state and the citizen. Even though regional inequalities continue up to the 
present day, the reform can be considered a success because it taught 
the central government important lessons for future fiscal reforms. Firstly, 
township governments have to be efficient and small in order to simplify an 
overly complex system. Secondly, township governments cannot solely be 
responsible for public service provisions, and lastly, the tax system has to be 
more progressive in order to decrease the pressure on rural governments.
These are three important elements of success learned from the reform of the 
agriculture tax. As mentioned earlier, the overall contribution of the agriculture 
tax to the total budget was only 1.7 per cent (Lü and Wiemer 2005: 320) so 
it was the ideal testing ground for the central government to implement 
changes. Hence, the abolishing of the agriculture tax can be considered a 
success even if it did not solve the continued regional inequalities. What is 
most important is that the reforms of the early 2000s created an important 
understanding which can now be applied going forward.
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1. Introduction
Since there have been systems of government, there have been 
popular mobilisations around food issues. Whether in the form of food 
riots or long-term movements of protest, food has always represented 
a fundamental element of the social contract (Patel and McMichael 
2009). It is what the Tunisian scholar, Larbi Sadiki, calls the ‘democracy 
of bread’ (cited in Bohstedt 2014: 17) and it is the idea that, at the very 
least, national governments are expected to provision those who consent 
to their rule, with the apparatus to access food within their means.
The basic tenet remains as it has always been. Reports of English 
rioters in the eighteenth century declaring that they would ‘rather be 
hanged than starved’ (Bohstedt 2014: 6) resonate with declarations 
from protesters in modern Haiti that if ‘[we are] not killed by bullets, 
we’ll die of hunger’ (Guyler Delva 2008). Technical fixes, such as the 
retraction of a tax or the increase of a subsidy, are progressively 
less effective in the face of the structural hegemony and growing 
inequality that defines the neoliberal development era. Food issues 
today run far deeper than nationally dictated policy, although the 
national governments which preside over them remain actively 
complicit in perpetuating the structures that breed them.
Popular mobilisation remains, as Hobsbawm (1952: 58) said, a form 
of ‘collective bargaining’ but the frontiers have been moved to 
incorporate the globalised system within which they operate. Bohstedt 
(2014) argues that what is expected of national governments is 
legitimised through a shared memory of expectation, but today, these 
memories have been subverted by the imposition of a world order 
that transcends traditional boundaries of national politics. As a result, 
various forms of mobilisation across the globe have been forced to 
shift their focus and redefine what it means to protest, challenging 
not only national food policy but also a global food regime.
Throughout this essay, I will use various terms to refer to popular 
mobilisation. Collective action, social movements, and riots will 
be discussed as I consider the different ways in which people 
mobilise. Alongside this, it is important to distinguish between 
a technical and a structural fix, as the distinction provides an 
important thematic backbone of my argument as to what is most 
effective on a policy level. By technical fixes, I mean clear changes 
in policy related to specific issues. When I discuss structural 
change, I mean the strategy of challenging the ideological and 
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political framework that informs the decisions of the policymakers 
themselves. Each approach has had varying degrees of success and 
failure, details of which will be articulated throughout this paper.
To begin with, I will explore some of the common themes around modern 
food issues that have informed protests and movements ideologically in 
their pursuit of change. I will then look at the unique conditions of a food 
riot and consider their success in bringing about lasting change. In the final 
two sections, I will explore the social movement La Via Campesina and 
the role it has had in mobilising a transnational movement in opposition 
to the global food regime. I will finish by outlining the success of the 
movement and briefly consider its strengths, and possible weaknesses, 
in instituting policy shifts locally, nationally, and internationally.
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2. Neoliberalism and food regimes
The idea that the market is the great leveller of global coexistence is one 
that permeates, defines, and justifies the neoliberal agenda that has 
defined the development narrative since at least the 1980s. The reality 
appears to be very different. McMichael (2008: 220) states that today at 
least 2.5 billion people find themselves ‘immiserated by the corporate food 
regime’ as we see the consequences of said regime close in around rural 
and urban communities. Instances of this come from far and wide. Africa, 
for example, came from a position of near self-sufficiency in the immediate 
post-war period to today, relying upon imports for around 25 per cent of its 
food needs (Patel and McMichael 2009). Indonesia, on the eve of the 
conception of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995, was in the top 
ten rice-exporting nations. Three years later in 1998, it was the world’s 
largest rice importer (McMichael 2008). It is this growing reliance on foreign 
imports that underpins many of the issues that have become key points of 
contention amidst popular movements around the world.
Much of the opposition to the neoliberal agenda over the past 30 years has 
been fuelled by the commodification of agriculture that is an inherent feature 
of the dominant food regime. Harriet Freidman (cited in Giménez and Shattuck 
2011: 110) defines a food regime as a ‘rule-governed structure of production 
and consumption of food on a world scale’. Patel and McMichael (2009: 
15–18) label the current food regime we find ourselves in as a ‘corporate food 
regime’. This is a system that, through leveraging the power and centrality 
of the market, prioritises extracting profit from agricultural systems, with little 
consideration for the communities that inhabit them or the environments 
that sustain them. Institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the WTO, and the World Bank, whose core principles embody this market-
centric message of neoliberalism, have supported and legitimised this regime. 
The pushback against this global system has required a global response.
Policies that undermine the basic rights of the population to provision 
themselves at a culturally and nutritionally acceptable level have 
provided a touchstone for the global solidarity we see today. Whilst every 
movement cannot be said to be imbued with a solid ideological focus, 
progressively we do see the grievances of these movements levelled 
at similar antagonists, albeit it through different policies and channels 
(Bush and Martiniello 2017). Mobilisation today transcends traditional 
peasant politics and finds new grounding in transnational solidarity with 
common causes (McMichael 2008). It is important to understand what 
these causes are and how they are being leveraged and by whom, and 
also what policies they are looking to promote and ultimately enact.
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One major point of contention is the Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(SAPs) imposed by the IMF in the 1980s (Borras 2010). In order to bail out 
states on the brink of financial collapse, austere terms were offered in 
return for loans. These included the lifting of protective tariffs on imports 
and deep cuts to subsidies for foodstuffs and agriculture (Bohstedt 
2014). Markets were flooded with cheap grain, the price of which was 
skewed by continued subsidisation in nations such as the USA. This 
pushed agricultural populations away from their traditional means of 
subsistence, supplanting traditional foodstuffs with cheap, often less 
nutritious foreign alternatives (Desmarais 2002). These cuts were met 
with widespread protests across the world that have come to be known 
as the ‘IMF riots’ (Walton and Seddon 1994). The issue with imposing 
global policies that breed oppression and inequality is that the reactions 
amalgamate themselves in a global context to combat it (Bové and 
Dufour 2002). A number of new frames have emerged in response to this.
One frame that has become especially prevalent in the approach of 
food movements is the human rights frame. Human rights are broadly 
defined by Suárez (2013: 240) as a ‘right that is inherent to human beings 
without any discrimination’ and the framing provides a space within 
which to reformulate understandings and challenge the hegemony of 
the neoliberal food regime. Stammers (cited in Hoddy and Ensor 2018: 75) 
argues that rights framings ‘render power visible’ and allow injustices to 
be brought to light and used to the benefit of opposition movements. 
This has proved crucial in some of the successful movements that have 
mobilised to claim rights otherwise unacknowledged and unclaimed 
(Borras 2010). Landless people in Brazil (Hoddy and Ensor 2018) and 
Honduras (Suárez 2013: 242) have invoked this framing to successfully 
claim land rights in their respective countries. What the human rights 
frame has proved able to do is inform and underpin movements that may 
not have otherwise found validation within a national or local context.
Campaigns against importing low-priced, highly subsidised foods (dumping) 
in the global South and against genetically modified organisms and 
transgenic seeds in the global North are also evocative of the modern 
focus of movements (Desmarais 2002). Solidarity, shared experience, and 
a desire to displace the incumbent food regime in favour of an approach 
that puts decisions in the hands of the people are the central features of 
modern collective action. This argument brings in many of the elements that 
underpin many modern instances of popular mobilisation, especially from 
a protracted and sustained popular movement perspective. However, not 
all protests fit neatly into this box, even if structurally they may share many 
of the characteristics and causes of their more organised contemporaries.
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3. Modern food riots
Influencing food policy through a riot on the streets is a tried and tested 
way to incite change. It is estimated that 30 countries experienced some 
form of rioting between 2007 and 2008 (Patel and McMichael 2009: 9). The 
root causes of these, many of which are discussed in the previous section, 
were secondary in the collective consciousness of the rioter. Their prime 
motivations appear to have been far more grounded in price spikes and 
a visceral response against the subversion of the social contract that 
underpinned the relationship between the governed and the governing.
In 2008, the world was in the midst of the worst financial crisis of 
modern times. Food has progressively found itself dragged into loosely 
regulated commodity markets (Patel 2013) and its price has become 
intertwined with energy prices (Bush and Martiniello 2017: 196). As a result, 
food systems have become closely linked to the fate of wider financial 
markets. Between 2007 and 2008, the global price of maize increased 
by 130 per cent whilst rice experienced a 75 per cent increase (Patel and 
McMichael 2009: 21). Whilst ‘developed’ economies of the global North 
were better positioned to absorb these spikes, the impact felt by the 
consumer in the global South was far more pronounced. Rioters from 
Port-au-Prince to Cairo took to the streets, both hungry and angry at 
what they saw as a fundamental failure on the part of their governments 
to uphold a core element of the social contract – access to food.
Going back to the idea of an ‘IMF riot’, it is interesting to consider 
how these protests fit into this model. Whilst global dependence on 
international food markets and the rollback of national food and 
agricultural subsidies may be important structural causes of these riots, 
it is clear that much of the motivation that took rioters to the streets 
was the perceived injustices of more visible policies. In Cameroon, for 
example, it was a dramatic rise in the price of fuel that saw protesters 
take to the streets (Schneider 2008), whilst in Burkina Faso, it was the 
apathy of the government and the lack of official channels within 
the apparatus of the state to voice grievances that led to mass 
mobilisation (Harsch 2008). So, whilst the ‘IMF riot’ frame may be a useful 
category for the outside observer reflecting upon the broader causes 
of protest, it does not seem to have been echoed in the sentiments of 
those across the world who took to the streets during this period.
The outcome of these riots highlights the willingness of governments 
to act in the face of a challenge to their power. As Thompson (1971) 
highlights, food riots open up a ‘political space for bargaining’. Patel 
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and McMichael elaborate on this, arguing that those moments of uprising 
stimulate ‘the recognition of the “moral economy” underlying food 
provisioning, a moral economy asserted by collective action at the same 
time as it imposes the technologies of rule’ (2009: 23). In order to maintain 
their mandate, governments were forced to act, and many did in a variety 
of different ways, with technical fixes largely defining their solutions.
The Egyptian army were pressed into baking bread as the government 
scrambled to enact policies that would see subsidies on food and fuel 
raised by 20 per cent during the period (Bohstedt 2014). In El Salvador, 
350,000 bags of fertiliser and improved maize seeds were distributed as 
part of a US$115m scheme aimed at providing incentives for small farmers 
(Schneider 2008). Despite these often quick-fire responses, regimes 
were still deposed, often as a direct or indirect consequence of the riots. 
Egypt saw President Mubarak ousted, whilst in Haiti, the Senate quickly 
voted to fire their prime minister. These depositions are evocative of how 
fundamental the ability to provision a population is in validating regimes. 
It illustrates that populations envisage power residing with their national 
government, the traditional administrators of power, not with the IMF or 
the WTO, the institutions whose policies appear to have compromised the 
ability of national governments to fulfil their mandate in the first place.
The inability of national governments to enact lasting change brings an 
important observation to the fore. Whilst it would be wrong to imagine them 
as powerless victims, blameless in their own integration into the ‘market-
driven economy’ (Desmarais 2002: 91), their ability to enact structural 
change has been significantly curtailed by the power of global institutions. 
The power of these institutions does not depend upon the ‘social contracts 
they have shredded’ (Bohstedt 2014: 16), but rather finds its validation in 
the debt structures and sanctions that can be imposed and are ratified 
by the Western-dominated international community (Suárez 2013).
In order to make a genuine and lasting difference, it is necessary to challenge 
the structures that underpin the food regime. As effective as a food riot may 
be at enacting technical shifts in policy,1 changes are often superficial and 
abandoned once the momentum has passed and order restored (Martínez-
Torres and Rosset 2010). This reflects both the nature of governments and 
their inability, and possibly unwillingness, to truly challenge and subvert 
the structures that simultaneously both shackle and sustain them.
1  For a comprehensive breakdown of the food riots and their outcomes from 2008, see We Are 
Hungry! A Summary Report of Food Riots, Government Responses, and States of Democracy in 2008 
(Schneider 2008).
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4. La Via Campesina and 
social movements
At the onset of the 1990s, the sharp edge of neoliberalism and a 
corporate food system was coming to bear as the consequences 
of the SAPs became clearer. Even as late as 1997, Chalmer, Martin, 
and Piester (cited in Desmarais 2002: 92) argued that they ‘could find 
few signs of a sustained, broad based popular movement against 
neoliberalism, and much less around an alternative project’.
The emergence of La Via Campesina (LVC) in 1993 in response to the 
growing influence of agribusiness on the development agenda proved 
to be an important turning point in the global struggle. In their own 
words, LVC are ‘an international movement bringing together millions 
of peasants, small and medium size farmers, landless people, rural 
women and youth, indigenous people, migrants and agricultural 
workers from around the world’ (La Via Campesina 2018).
Working from a pluralistic framework,2 they have mobilised grass-
roots movements into a transnational collective with an international 
presence on the world stage. In the process, it has successfully united 
diverse causes, forcing neoliberal institutions and global actors to 
acknowledge the new spaces within which the movement operates.
Where food riots are often reactionary, spontaneous, motivated, and 
appeased by short-term fixes that alleviate perceived injustices, social 
movements such as LVC operate from a far more proactive position. Yúdice 
(cited in Martínez-Torres and Rosset 2010: 150) goes as far as to call the 
movement ‘the most innovative actor in setting agendas for political and 
social policies’. It is difficult to disagree with the premise of this statement. 
To date, LVC have assisted in toppling governments in both Bolivia and 
Ecuador, a real sign of the growing power of the movement (Edelman 
2005: 337). What began as a defensive movement aiming to reclaim 
the voice of the small farmer and agricultural community amidst the 
deafening noise of agribusiness, has today become an offensive movement 
that uses that voice to attempt to shape policy along its own lines.
There are similarities with classic food riots; indeed, LVC still sees 
mobilisation en masse as one of its ‘principal strategies’ (Borras 2010: 
794). The crucial difference is the international cooperation that defines 
and informs their actions. Every year, hundreds of thousands of farmers 
2  For more on pluralistic approaches to development, see On Pluriversality (Mignolo 2013).
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and agricultural workers take part in collective action across the world 
in a show of solidarity with the common causes of LVC (Desmarais 2002). 
Typically, these causes are defined by the common desire to stabilise 
global food prices, redistribute power more equally, pursue sustainable 
agricultural practices, and, more broadly, challenge the enduring and 
oppressive jurisdiction of neoliberal institutions such as the IMF and the 
WTO. The LVC rejects an agenda that accepts short-term technical fixes 
to abate their protests. Action is sustained, dynamic, and framed through 
a concept that they themselves pioneered in 1996 – food sovereignty.
According to the LVC definition, food sovereignty is ‘the right of each 
nation to maintain and develop its own capacity to produce its own 
basic foods respecting cultural and productive diversity’ (cited in 
Karriem 2009: 322). The framework rejects the commodification of 
food by the corporate food regime, and uses the human rights frame 
outlined earlier in this essay to define it as a community right (Clapp 
2013). Whilst the definition provides a specific frame, content-wise, the 
application is very malleable. We can see this from an anecdote by 
Laura Carlsen (cited in McMichael 2008: 221) from the Via Campesina 
conference in 2006. She tells a story of how maize farmers from Mexico 
and rice farmers from Thailand found solidarity in each other’s causes 
after they identified that the presence of transnational corporations 
was undermining their sovereignty over their core staple foods.
From these perspectives, we can see how different approaches are 
being used by LVC to combat the policies of an overarching global 
agenda dictated from above. This determination to imagine alternative 
futures from a global perspective is what Edelman labels ‘globalization 
from below’ (Edelman 2001: 304). The question remains, however, that, 
despite the success of the movement in unifying transnationally, how 
successful have they actually been in institutionalising change?
Throughout the final section of this essay, I will outline the approach LVC 
has taken in institutionalising change locally, nationally, and internationally. 
Where perhaps we see a heightened awareness of the corruption and 
inequality of the food system globally, the challenge is not how united a 
cause can be but how it brings this unity to bear in order to leverage its 
position and incite tangible, structural, and lasting processes of change.
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5. The implementation of change
Karl Polanyi, the economic sociologist, made a bold prediction in 1944. He 
posited that the growing ‘self-regulating’ markets and overly liberalised 
food regimes would not crumble from within, but rather would be ousted by 
social pressure from below, despite what would seem like insurmountable 
structural strength (Polanyi 1944). With LVC, we can see this process 
beginning to unfold. Despite the strength of the corporate food regime, 
its inequalities and failures are beginning to be recognised on a global 
scale and LVC have been an important contributor to this recognition.
Having explored the framework used by LVC, it is important to 
understand their strategy in institutionalising changes and identify 
where this has been successful and where it has been ineffective. As 
a grass-roots movement, its practical success has largely come, at 
least on a policy-based level, on a local and national stage (Bellinger 
and Fakhri 2013). Whilst there is an acknowledgement of the need to 
institute change internationally, there is pragmatism to the approach 
of LVC. Paul Nicholson, an LVC activist, highlights how ‘direct dialogue 
with national governments may be, strategically, more accessible’ 
than attempts to mould international policy and rely on the effects 
trickling down into the national political landscape (Nicholson cited in 
Claeys 2015: 456). Through movements associated with LVC, we can 
see this strategy work effectively as a means of instituting change.
The MST (Brazil’s Landless Workers’ Movement) are a particularly successful 
example of a national movement utilising a number of different frames 
and approaches to achieve and engrain policy changes. They have 
invoked the aforementioned human rights frame (Hoddy and Ensor 2018) 
as well as using withstanding legal apparatus to compel governments 
to legitimise their claims for land (French 2007). Alongside this, they 
have used education to imbue members with an understanding of the 
injustice of the system as well as ways to mobilise against it (Diniz-Pereira 
2012). Not averse to taking to the streets, the MST have for 30 years 
represented the evolution of collective action in the face of neoliberalism 
and dominant agribusiness. Their partnership with LVC has seen their 
struggle written into an international narrative that illustrates the injustice 
of the corporate food regime. Herein lies the real strength of LVC.
The movement has provided a crucial platform from which grievances can 
be articulated and pressure applied upon the international community, 
as well as instilling new groups with the impetus to mobilise. In their own 
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words, LVC are ‘both an actor and an arena of action’ (cited in Borras 
2010: 795). So far, in pursuit of ‘concrete and feasible alternatives, here and 
now’, there is an argument that less effort is being put into the ‘regulatory 
apparatus’ required to enable said alternatives to endure (Claeys 2015: 
456). As Claeys (2012) outlines, this is in part due to their refusal to bring the 
WTO to account and challenge their legal validity through engagement. 
This would undermine these institutions and bring into question their 
legitimacy to continue to perpetuate the structures that underpin them.
In counter to this, it is clear that LVC has penetrated international 
consciousness. Since the 2008 riots, even free-market advocates, such 
as the World Bank and IMF, have begun to question the wisdom of such 
dogmatic adherence to neoliberal principles (Bohstedt 2014). Whilst the 
impact of LVC cannot be considered the direct cause of this shift, the 
issues it has brought to light have certainly formed an important part of 
an emergent alternative vision. This ideological shift may not have initially 
translated into clear structural policy shifts, but the acknowledgement 
that neoliberal free markets may not be the answer represents significant 
progress. Movements exclusively revolving around food issues will, after 
all, not bring about the structural changes necessary to implement a 
more equal, sustainable, and accountable world order on their own. 
The intersectional nature of grievances against the neoliberal agenda 
necessitates pressure from multiple sections of global society, yet if 
popular mobilisation around food issues can play a role through solidarity, 
acknowledgement, and action then that can surely only be a good thing.
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6. Conclusion
Wherever you go in the world, issues around food have the ability 
to incite frustration, anger, and eventually, protest. Hunger is 
the same whether you are in Haiti or Egypt, and the ability of 
governments to abate it has been shown throughout this essay 
to be a crucial feature in underpinning the social contract.
As the world has experienced globalisation, neoliberal institutions 
such as the World Bank and the WTO have attempted to homogenise 
the world food system and appropriate market control for their 
own causes. As a result, we have seen populations across the 
global South and North lose access to their traditional means 
of production and lose sovereignty over their own consumption 
choices. As Polanyi (1944) highlighted, the backlash may have been 
predictable but the contexts within which it has occurred have not.
It appears the days are gone where governments can appease 
populations with the implementation of a technical adjustment to a 
policy. Movements have become too well informed and operate from an 
ideological perspective that rejects the legitimacy of the corporate food 
regime. From this position, structural change is pursued through challenging 
institutions that prop up the regime. The situation today is still one in flux, 
evolving to adapt to the changing climate of the global food system.
Popular mobilisation is shaped by a circular process of constant 
adjustment. The prevailing injustice of the incumbent regime has 
shaped the responses we have seen, and the consequent action 
has gone a long way to reimagining responses to food issues from a 
global perspective. Where these responses may, in many cases, remain 
less than satisfactory, it is a testament to the strength and power of 
collective action that policies are beginning to reflect key elements 
of what were once considered subversive ideologies. The struggle will 
persist, and the monolithic imposition of the corporate food system will 
continue to loom large, and popular mobilisation, I believe, will remain 
a central component in this struggle to readjust its parameters.
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1. Introduction
That climate change will increase the incidence of violent conflict is a 
common claim made by both policymakers and climate change activists. 
I aim to question and critique the simplistic assertion that climate change 
will cause increased violent conflict, showing how the relationship between 
climate change, scarcity, and violent conflict is neither straightforward nor 
unidirectional. Moreover, as the evidence to support the ‘scarcity–conflict’1 
thesis is disputed and contested, the multidimensional relationships 
between conflict and scarcity are overlooked. I argue that it is imperative 
to explore the inverse relationship: how conflict influences scarcity in 
an environment of climate change, with a focus on vulnerability.
Section 1 outlines the primary assertions of the scarcity–conflict thesis, 
specifically focusing on concerns surrounding population growth and 
environmental scarcity. Section 2 presents the major critiques of the 
scarcity–conflict thesis, primarily focusing on its appealingly linear 
explanation of scarcity and conflict, and its theoretical limitations. Section 
3 focuses on the case study of post-war northern Uganda, specifically 
the livelihoods of the Acholi people, where the scarcity–conflict thesis has 
been inverted to a conflict–scarcity relationship and villagers’ vulnerability 
to the variable climate has been exacerbated. In conclusion, I argue 
that climate change could cause greater resource scarcity and could 
be one of many causes of armed conflict, but it is prudent to question 
the deterministic relationship between resource scarcity and armed 
conflict, examine the effects of conflict on scarcity, and explore the more 
fundamental role of vulnerability to climate variability and uncertainty.
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2. The Coming Anarchy and 
environmental scarcity
This section outlines the central ideas of two influential texts supporting the 
climate–conflict thesis (Kaplan 1994; Homer-Dixon 1999). The first subsection 
explores Kaplan’s cataclysmic prediction that ‘overpopulation’ will cause 
social unrest in developing countries, while the second subsection focuses on 
Homer-Dixon’s claim that environmental scarcity can be a primary cause of 
violent conflict. Finally, I update these theses with the introduction of climate 
change, and the threat it poses to existing pressures of environmental 
scarcity. In short, a scarcity of resources coupled with a growing population 
and compounded by climate variability could produce violent conflict.
2.1 Overpopulation
Kaplan (1994) claims that in economies where poverty is widespread, 
resource scarcity will increase through rapid population growth, inevitably 
leading to social breakdown and conflict. Therefore, surging population 
growth, specifically among poor, rural people, is a significant trigger 
for social and political unrest. Following Malthusian logic ([1798], 2008), 
where rates of population growth exceeding rates of food production will 
inevitably lead to misery for increasingly large numbers of people, Kaplan 
(1994) predicts that countries faced with growing population pressure 
and resource scarcity are likely to face civil strife and ‘split into several 
pieces’ in the next few decades. Moreover, Kaplan attributes the cause 
of ‘soil erosion’, ‘desertification and deforestation’, which has led to ‘more 
flooding and mosquitoes’, to ‘overpopulation’, specifically the influx of 
destitute rural populations into increasingly populated cities (ibid.). In 
Kaplan’s argument, population growth exacerbates existing resource 
scarcities and people will resort to violence to secure their livelihoods.
2.2 Environmental scarcity
Homer-Dixon (1999) highlights the overlooked role of environmental 
scarcity in driving violent conflict. He argues that scarcities can ‘generate 
severe social stresses within countries, helping to stimulate subnational 
insurgencies, ethnic clashes, and urban unrest’ (ibid.: 12). More specifically, 
Homer-Dixon identifies three primary means by which scarcity leads to 
conflict: (1) supply-induced scarcity, where ‘depletion and degradation 
produce a decrease’ in the total resources; (2) demand-induced scarcity, 
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where ‘population growth and changes in consumption behaviour can 
also cause greater scarcity’; and (3) structural scarcity, which causes 
a ‘severe imbalance in the distribution of wealth and power’ (ibid.: 15). 
Using the frustration–aggression approach popularised in political 
psychology (Gurr 1970), he argues that ‘increased scarcities can reduce 
or constrain economic productivity’, which may cause the affected 
people to ‘migrate or be expelled to other rural lands or cities’, and ‘local 
decreases in wealth can cause insurgencies and rebellion’ (Homer-Dixon 
1999: 133). In short, a supply-induced scarcity of resources can encourage 
people to resort to violence to gain more resources, a demand-
induced scarcity can facilitate conflict among groups competing over 
the same scarce resources, and structural scarcity builds resentment 
by groups with few resources towards those with many resources.
2.3 Climate change
Climate change, and the increased variability and hazardous nature 
of climates, will exacerbate existing issues of environmental scarcity 
(Porter et al. 2014). Malthusian concerns with exponential population 
growth, particularly in areas where resources are already limited, are 
compounded with the knowledge that increasingly variable rainfall 
patterns and unpredictable weather will create even greater scarcity 
in subsistence economies (FAO 2008). While the threat of climate 
change on environmental scarcity is significant, the causal link between 
climate change and the potential for violent conflict remains one where 
environmental scarcity, albeit heightened, is the animating factor 
(USGCRP 2018). In short, instead of the model proposed by Kaplan and 
Homer-Dixon; that is, population growth–scarcity–conflict (Peluso and 
Watts 2001: 18), the concern that climate change leads to violent conflict 
becomes a climate change–scarcity–conflict relationship. Therefore, to 
evaluate whether climate change could lead to increased violent conflict, 
it remains critical to evaluate the validity of the scarcity–conflict thesis.
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3. Political ecology
This section presents the ‘political ecological’ critique of the scarcity–conflict 
thesis. This section primarily addresses the main critiques of Homer-Dixon’s 
(1999) argument, highlighting its shortcomings, determinism, lack of political 
analysis, and limited conception of scarcity. Finally, this section addresses 
Kaplan’s (1994) concerns with population growth as a trigger for conflict.
3.1 Scarcity, agency, and conflict
There are four important critiques of Homer-Dixon’s thesis, namely: (1) an 
emphasis on shortage over abundance; (2) determinism; (3) ignoring the politics 
of distribution and scarcity; and (4) a limited understanding of scarcity. Firstly, 
Homer-Dixon (1999) assumes that conflict is generated by a lack of access to 
resources but does not account for how conflict breaks out over an abundance 
of resources or battling for control over a monopoly (Peluso and Watts 2001). 
The control of large oil fields has historically been a significant cause of conflict 
between states, corporations, and political elites (Mitchell 2011), and access 
to abundant oil reserves continues to stoke violent conflict (Watts 2001).
Secondly, the central assertion that scarcity leads to conflict does not account 
for the grievances of potential conflict actors or the particular complexities of 
violence. Homer-Dixon (1999: 27) uses the example of South Africa’s ‘townships’, 
mass informal settlements burdened by unemployment and poverty, of 
scarcity leading to conflict. He elides the influence of violent conflict as part 
of a struggle for political liberation or that townships were created by racist 
legislation restricting access to urban areas and building significant racial 
resentment between the population (Magubane 1979; Beinart 2001). Homer-
Dixon simplifies conflict as an inevitable outcome of scarcity and fails to 
account for conflict as ‘complex social practice’ (Peluso and Watts 2001: 27).
Thirdly, both Homer-Dixon and Kaplan have been criticised for 
overemphasising the role of nature in generating scarcity (Peet, Robbins 
and Watts 2011). In both accounts, the environment ‘plays a role as a 
trigger, target, or catalyst for conflicts’, but ‘the processes [emphasis 
in the original] by which violence occurs are partially explained and 
often occluded’ (Peluso and Watts 2001: 22). The scarcity–conflict 
thesis assumes that the pressures of supply and demand influence 
the availability of resources without accounting for the politics of 
distributing and accessing resources. In short, it is myopic to assume 
that scarcity is a strictly natural issue, when ‘environmental insecurity 
stems from a failure of politics and governance’ (Barnett 2001: 160).
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Finally, the scarcity–conflict thesis fails to account for the complexity of the 
idea of scarcity. Homer-Dixon (1999) implicitly assumes scarcity to be a 
‘lack of’ a particular resource, failing to account for relativist definitions of 
scarcity (Peluso and Watts 2001), social constructions of scarcity (Mehta 
2011), or that ‘resources are constructed rather than given’ (Robbins 2012: 17).
In short, the scarcity–conflict thesis rests on several simplistic assumptions 
about the nature of resources, distribution, and conflict, and a critical 
appraisal of these assumptions reveals the shortcomings of the argument.
3.2 Population pressures
Kaplan’s concern with ‘overpopulation’ is inconsistent. Firstly, an exclusive 
concern with population growth generating further scarcity precludes an 
understanding of the dynamics of resource distribution; scarcity is not a 
natural phenomenon, but a product of economic and political processes 
(Sen 1982). Secondly, neo-Malthusianism is a mostly outdated model for 
analysing population growth relative to food production, as resources 
can be produced at a far higher rate and in a far greater quantity 
than Malthus feared in the eighteenth century (Trewavas 2002). Thirdly, 
Kaplan is solely concerned with population growth among the world’s 
poor, despite resource use and exploitation being most common among 
wealthy people in the West (Malm and Hornborg 2014). Resource scarcity 
in developing countries is intimately connected to unequal global 
trade and the way in which countries have been integrated into the 
global economy (Amin 1974; Wallerstein 2004). In short, while population 
pressures may be a factor in causing environmental scarcity, there are 
far greater socio-political dynamics at play in resource scarcity.
3.3 Climate change and conflict
Drawing from the scarcity–conflict thesis, many scholars have attempted 
to determine whether climate change, in producing environmental 
uncertainty, will cause violent conflict (Barnett and Adger 2007). In 
short, the evidence to prove this assertion is relatively contested and 
disputed (Adams et al. 2018). The political ecology critique of the 
scarcity–conflict thesis invites an examination of the dynamics involved 
in resource conflicts, specifically vulnerability and uncertainty (Peluso 
and Watts 2001). Moreover, the relationship between scarcity and 
conflict is not linear, and an inversion of this relationship allows a closer 
appraisal of the role of conflict in influencing livelihood vulnerability and 
uncertainty. Moving beyond a unidirectional approach to examining 
scarcity, climate change, and conflict, the next section explores the 
influence of conflict on vulnerability, uncertainty, and scarcity.
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4. Beyond scarcity–conflict
This section presents the case of post-war northern Uganda, with a focus 
on the Acholi people, as complicating the scarcity–conflict thesis. The first 
subsection presents a necessarily brief overview of the 20-year conflict 
in northern Uganda, focusing on the debilitation of the local population 
and environment. Secondly, I explore how the war has devastated the 
Acholi and their relationship to their environment. Thirdly, I argue that 
the sustained conflict has increased the population’s vulnerability to 
climate change. Finally, I argue that the case of northern Uganda is 
indicative of the need to think more contextually and critically when 
examining the relationship between climate change and conflict.
4.1 War and displacement
Between 1986 and 2006 in northern Uganda, the state’s army has been 
at war with rebel groups, primarily the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), which 
aims to contest the state’s authority over the north (Branch 2011). The 
war is emblematic of a ‘dirty war’, with the LRA launching small strikes 
on strategic interests and the army decimating tree cover in order 
to reveal combatants. The causes of the war are deeply contested 
and debated (Finnström 2008: 8), but the unique ethnic, cultural, and 
linguistic traditions in the north have presented an obstacle to national 
integration (Laruni 2015). Despite the antagonistic dynamic between 
rebels and the state, the ‘principal victims are the population within the 
“war zone” ’ (Dolan 2009: 1). Much of the region has been decimated by 
the protracted periods of warfare, where trees have been cut down, 
forests have been cleared, and landmines have scarred the landscape.
Both the rebels and the state have engaged in egregious violence, as 
‘killings, rape, and other forms of physical abuse aimed at non-combatants 
became the order of the day’ (Finnström 2008: 71). Since the late 1980s, 
the state has sought to establish greater control over the population in 
the north by forcing their relocation into ‘protected zones’. Ostensibly for 
the protection of the detainees, the state imposed ‘its rule by regulating 
everyday life’, including ‘food resources and food distribution’ (ibid.: 144). 
In 2005, one year prior to the end of the war, Finnström claims ‘two million’ 
Ugandans were displaced, including ‘more than 90 per cent’ of the Acholi 
(ibid.: 133). In the camps, mortality rates were exceptionally high, with 
some estimates showing over a thousand deaths occurred in the camps 
each week, mostly through ‘curable diseases and malnutrition’ (ibid.: 133). 
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Although malnutrition was relatively high before internment, the conditions 
of the camps exacerbated child malnourishment, where ‘a whole new 
generation was being physically “dumbed down” ’ (Dolan 2009: 162).
4.2 Vulnerable livelihoods
One of the primary grievances shared by survivors of the war is their sense 
of loss over their livelihoods. In 1991, before mass internment, ‘subsistence 
farming accounted for 77 per cent of economic activity and employed 
around 95 per cent of the population’, but by the end of that decade, 
‘less than 10 per cent of land was being utilised yearly’ (Dolan 2009: 119). 
Before the war, ‘many Acholi families kept cattle’ while fruit and cash 
crops were grown for market, but throughout the course of the war, ‘most 
cattle have been looted or killed by the fighting forces’ and villagers 
struggled to grow crops to meet their own needs (Finnström 2008: 34–5). 
Agricultural and economic conditions were devastated by the war.
The physical degradation of the environment is compounded by the 
experience of forced containment, where thousands of people lived with 
hunger and malnourishment in unsafe conditions. Returning to their villages 
after the war, households lacked the ‘physical capacity and strength to 
re-open fields that had lain fallow for several years’ due to malnourishment 
or the death of family members (Dolan 2009: 187). While villagers often 
relied on food aid for sustenance in the camps, the state did not provide 
sufficient support to returning villagers to allow for an effective return to 
subsistence livelihoods (ibid.: 188). The conditions of seemingly permanent 
devastation, violence, and containment are indicative of the Acholi term, 
‘bad surroundings’ (Finnström 2008). In contrast to ‘good surroundings’, ‘when 
things are normal, the society thriving, facing and overcoming crises’, ‘bad 
surroundings’ describe when ‘the entire apparatus of the culture cannot 
cope with the menace any more’ (p’Bitek 1986: 27, cited in Finnström 2008: 
14). When the Acholi perceive their surroundings to be ‘good’, ‘uncertainty is 
handled’, but in ‘bad surroundings’, the violence of the conflict has caused 
a loss of control (Finnström 2008: 12). In short, ‘bad surroundings’ refers to 
the sense of vulnerability engendered through the experience of conflict.
4.3 Uncertainty and ‘climate change’
The climate of northern Uganda is a highly variable one, where both drought 
and heavy rainfall are common (Webster, Ogot and Chretien 1992). To 
survive, the Acholi have developed complex means of subsistence, highly 
attuned to weather patterns (Cohen 1989). Since the end of the war in 2006, 
local people have encountered difficulty when reorienting themselves 
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with the landscape. Branch (2018: S315–17) recounts how returning villagers 
believed that the landscape appeared ‘unfamiliar’, ‘the environment has 
become unfriendly’, and the frequent droughts are ‘commonly viewed as 
tied up with the violence of war’. Acholi villagers lamented the destruction 
of the trees, in particular ‘the forests’ role in attracting rain and retaining 
water’, as ‘deforestation has harmed people’s broader livelihoods’ (Branch 
2018: S318). With regard to the climate, uncertainties are ‘constructed in 
relation to social, economic, and political orders, not just natural ones’ 
(Scoones 2019: 25). Through the devastating conflict, the Acholi have 
become increasingly vulnerable to the uncertainty of their surroundings.
Before the war, the Acholi were well attuned to the naturally variable 
climate in northern Uganda, but the effects of long-term conflict have 
impinged on their means of subsistence and resilience to climate variability. 
Crucially, although climate change exacerbates existing uncertainty, 
people’s vulnerability to greater uncertainties, as well as their capacity to 
adapt to shocks, are conditioned by historical and political factors (Blaikie 
et al. 2004; Eriksen and Lind 2009). Drought and other climactic shocks in 
the region should not be ‘viewed as an isolated phenomenon’, but rather 
as part of ‘much broader regimes of devastation in which the dominant 
history is one of war’ (Branch 2018: S322). In short, the war has devastated 
the landscape, the camps have debilitated the Acholi, and maintaining 
a subsistence livelihood is becoming increasingly tenuous. In northern 
Uganda, scarcity was not the cause but an outcome of violent conflict.
4.4 Re-thinking the dynamics of scarcity and 
conflict
The case of northern Uganda illustrates a more complex relationship 
between conflict, scarcity, and climate change than is presented in the 
scarcity–conflict literature. Vulnerability to climate change, specifically the 
variability of the climate, is exacerbated by periods of extended conflict 
and displacement (Eriksen and Lind 2009). Although climate change may 
play a role in causing greater environmental scarcity and thereby creating 
greater impetus for conflict, the inverse relationship, where conflict hinders 
people’s capacity to cope with climate change, is also true (Blaikie et al. 
2004). Going beyond the seemingly intractable debate as to whether 
scarcity is a primary cause for violent conflict (Adams et al. 2018), I argue 
that it is more prudent to focus on the multidimensional relationships 
between scarcity, conflict, and climate change, and highlight the centrality 
of vulnerability to understanding the effects of climate change and conflict.
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5. Conclusion
This essay has introduced the arguments supporting the assertion that 
climate change will lead to an increased incidence of violent conflict, 
provided a critical reflection of these arguments, and used the case 
study of conflict and devastation in northern Uganda to highlight the 
complexity of the relationship between scarcity and conflict. As climate 
change produces greater variability and unpredictability in weather 
patterns, subsistence economies are most likely to suffer. However, 
subsistence economies, as demonstrated by the Acholi, are equally 
vulnerable to the effects of devastating conflict, which in turn impinges on 
their livelihoods and creates scarcity. The relationship between scarcity 
and conflict is therefore not a straightforward or linear relationship. 
Although environmental scarcity may play a role in inciting conflict, it is 
not enough, in and of itself, to cause conflict to break out. Furthermore, 
I argue that it is imperative to pay attention to the inverse relationship, 
examining the effects of conflict on scarcity, and remain critical of simplistic 
and universal relationships of causality between complex variables.
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1. Introduction
Current economic development is facing issues such as fast population 
growth, weak markets, poor infrastructure and service provision, 
along with weak governance systems, and climate change can make 
these challenges harder to overcome and thus affect their outcomes 
(Tanner and Horn-Phathanothai 2014). For instance, climate change 
enhances the frequency of drought and floods, causing a decrease 
in agricultural production leading to food insecurity, water scarcity, 
damaged infrastructures, and a decrease in the gross domestic 
product (GDP) of countries. Therefore, countries need to find measures 
to adapt to those impacts and build their resilience to climate change. 
The concept ‘resilience’ itself has become the new buzzword in the 
last decade (Hussain 2013), but the real meaning remains vague and 
unclear (MacAskill and Guthrie 2014). However, this concept has now 
been appropriated by the bilateral and multilateral donor organisations 
(Mitchell and Harris 2012) and has become prominent in development 
and vulnerability reduction sectors such as disaster risk reduction (DRR), 
social protection, and climate change adaptation (Béné et al. 2012).
This paper will explore the contextual definitions of climate-resilient 
development (CRD), with Ethiopia as a case study. The topic is chosen 
because it is critical to evaluate how the concepts of resilience and 
CRD are defined according to current existing interpretations. Ethiopia 
was selected for the case study as it is one of the countries negatively 
impacted by climate change; however, it is also one of the pioneer 
countries in developing a climate-resilient strategy. Therefore, it is 
essential to evaluate how CRD is defined in the Ethiopian context as 
drawn from its government strategies and implemented activities: 
in this case, in the agriculture sector. It will also be crucial to assess 
the perspective of Ethiopian farmers of the concept, to see how the 
meaning of CRD can vary. In principle, I argue that the definition of 
CRD is determined by the way we define the concept of resilience itself 
which can be objective or subjective, and that the focus should not be 
on the definition itself but on what the concept can achieve. In regard 
to the implementation of CRD in a particular context, it is important 
to accurately recognise how resilience is understood among the 
beneficiaries in those surroundings, in order to ensure its effectiveness.
The paper will be organised as follows. Firstly, in the key definition 
and literature review, I will unpack the concept of resilience with its 
link to climate change, development, and vulnerability, and how the 
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definition of CRD is shaped by the subjective or objective method of 
resilience measurement. Secondly, in order to explain CRD in a particular 
context, a case study on Ethiopia will be analysed by focusing on 
the agriculture sector as one of the main pillars of the government’s 
strategy. I will then draw out the definition of CRD accordingly and 
also look at how CRD is described from another perspective, that is, 
of Ethiopian farmers, and the challenges found in the strategy and 
implementation of CRD as well as some policy implications. Ultimately, I 
conclude that due to different perspectives in interpreting vulnerability 
and in measuring resilience, the definition of CRD varies. Although 
there is no single definition, it may be critical and more productive 
to look deeper into the individual elements of CRD, enabling it to be 
adaptable to the local context and more effective for the beneficiaries.
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2. Key definition and literature review
As mentioned in Section 1, this paper aims to define CRD in a 
particular context and, in this case, Ethiopia is chosen as a case 
study with the agriculture sector as the focus. In order to be able 
to delineate the concept in that particular context, it is important 
to first unpack the concept of CRD itself and evaluate each 
component, and especially the concept of resilience itself.
2.1 Unpacking CRD: resilience and its link to 
climate change, development, and vulnerability
The term ‘climate change’ is defined as the change in a large-scale, long-
term shift in the planet’s weather patterns and average temperatures, 
as a result of natural processes or human activity (IPCC 2012; MET Office 
2019). Climate change impacts are mostly felt by poor people who 
are more vulnerable to the risk of food insecurity, water scarcity, and 
other climate induced disasters, making climate change the biggest 
development challenge (Tanner and Horn-Phathanothai 2014).
As for development, this concept has been a buzzword for almost 60 years 
and its definition is still considered to be ambiguous, complex, and elusive 
(Rist 2007). However, in this paper, development is described as intentional 
efforts to improve human wellbeing in poverty reduction, health, education, 
and livelihood diversification (Tanner and Horn-Phathanothai 2014). Given 
that climate change has major impacts on poor people who are the target 
of development, as a consequence, it has also influenced the way that 
development has been shaped (ibid.).
Since climate change has become a part of development and that it 
is essential to reduce the vulnerability of poor people to its shocks, over 
the past decade, the term ‘resilience’ appears to have become the 
new jargon (Hussain 2013) and it is now included as a key development 
priority and practice (Jones 2019; Mitchell and Harris 2012). Resilience, as 
a very complex concept, is often used as an equivalent of adaptation 
and vulnerability reduction (Schipper and Langston 2015); however, it is 
more related to preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery (Patel 
et al. 2017). Given that it has various meanings and definitions (Jones 
and Tanner 2015), there is a lack of consensus on the definition of the 
concept among development practitioners and scholars (Thiede 2016).
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When discussing resilience in the development context, it is inevitable 
to come back to the concept of vulnerability. The connection between 
the two concepts is that to limit the impacts of shocks, in this case, 
climate change, for poor people, efforts need to be made to move 
from a vulnerable to a resilient state (Béné et al. 2012). According to 
O’Brien et al. (2007), the vulnerability to climate change in development 
can be interpreted in two ways, resulting in two distinct framings of 
climate change issues. These framings are outcome vulnerability 
related to scientific framing, and contextual vulnerability linked to 
human-security framing that create distinct types of knowledge and 
accentuate different kinds of policy responses to climate change (ibid.).
Resilience has multiple aspects and can be described at individual, 
household, community, regional, and national levels (Béné 2013; Clare 
et al. 2017). For this reason, Jones (2019) contends that resilience is 
not the same for all; thus, it is important to compare and evaluate 
the subjective and objective experience as to how resilience is 
defined. The IPCC (2012: 5), for instance, describes resilience as ‘the 
ability of a system and its component parts to anticipate, absorb, 
accommodate, or recover from the effects of a hazardous event in 
a timely and efficient manner’. Although there are different ways of 
defining resilience, we can see that there are similar words highlighted 
in the literature such as adapting to variability and uncertainty, 
bounce-back, and positive transformation or recovery (Béné et 
al. 2012; Clare et al. 2017). In addition, Béné et al. (2012) also argue 
that there are limitations regarding the concept of resilience in 
tackling poverty, due to its inability to apprehend and reflect social 
dynamics accordingly, and to take into account power-related 
connotations of vulnerability. This consequently can generate the 
risk that resilience cannot be differentiated from adaptation and is 
perceived as having similar impacts (Cannon and Müller Mahn 2010).
In summary, despite its ambiguous definition and complexity, 
resilience has the ability to reshape development and provide 
opportunities to connect sectors, approaches, instruments, and 
institutions that generally work in silos (Tanner et al. 2017). From 
those definitions of the CRD components, I will discuss next two 
distinct ways of measuring resilience that will affect the way the 
concept of resilience is defined, as well as the concept of CRD.
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2.2 The influence of climate resilience 
measurement methods in defining CRD
According to Clare et al. (2017) and Jones (2019), there are two methods 
to measure climate resilience, which are the objective and subjective 
methods. Firstly, in regard to the objective method, it examines the 
individual’s psychosocial characteristics such as self-efficacy, risk 
perception, and sense of place as resilience capacity, independently 
of their judgement. This more top-down approach has been the norm 
for both research and practice, and it dominates to a large extent our 
understanding of the processes by which societal responses to climate 
variability and change are constructed. Walsh-Dilley and Wolford (2015) 
add that this approach pays little attention to lay knowledge in favour of 
scientific expertise, depoliticises poverty, and tries to deal with vulnerability 
through market mechanisms, self-exploitation, and entrepreneurship.
Secondly, the subjective method observes people’s understandings of 
their general perceived resilience to shock. This more recently advocated 
bottom-up approach asserts that people’s knowledge such as cognitive 
barriers, risk perception, and personal or cultural values are the key 
elements that shape and contribute to their resilience (Jones and 
Tanner 2017; Sturgess 2016). Despite these different conceptions and 
applications, Patel et al. (2017) along with Chandler and Coaffee (2017) 
suggest that a focus on the individual element as the subject of resilience 
intervention, or the subjective approach, will be more productive and 
efficient than the attempt to define resilience as a distinct concept. 
Jones (2019) emphasises that there is no one-size-fits-all approach to 
measure resilience, meaning that different actors with different focuses 
and goals will have their own definition of the resilience concept. 
Therefore, this will create a different understanding of the concept of 
climate resilience and ultimately in defining the concept of CRD.
Furthermore, if we connect these two theories on climate resilience 
measurements with O’Brien’s theory on two distinct interpretations 
of vulnerability to climate change, we will come to the conclusion 
that the scientific framing is used as an objective measurement 
and becomes the pattern in most research and development 
practice, whereas the human-security framing of climate change 
is the basis of the subjective method of resilience. However, it is 
less evident in formal, international scientific and policy discussions 
(O’Brien et al. 2007). The connection can be observed in Figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1 The connection between vulnerability 
interpretations and resilience measurement 
resulting in an objective or subjective definition 
of resilience
Source: Author’s own, based on Clare et al. (2017), Jones (2019), and O’Brien et al. (2007).
As a consequence, this will also apply in describing the concept of 
climate-resilient development. Although there are a lot of policies and 
research papers stating the need for climate-vulnerable countries 
to find ways to become climate-resilient societies and economies, 
there is no single definition found of the term. For example, from the 
perspective of the World Bank as a donor institution, thus using the 
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objective or top-down approach, in one of its reports CRD is described 
as the sustained effort of poverty reduction and other development 
objectives with the continuous and integrated process of addressing 
risks from the current climate and preparing for future change (Sperling 
et al. 2008). From this definition, the World Bank has published its 
strategy, namely climate and disaster-resilient development, by 
which it aims to develop long-term resilience, decrease risk, and 
avoid increasing future costs with the inclusion of disaster risk 
management in its CRD activities (De Bettencourt et al. 2013).
Another example of a different interpretation of CRD comes from 
the non-governmental organisation CARE, who defines CRD using 
the subjective approach, and focusing more on the beneficiaries 
through programme implementation such as advocacy in 
promoting gender-equitable responses to climate change, capacity 
building, and community-based adaptation (CARE n.d.).
Moving forward, in order to discuss the definition of CRD in a particular 
context, I will evaluate CRD in Ethiopia’s agriculture sector, which will 
allow us to observe to what extent the CRD definition can vary.
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3. CRD in the context of Ethiopia
3.1 Ethiopia: the context of the country, historic 
pattern, and impacts of climate change
As one of the largest and the second most populous country in Africa, 
Ethiopia’s landscape encompasses desert, lowlands, plateaus, and 
canyons (OECD 2013). Although the poverty rate has been decreasing 
particularly in urban areas, the country is still classified as a least 
developed country; hence its government has an objective to achieve 
middle-income status by 2025 (FDRE 2011a; OECD 2013, 2014). However, 
climate variability and frequent extreme weather can put development 
achievements at risk, with an estimated temperature rise of 1.5–3°C 
by the 2050s (OECD 2014). Without climate change, Ethiopia’s GDP is 
predicted to increase by more than 8 per cent annually (FDRE 2011a).
Climate change impacts in Ethiopia are already very visible with an increase 
in temperature, changes in precipitation patterns, and more recurrent or 
uncertain extreme weather events such as floods, droughts, and heatwaves 
where some of them are related to El Niño Southern Oscillation (ENSO) 
events (Bishaw et al. 2013; IGAD ICPAC 2007; OECD 2013). Annual droughts 
have caused severe food insecurity issues and erratic and high rainfalls have 
created seven major floods since 1980 (OECD 2014), generating an increase 
in government budget on food aid and emergency relief during those 
periods (Robinson, Strzepek and Cervigni 2013). Overall, climate change 
has significant impacts on the country’s economy and people, such as 
GDP reduction by 8–10 per cent due to a decline in agricultural production, 
growing inequality, a decrease in income and investment which exacerbates 
poverty, and also political instability (Mideksa 2010; Robinson et al. 2013).
3.2 The Government of Ethiopia’s policies and 
strategies on CRD
Since Ethiopia is one of the most vulnerable countries to climate change (Huq 
and Ayers 2007), the Government of Ethiopia (GoE) has been integrating climate 
change into its development planning for the last few decades (OECD 2014).
The strong and centralised technocratic leadership and vision of the late 
prime minister, Meles Zenawi, the initiator of the green economy agenda 
for both Ethiopia and Africa (Teshome 2018; Christopher and Weinthal 
2019), has triggered high-level engagement and policies actioned across 
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ministries, making the country one of the front runners in developing its 
climate change-related strategies (Jones and Carabine 2013; OECD 
2014). Among many policies that have been issued by the GoE are the two 
primary and recent policies closely related to resilience, as detailed next.
3.2.1 Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) I and II (2011–20)
The GTP is the five-year national development plan aiming to formulate 
and effectively implement policies and strategies which will foster a 
green economy and enhance people’s welfare (Jones and Carabine 
2013; OECD 2014). It states that mitigation and adaptation are the key 
issues in building a green and climate-resilient economy; however, both 
documents, that is, Part I and II, only contain two pages on the environment 
and climate change (MoFED 2010; National Planning Commission 2016).
3.2.2 Climate Resilient Green Economy
Launched in 2011, the Climate Resilient Green Economy (CRGE) was 
designed to ‘climate-proof’ the GTP to avoid a conflict of goals 
for economic development, and mitigation and adaptation being 
deprioritised and under-funded (OECD 2014). With the final objective 
being to make Ethiopia a low-carbon climate-resilient middle-income 
country by 2025 (FDRE 2011a; OECD 2013, 2014; Teshome 2018), the CRGE 
supports the GTP to reach its development goals while maintaining 
carbon emissions at the current level and increasing Ethiopia’s resilience 
to climate change (FDRE 2011a). The CRGE has two components; namely, 
the Green Economy Strategy (GES) which focuses on mitigation and 
the Climate Resilience Strategy (CRS) which focuses on adaptation; 
and four main pillars or prioritised sectors which are land use and 
agriculture, power, industry, and forestry (FDRE 2011a; OECD 2014).
In order to draw a contextual and sectoral definition of CRD, this paper will 
only evaluate agriculture which is highly sensitive to climate change and the 
most prioritised sector of the GoE.
3.3 Defining CRD in the Ethiopian context
3.3.1 How is CRD conceptualised and defined by the CRGE?
As mentioned above, this paper focuses only on the agriculture sector as 
the primary sector of the Ethiopian economy and the CRGE, contributing 
about 40–52 per cent of GDP and employing about 80 per cent of the 
population (Conway and Schipper 2011; Deressa et al. 2009; FDRE 2011a, 
2011b; World Bank 2010). About 80 per cent of the country’s population 
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live in rural areas and agriculture remains the major source of income for 
most of them (Bryan et al. 2009). The sector has objectives to increase 
crop and livestock production activities for higher food security and 
to enhance farmers’ revenue while reducing emissions (FDRE 2011a).
The CRS-CRGE divides its strategy into three steps whereby it firstly analyses 
the challenges, secondly, identifies the responses needed to tackle the 
challenges on a macro and household level, and thirdly, actions implementation 
(FDRE 2011b). Although it includes some mitigation measures, the agriculture 
sector mainly focuses on adaptation activities, with 350 prioritised actions 
listed in the CRS (OECD 2014), among which are: (1) crop switching; (2) climate-
smart irrigation; (3) institutional strengthening and building; (4) climate 
information; and (5) agricultural research and development (FDRE 2011b).
From the above mentioned description on the strategy and identified 
activities, the CRGE has received some criticism due to its objective 
approach in conceptualising CRD. The CRGE was developed at the federal 
level and so were most of its activities, making it difficult to reach to the 
local level (Christopher and Weinthal 2019). Besides its weak institutional 
design in transforming climate policy, the CRGE is not considered to be 
overtly inclusive and fails to engage stakeholders at all society levels, 
especially poor farmers at the local level who are already politically and 
socially marginalised, which creates issues of lack of representation, 
recognition, and fairness (Jones and Carabine 2013; OECD 2013).
The CRGE is not people-centred; it excludes softer issues such as vested 
interest and power relations and although regional and local governments 
were involved during the consultation of the CRGE development, 
vulnerable communities have been removed from the participatory process 
(Jones and Carabine 2013). This is in juxtaposition to those vulnerable 
communities being the demand drivers for more inclusive green growth, 
given the social pressures they face such as land ownership and resource 
scarcity (OECD 2013). The main issue is that the CRGE was developed by 
international experts using IPCC and science-derived methodologies, and 
they failed to capture substantial social, cultural, religious, and political 
elements in their economic and quantitative analysis (Jones and Carabine 
2013; OECD 2013). In order to build resilience and foster adaptation to 
environmental shocks especially among rural households, it is critical to 
have financial, human, physical, and social capital (Paul et al. 2016).
Therefore, from the perspective of the GoE through the CGRE, I will outline 
the meaning of CRD as a development process with a top-down approach. 
This process aims to achieve green economic growth and poverty 
reduction under current and projected climate conditions by implementing 
mitigation and adaptation measures in a continuous and integrated way.
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3.3.2 How is CRD implemented and perceived by farmers?
In order to ensure food security, Ethiopia has been implementing 
many agricultural projects, even before the CRGE. There are two big 
projects which are considered to have been successful in building 
people’s resilience. Firstly, the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP), 
which provides cash to 7.8 million households who are unable to feed 
themselves. In return, those households restore the local environment 
which they depend on, which enables them to invest small amounts 
of money into their future. Secondly, the Household Asset Building 
Programme (HABP) gives long-term support to the same beneficiaries 
by diversifying and raising their revenue (Conway and Schipper 
2011; Sandford and Hobson 2011; World Bank 2013). As well as these 
programmes, Ethiopia has also implemented climate-smart agriculture 
(CSA) projects aimed at decreasing the vulnerability of the agricultural 
system to climate change and enhancing its adaptive capacity 
while obtaining mitigation co-benefits (Lipper et al. 2018) and also 
agriculture modernisation programmes (Milman and Arsano 2014).
However, although those projects have been deemed successful, 
many issues appeared during project implementation which is partly 
due to the top-down approach used in conceptualising them. This 
can be seen, for example, in government support to farmers such as 
subsidies and inputs. These have been shown to have a negative 
impact on poor farmers because they have less ability to access 
that support, given that it is designed to meet the needs of wealthier 
farmers (Bryan et al. 2009). The primary issue for poor farmers is the 
shortage of land, and this issue is not addressed by the government, 
besides limited access to credit, and climate information (ibid.). 
The unresolved issues regarding land ownership, for instance, have 
caused conflicts and tensions between and among indigenous 
populations and it has expanded into tensions regarding governmental 
authority over access to infrastructure (Milman and Arsano 2014).
When asked about what resilience means to them, many farmers will 
respond that it means a set of resources required to sustain agricultural 
production which is related to wealth, such as land, livestock, monetary 
savings, a corrugated-iron-roof house, and even a motorcycle 
enabling them to be more mobile. In addition, some other farmers 
will answer that resilience is not only a matter of wealth and social 
network but also social status or position (Thiede 2016). These different 
perspectives from the farmers confirms the subjectivity of resilience.
Despite the main goal of the implemented CRD projects to reduce poverty, 
they do not address its root cause. Therefore, from the farmers’ perspective, 
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I would define CRD as the development processes which provide them 
with access to financial and technical resources, a higher social status, and 
sources of livelihood outside of the agriculture sector, which allows them to 
reduce their vulnerability and recover from shocks caused by climate change.
3.3.3 What are the challenges and policy implications?
As mentioned previously, CRD project implementation in Ethiopia faces 
problems such as lack of human resources and technical capacity, limited 
financial resources, divided implementing agencies, as well as outdated and 
overlapping policies (OECD 2014; Teshome 2018). Regarding the challenge 
closely linked to the subjectivity of the resilience concept, the issue is how 
different understandings influence its operationalisation, whereby the ideas 
of wellbeing or a good life are often conflated with merely fulfilling relatively 
basic needs (Thiede 2016; Walsh-Dilley and Wolford 2015). In other words, it 
creates temporal tensions between the beneficiaries’ needs whereby poor 
farmers tend to be oriented towards coping with short-term crises, whereas 
wealthier farmers tend to plan and take action over the long term (ibid.).
In order to tackle those challenges, the GoE needs to make efforts, for 
instance, to promote irrigation, soil conservation, and new crop varieties 
in future policies to avoid farmers facing crop failure in times of drought 
(Deressa et al. 2009). The GoE also needs to consider farmers’ needs and 
softer issues in their strategies (Bryan et al. 2009) as well as scaling up 
investment and engaging the private sector (Christopher and Weinthal 
2019). Finally, in relation to the subjective perspective of resilience, the 
GoE will need to emphasise an individualistic view of welfare instead of 
questioning the structural cause of vulnerability, by taking into account 
in its policies the spatial and temporal scales at which resilience is 
promoted or restrained (Thiede 2016; Walsh-Dilley and Wolford 2015).
As described above, from the case study of Ethiopia, we can observe 
that CRD can be perceived differently by two different actors; the GoE 
on one side and the farmers as the beneficiaries of the CRD on the 
other. The GoE uses the objective approach and sets aside existing 
power relations in society in defining CRD in the CRGE, whereas for 
the farmers, CRD means a set of resources such as finance and higher 
social status, which would allow them to come out of poverty and 
become less vulnerable. These different understandings reaffirm how 
subjective the meaning of CRD is and what it can accomplish is more 
important than the definition itself. Therefore, to ensure the effectiveness 
of its implementation, it is important to focus on how CRD is perceived 
by the subjects of the intervention (Chandler and Coaffee 2017).
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4. Conclusion
This paper has discussed the meaning of CRD using Ethiopia and its 
agriculture sector as a case study. For the past ten years, resilience 
has become the new buzzword in the development world, and this 
concept has also become a key element in the policy and strategy 
of development and in the sectors of vulnerability reduction.
In order to describe what CRD means in the Ethiopian context, I started 
with the key definition and literature review, in which I unpacked CRD 
by evaluating the meaning of each element of the concept and in 
particular ‘resilience’ as the primary element. I then discussed linkages 
between resilience and vulnerability and depicted the two different 
ways of interpreting vulnerability and the two distinct methods of 
measuring resilience. This leads on to an objective or subjective definition 
of resilience which can also be applied to an explanation of CRD.
I then assessed how CRD is defined by the GoE in their CRD strategy; 
namely, the CRGE through the agriculture sector. The CRGE, aimed 
at achieving green economic growth and making Ethiopia a middle-
income country by 2025 by reducing poverty and ensuring food security, 
contributes to the GoE’s strategy in building people’s resilience by using 
a top-down approach. However, it does not consider softer issues 
such as vested interests and power relations, resulting in an ‘objective’ 
definition of CRD. On the other hand, when CRD is described from the 
farmers’ perspective, it is defined in a ‘subjective’ way, whereby it is 
perceived as a set of resources such as wealth and higher social status 
enabling them to step out of poverty and become less vulnerable. 
This shows that the definition of CRD is subjective depending on 
the perspective we use: whether it is the government or top-down 
perspective, or the beneficiaries’ or bottom-up perspective.
In conclusion, CRD may be defined in two ways, both objectively and 
subjectively. However, it can be argued that it is more essential to identify 
how resilience is understood from the point of view of a beneficiary in order to 
ensure that CRD is implemented in the most productive and effective way.
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1. Introduction
The production of biofuels in sub-Saharan Africa has reached 
unprecedented levels and continues to increase, with predicted production 
rates of 4.7 million metric tonnes (MT) by 2035 (as compared to 0.2 million 
MT in 2015) (Statista 2019). Whilst previously hailed as a panacea for 
mitigating detrimental environmental impact, biofuels have now received 
substantial criticism, with a new narrative emerging advocating for 
‘sustainable’ biofuel methods to be implemented. In Sierra Leone, the 
leasing of land for biofuel developments is deemed by policymakers to be 
a leading development pathway, relying on foreign investment to lift the 
country out of poverty. However, by relying on this development pathway, 
decision makers are disregarding alternative options for sustainability, 
failing to acknowledge the complex dynamics of the country and the 
varied interpretations of sustainability from multiple stakeholders.
This paper will draw on the STEPS Centre’s Pathways approach (Leach, 
Scoones and Stirling 2007) to explore the dominant and alternative 
framings of sustainability within Sierra Leone’s biofuel debate. The 
‘three lenses on policy processes’ framework will be applied to 
explore how various framings of sustainability have closed down 
multiple pathways (Wolmer et al. 2006; Keeley and Scoones 2003). 
This framework will be applied to help consider the following:
1.  How sustainability has been framed by different actors;
2.  How political interests and agendas have shaped the debate;
3.  How knowledge and interests have shaped discourse 
and the closing down of multiple pathways.
My analysis conveys that powerful stakeholders frequently frame 
sustainability issues in ways that suit self-interests and in turn, influence 
the dominant discourse. This development pathway is based on 
a linear notion of progress, which does not account for multiple 
complexities and which closes down alternative pathways.
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2. Biofuels in Sierra Leone
Sierra Leone’s development goal to become an ‘inclusive, green, middle-
income country’ by 2035 (Government of Sierra Leone 2012: 1) was 
significantly compromised following the 2014–16 Ebola epidemic. Increasing 
foreign investment for biofuel development has become a key component 
of the country’s development pathway. Their 2019 Medium-Term National 
Development Plan (2019–23), has emphasised the need to attract private 
investment (Government of Sierra Leone 2019). Biofuel initiatives have 
been running since the 1980s (Amigun, Musango and Stafford 2011), yet 
this new period is highly significant as dominant sustainability framings 
are designed to be the bedrock for the country’s recovery trajectory.
Sierra Leone’s growth-centred development model raises an interesting 
question as to how sustainability is interpreted within domestic policy. 
It does not fit the Bruntland Report’s definition of ‘meet[ing] the needs 
of the present without compromising the ability of future generations’ 
(UN 1987: 43), but instead is more suited to an alternative sustainability 
definition, having the ‘ability of a system to bounce back from shocks and 
stresses and adopt stable states’ (Leach, Scoones and Stirling 2010: 33). 
In short, the dominant sustainability policy in Sierra Leone neglects the 
additional components of the sustainability definition, such as ‘qualities 
of wellbeing, social equity and environmental integrity’ (ibid.: 17).
Although Sierra Leone’s feedstocks of sugarcane and palm oil produce 
biofuels such as ethanol and biodiesel which are believed to have 
‘green’ credentials, by decreasing deforestation and environmental 
degradation (Wolde-Georgis and Glantz 2010), the social and political 
implications of biofuels have been disregarded. The end result is 
that the current government policy undermines the livelihood of 
farmers due to frequent land dispossession, threats to food security, 
increased food prices, and the resulting exacerbation of poverty and 
starvation (Maconachie 2019). This illustrates the subjective, value-
laden, and deeply political nature of the term sustainability, which 
is often framed to fit certain agendas. It is the actors, interests, and 
knowledge that shape the way that sustainability is interpreted and 
applied, which will be further developed in the methodology section.
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3. Methodology
In this paper, I apply the STEPS Centre’s Pathways approach (Leach et al. 
2007) and the ‘three lenses on policy processes’ conceptual framework 
(Wolmer et al. 2006; Keeley and Scoones 2003) to analyse how notions 
of sustainability have been framed, how such narratives have come to 
dominate, and the power reflected in political interests and agendas. The 
notion of pathway conveys ‘the way a given system changes over time’ 
(Leach et al. 2007: 12). The Pathways approach recognises the complex 
and diverse nature of social, ecological, and technical systems with 
diverse knowledges, values, and plural pathways to achieving intended 
goals. This approach perceives that often systems may have a linear view 
of ‘sustainable’ development, with a dominant pathway that neglects 
or suppresses alternative narratives. This paper explores the contested 
framings of biofuel used to promote sustainability, arguing that biofuel 
has become the dominant pathway and has, in turn, closed down 
alternative and multiple pathways towards achieving sustainability.
The ‘three lenses on policy processes’ diagram (see Figure 3.1) illustrates 
the dynamics that are involved in policymaking, categorised into three 
main groups: roles and agency amongst actors and networks; state 
and civil society interactions and group interests; the impact of shifting 
discourses and use of knowledge (Wolmer et al. 2006: 7). In this paper, 
I will apply the conceptual framework to assess the actors, interests, 
and discourse involved in the political process of biofuel expansion in 
Sierra Leone, and how these components overlap and intersect within 
decision-making processes. This framework helps to map out:
1.  Who are the authors of various narratives?
2.  Whose interests inform the policies?
3.  What knowledge and narratives create and 
reinforce the dominant discourse?
The framework will help to identify any alternative narratives 
and where they sit within the biofuel debate. The framework also 
helps to discern how dominant framings project a dominant 
discourse and shut down alternative pathways.
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Figure 3.1 Three lenses on policy processes
Source: Wolmer et al. (2006).
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4. Sustainability narratives 
in Sierra Leone
In this section, I will draw on the ‘three lenses on policy processes’ 
framework (Wolmer et al. 2006; Keeley and Scoones 2003) to 
explore the multiple sustainability narratives from different 
stakeholders and how they have influenced narratives in Sierra 
Leone. This includes the EU and G20; the World Bank; the Sierra 
Leone government; private companies; local elites and local non-
elites. My discussion section will analyse how certain framings have 
stimulated the closing down of multiple pathways to sustainability.
4.1 The EU and G20
The EU Renewable Energy Directive has introduced a new biofuel criteria 
for achieving sustainability (European Commission 2019), and the G20 
has published a toolkit for renewable energy deployment, calling for 
sustainable biofuel production pathways to be prioritised (IRENA 2016). 
These recognise the negative and unsustainable implications biofuel 
production can have on energy, land, and livelihoods. However, despite 
the new sustainable criteria instigated by global leaders, there has been 
increased investment from the European Commission, the World Bank, and 
other international players, often failing to achieve the same standards of 
sustainability and satisfying a ‘minimum compliance approach’ (German 
and Schoneveld 2012: 33). The EU’s framing of sustainability therefore 
reveals a contradiction, rendering nugatory the standards advocated 
within European policy, and signifying that Western political interests 
within Sierra Leone may have a neo-colonial underpinning. There are 
no existing sustainability criteria which can justify the current scale of 
land acquisition across the African continent (Bracco 2015: 137). The 
increasing involvement of European actors extracting biofuels in Sierra 
Leone reinforces the dominant market-led development pathway.
4.2 The World Bank
Two months ago, the World Bank approved a US$40m grant in Sierra 
Leone, to ‘promote sustainable and inclusive growth’ through increased 
productivity in agriculture and other activities, and authorising the scaling 
up of investment (World Bank 2019). The World Bank’s growth-led narrative 
suggests that economic development will contribute to the eradicating 
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of poverty and improve national prosperity, dependent upon ‘a solid 
enabling environment for the exploitation of its abundant natural resources’ 
(ibid.). The World Bank’s framing of sustainability propels the narrative of 
economic growth as the dominant development pathway, without the 
necessary consideration of local livelihoods and alternative pathways.
4.3 The Sierra Leone government
This sustainability rhetoric is adopted by the Sierra Leone government 
who hope to re-stabilise the economy through export-oriented business 
(Maconachie 2019). The primary assumption is that pro-biofuel policies 
will encourage economic growth, creating agricultural jobs and salaries 
(Palliere and Cochet 2018). Sustainability is framed as economic growth 
that will gradually ‘trickle down’ to populations, despite ongoing 
evictions of smallholder farmers and job loss (Maconachie 2019). In 
this case the dominant development model is promoting a singular 
notion of progress which is, in turn, closing down multiple pathways 
and limiting the prospects for local perspectives to be heard.
4.4 Foreign biofuel companies
Multinational companies engaging in biofuel production often 
adopt corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies to reduce the 
negative impacts on local communities (Maconachie 2019). CSR has 
become a new phenomenon to tackle sustainability issues, addressing 
the economic, social, and environmental effects of a company’s 
engagements. Although there may be good intentions behind many 
CSR projects, CSR can be framed to construct a particular narrative 
that fits with the interests of the company. This helps the company 
project a positive image of their practices, selectively choosing which 
information will be shared, and influencing the public discourse.
4.5 Addax Bioenergy Ltd
CSR activities have been adopted by the large bioenergy project run by 
Addax Bioenergy Ltd who have claimed to enact positive social practices, 
working with the local farming communities to mitigate disruptions caused 
by the project (Millar 2018).The project has been recognised for its claims to 
economic, environmental, and social responsibility (ibid.), setting up a 
Farmer Development Programme in partnership with the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO), assisting farmers in efficient farming 
practices, and working with local populations affected by the project to 
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guarantee food security (Bottazzi et al. 2018). Studies have shown that many 
villagers who have taken part in the programme have had an increase in 
financial income and arguably improved food and water security, although 
there has not been a linear impact (ibid.: 128). The underlying incentives for 
the company to engage in social programmes that promote sustainability 
within the region has been the international reputation the company has 
gained and the conditional public funding received for committing to 
sustainable practices (ibid.).
Although the ambitions of this bioenergy project have been to ‘become 
a benchmark for sustainable investment in agriculture’ engaging with 
multiple stakeholders (ibid.: 130), studies have shown that there have been 
degrees of coercion from the company whilst pushing their sustainability 
agenda. Millar (2018) traced the social dynamics of the project and 
their findings evidence that despite organised activities with locals 
to remediate the disruptive or negative impacts of their project, the 
company exercised control over rural farming populations through direct 
and indirect force. The direct force occurred through intimidation of local 
farmers by the use of security guards protecting the site, and the indirect 
force was contained in the company’s position as a legal entity with 
protection from the government (Millar 2018: 760). These findings suggest 
that although Addax Bioenergy Ltd have publicly projected their values 
of sustainability, the methods by which they achieve such recognition are 
complex and contested, often exacerbating inequality on a local level.
Furthermore, a lack of local knowledge within rural areas can also jeopardise 
the sustainability of local livelihoods. Farmers mainly operate within an 
informal system without legal titles (FAO 2018), and therefore land acquisition 
can lead to the displacement of farmers. Foreign companies intervening 
in local contexts, irrespective of social and cultural dynamics can cause 
conflict (Millar 2018: 766). The government often ignore local connections with 
land and advertise land as ‘under-utilised’, ‘free’, or ‘unused’ (Palliere and 
Cochet 2018: 424), despite the fact that such land is often being used by 
smallholder farmers. The government’s interests and prioritisation of market-
led development overlooks local contexts and further exacerbates poverty.
4.6 Local non-elite perspectives
Studies show that sustainability is interpreted differently by smallholder 
farmers who frame sustainability as food security, land rights, and 
employment. Yet the government is preoccupied with tactics to attract 
bioenergy investors, placing agribusiness ‘at the centre of the country’s 
development trajectory’ (Maconachie 2019: 876), often ignoring the 
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voices of local populations. Moreover, there have been clashes with 
multinationals and local populations in ‘negotiating the best deals’, with 
women especially vulnerable in not having their voices heard (Palliere and 
Cochet 2018: 423). This is of particular concern given that women’s claims 
to land are already inhibited by existing gender roles and the demands 
of childbearing; therefore, land acquisition, even if seemingly gender-
neutral, reinforces gender disempowerment (Millar 2015: 455). The single, 
dominant pathway promoted by domestic policy neglects marginalised 
groups and reinforces the unequal power divisions amongst stakeholders.
4.7 Local elite perspectives
Acknowledgement of the intersectionality amongst stakeholder groups 
is imperative to further understand existing power divides. Sierra Leone 
is a very unequal country and an individual’s agency can differ greatly 
between groups. There are large disparities in wealth between the 
elites who have access to education, employment, and travel and 
the non-elites in rural areas (Millar 2014). The power held amongst 
authorities such as ministers, district officers, and paramount chiefs has 
enabled these actors to work with foreign companies to secure deals 
that benefit their own interests, failing to adequately represent the 
local non-elites and their needs (Millar 2018). Chiefs received ‘20 per 
cent of every land-lease dollar paid by the project, or approximately 
US$71,000 per year collectively’ (Millar 2018: 763), providing them with 
an incentive to support the biofuel projects. Furthermore, studies have 
shown that resources have been distributed amongst elites who are 
most likely to support and serve the companies, influencing the actions 
and opinions of locals and reinforcing the pro-biofuel discourse (ibid.).
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5. Discussion
The above section has illustrated the multiple actors within the biofuel 
debate, and the various sustainability perspectives. It also has conveyed 
the unequal relationships between authorities, private investors, and 
local farming populations. Within the top-down system, where policy is 
influenced by powerful actors, vulnerable and marginalised groups have 
not been taken into account. This linear pathway for sustainability fails to 
acknowledge the complexity and dynamism within the social order, and is 
inherently exclusive, effectively serving only the interests of the powerful.
Analysing the various framings of sustainability by different stakeholders 
has identified the political interests and underlying agendas. While political 
bodies such as the World Bank, the EU Renewable Energy Directive, and the 
Sierra Leone government are prioritising foreign investment and economic 
growth as the country’s pathway to sustainability, local non-elite populations 
interpret sustainability as adequate food security, land rights, and 
employment, yet at the same time they have no power to frame their opinions 
within domestic policy. This highlights the importance of opening up pathways 
to sustainability, addressing diverse values, perspectives, and knowledge.
My findings convey that it is the powerful stakeholders that create and 
reinforce the dominant discourse, to suit particular political interests. 
Knowledge from authorities is prioritised and marginalised groups 
are further side-lined. Knowledge is therefore ‘produced discursively, 
shaping and reflecting particular institutional and political practices’ 
(Keeley and Scoones 2003: 1), further exacerbating inequality. For 
a more inclusive, sustainable model, alternative pathways need to 
be addressed, acknowledging marginalised voices, local forms of 
knowledge, and in turn, opening up multiple pathways to sustainability.
It is evident from the analysis above that the dominant discourse prioritises 
foreign investors over non-elite rural populations. It is, however, unfeasible 
to accept the ‘one-size-fits-all’ notion that Western innovators assume 
when adapting biofuel processes in new contexts. There is a degree of 
‘incomplete knowledge’ of the complex dynamics of the new setting, the 
risks, uncertainty, and ambiguities that may occur in a new environment, 
climate and cultural setting (Leach et al. 2010). This single development 
pathway inhibits other options and risks creating a technological ‘lock-
in’, whereby there is a dependency on one particular technological 
process (Unruh and Turray 2006). Reliance on one particular development 
trajectory may well cause problems in the face of future shocks or 
stresses that the country may experience (Leach et al. 2010: 13).
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6. Conclusion
This paper has examined the various framings of sustainability by different 
stakeholders, applying the ‘three lenses on policy processes’ framework 
to explore the actors and political interests that influence the dominant 
discourse. The Pathways approach has guided my analysis in examining 
the dominant and alternative pathways within Sierra Leone’s biofuel 
debate, concluding that the dominant, government-led pathway to 
sustainability closes down alternative pathways, excluding alternative 
narratives and failing to address the needs of the local farming population. 
This dominant pathway does not consider the complex dynamics within 
Sierra Leone, and as a result, local livelihoods are not protected. Diverse 
knowledge and perspectives need to be taken into account in order 
to create a more inclusive and sustainable development trajectory.
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1. Introduction
Like many sub-Saharan African countries, Zimbabwe has a large agricultural 
production sector but experiences domestic food shortages. In 2004, 
for example, 1,520,000 metric tonnes (MT) of maize was produced and 
yet 250,000 MT of food aid was received (Trading Economics n.d.).
The poverty headcount ratio at US$2 a day (PPP) is 45.5 per cent of 
the population, with a Gini index score of 43.15 (Trading Economics 
n.d.), yet Zimbabwe was a major trading partner to Europe before the 
2000–09 period of economic depression and land reforms (Borras 
Jr et al. 2011). Persistent bouts of economic and political instability 
exacerbate food insecurity. Trading economics data for maize production 
in Zimbabwe shows that approximately 350,000 MT of food aid was 
required in 2008 during the contested elections, over double the 
average required during the previous three years (Trading Economics 
n.d.). Reliance on food aid brings further uncertainty as international 
food aid is often linked to political will and donor countries’ confidence 
in domestic countries’ ability to manage resources equitably.
Yield trends are insufficient to double global crop production by 2050 (Ray 
et al. 2013) and climate change will increase vulnerability and exacerbate 
low crop yields globally (Twomlow et al. 2008). Small-scale farmers will 
need to diversify if they are to become resilient to shocks and stresses 
(Ellis 2000). Given that maize accounts for 90 per cent of Zimbabwe’s 
total cereal output (FAO 2019), if more value can be derived from maize 
production, this could have a significant impact on poverty reduction.
This paper seeks to apply the literature on value chain upgrading to 
the Zimbabwean context in the main staple crop, maize. The research 
found that most process upgrades and indeed, some product upgrades, 
are not likely to lead to increased income or options as maize farmers 
are captive suppliers in a quasi-hierarchical value chain governance 
structure, with the government-buying entity, the Grain Marketing Board 
(GMB) being the monopoly buyer. Some product upgrades might lead to 
farmers creating new products for new markets, such as livestock feed 
production. However, it should not be assumed that increased income 
will lead to more robust and resilient livelihoods, especially in the context 
of economic uncertainty, cash illiquidity, and rapid cash devaluation in 
Zimbabwe. As such, this paper argues that product upgrading might 
be a starting point but not a sufficient ‘end game’ for Zimbabwean 
small-scale maize farmers, and looks at the Schmitz cluster model 
(1999) as a method for how improvements might be implemented.
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2. Methodology
This paper relied on secondary data research but draws on a foundation 
of the author’s own observation, having worked on livelihood improvement 
programmes in Zimbabwe. The key framework drawn on and operationalised 
is Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon’s (2005) thinking on value chain 
governance and analytical typologies and Schmitz’s three types of value 
chain upgrading and thinking on clusters (Humphrey and Schmitz 2002).
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3. Literature review
Value chain governance describes the conditions and terms of trade between 
suppliers and buyers or lead firms, including how and at what price a product 
is produced and remunerated (Gereffi 1999; Humphrey and Schmitz 2002). An 
analysis of the governance of value chains can reveal the power relations and 
what constraints and options are open to those with less agency (Kaplinsky 
2000). An analysis of the power dynamics and motivations of different 
interest groups is necessary to design meaningful change programmes.
Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) identified the four categories of value chain 
governance as Hierarchy, Quasi-hierarchy, Network, and Market, which Gereffi 
et al. (2005) adapted to the five categories of Hierarchy, Captive (or quasi-
hierarchical), Relational, Modular, and Market, as visualised in Figure 3.1. The 
typologies, going from left to right, describe the degree of integration and 
therefore control that lead firms have over the value chain. The more integrated 
the value chain is, the higher the degree of power asymmetry. A good example 
is a multinational corporation such as Coca Cola, who may have local 
sourcing and manufacturing operations run by local entities, but those local 
entities are producing to a recipe dictated by Coca Cola and bottling the 
product in Coca Cola-branded bottles with Coca Cola labels, distributed 
by branded trucks. Local entity firms are not free to do their own marketing 
and producers of the ingredients are producing to Coca Cola specifications.
Figure 3.1 Value chain governance typologies
Source: Gereffi et al. (2005). Reprinted by permission of the publisher (Taylor & Francis Ltd)
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According to Gereffi’s definition, the Zimbabwean maize value chain 
mostly fits the ‘captive value chain’ model because all maize farmers 
are obliged to sell their total output to the GMB, so they are not free 
to brand and package their raw maize for other markets where they 
might find niche or high-value markets. For example, they might be 
better off selling to local informal markets during times of shortage 
or export to Zambia or Mozambique when there are shortages. 
However, it is not a straightforward case as it is difficult to say that 
farmers are disadvantaged because the GMB usually offers one of 
the highest world market prices. However, power relations are what is 
being examined and this favourable price has been set at the behest 
of an authoritarian government and there are fears that the new 
dispensation, and finance minister, may bring new ideas. The GMB 
offers a favourable price to millers wishing to buy maize for secondary 
processing which presents an opportunity, but again, this is within the 
control of the government, whereas farmers and small enterprises have 
extremely limited agency over their sourcing and price of inputs.
Gereffi (2018) discusses the following three factors to determine value chain 
governance:
– Complexity of transactions: how complex, or easy to 
penetrate or replicate, are the transactions? Could the 
supplier have access to this upstream information?
– Codifiability of information: how transparent, or embedded is the 
information?
– Capability of suppliers: does the supplier have access to key components 
(skills, knowledge)?
The following indicators and framework have been operationalised 
as a value chain governance diagnostics tool for the purposes 
of classifying the Zimbabwean maize value chain.
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Figure 3.2 Value chain governance diagnostic tool
Source: Author’s own.
The government’s Command Agriculture Programme is a contract 
farming initiative whereby farmers are given inputs on credit, which 
are deducted from their maize delivery to the GMB. Maize produced 
under the government’s contract farming initiative presents some 
characteristics of a fully hierarchical value chain but does not fit the 
classical definition of vertical integration as the GMB doesn’t do secondary 
processing such as milling and feed formulation but sells to secondary 
processors. Depending on where we choose to begin and end the maize 
value chain, it can be seen as quasi-hierarchical or hierarchical.
Understanding the value chain governance as well as the capacity of the 
supplier is key to evaluating the options open to a particular supplier in order 
to increase the power and agency the supplier has. Sturgeon identifies three 
types of suppliers, or ways of looking at their capabilities (Gereffi et al. 2005):
– Commodity supplier: who produces standardised, 
generic inputs that are easy to copy;
– Captive supplier: who produces non-standard inputs 
or parts, typically using specialised machinery;
– Turn-key supplier: who produces customised products, using flexible 
machinery and perhaps pools the capacity of other suppliers as part of 
modular production networks.
Ideas from IDS: Graduate Papers from 2018/19
What Viable Value Chain Upgrading Options are Open to Small-Scale 
Grain Farmers in Zimbabwe?
© 2020 Amy Coupland © Institute of Development Studies
142ids.ac.uk
According to Sturgeon’s definition (Gereffi et al. 2005), maize farmers 
are commodity suppliers to the GMB of Zimbabwe, the government 
subsidiary to whom all grain farmers are obliged to sell to. The GMB has 
the market monopoly for raw material and adds value itself by producing 
‘maize meal’ (milled maize which is used to make ‘sadza’, the household 
staple food) or issues millers’ licences to formal and informal millers.
Schmitz (1999) is a key proponent of the three theoretical 
approaches to the foundation of value chains:
– Transaction cost theory: non-monetary costs involved with production;
– Network: trust, reputation, mutual dependence;
– Firm capabilities: available knowledge and skills.
Schmitz also adds the dimension of local governance, the relationship 
between local and global policy, and the role of clusters as a 
mechanism to improve governance to the Gereffi, Humphrey, and 
Sturgeon literature which will be pertinent for this paper.
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4. Case study
Figure 4.1 represents the Zimbabwean maize value chain. A key issue 
on the inputs side is the lack of research and availability of improved 
certified seed (Mukeredzi 2017). As discussed later, there have been 
improved seed initiatives with variable results. Cost and accessibility of 
seed for farmers is likely to be a barrier due to reduced purchasing power 
owing to worsening economic conditions since 2015. Land preparation, 
management, and harvesting is labour-intensive and done by hand 
among small-scalers. In 2018, the GMB was offering US$390 per tonne for 
maize (FAO 2017) compared with the highest world price of US$210 (FAO 
2017). However, there are questions around the payment times and terms 
of the GMB. The high prices set by the GMB are likely to create an incentive 
for farmers to give much of the land they have access to over to maize 
production and to sell as much as they can afford to sell to the GMB.
The paradigm of long-term ecological losses for the short-term gains 
of intensive monocropping is well documented (Tittonell and Giller 2013). 
More diverse crops would likely be better for nutrition, resilient income 
sources, and ecological sustainability but the strong market pull for 
maize is likely to overpower alternatives. Key issues relating to the actors 
in the inputs and services space are the high barriers to accessing 
performance-enhancing technologies such as irrigation for small-
scalers. For example, the high cost of technologies and lack of collateral, 
or an alternative narrative might cite a poorly designed financial sector 
with products that do not serve a huge section of their market.
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Figure 4.1 Value chain governance diagnostic tool
Source: Author’s own.
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4.1 Problem and root cause analysis of the maize 
value chain
Table 4.1 Problem analysis of the maize value chain
Value chain 
governance
Market 
failures
Political/ 
economic
Climate
Maize market is a state-owned monopoly X
High price for raw maize undermines food 
security and nutrition
X
Lack of purchasing power for improved 
inputs or new technologies (e.g. improved 
seed, irrigation systems)
X
Lack of knowledge and skills to improve 
yields, apply new technologies or diversify
X X
Lack of access to balanced extension 
services (AGRITEX, the government-run 
service prevails)
X
Climate uncertainty undermines yields (El 
Niño in 2015, drought of 2018 and 2019)
X
Political instability undermines yields 
(contested elections in 2008 and 
depressed economy, army takeover in 
November 2017) 
X
High transaction costs for farmers 
(transport, distribution, mobile money fees), 
particularly the most rural and poorest
X
Market flooding during main harvest (and 
inability to safely withhold and store grain)
X
Source: Author’s own.
4.2 What are the possible strategies for redressing 
power asymmetry?
Table 4.1 shows that many of the problems fall into the root cause 
categories of political and economic challenges and asymmetrical power 
dynamics in the value chain (value chain governance). Farmers and 
actors who might be mobilised to implement a change strategy (such as 
small- and medium-sized enterprises, non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), producer organisations) do not have the authority and agency 
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to influence these key problem areas and therefore any strategy needs 
to take this macroeconomic context into account. Empirical evidence 
shows that food riots are a key cause of political unrest. These commodity 
suppliers exist in an autocratic governmental system that is geared 
towards reaching grain targets and being able to claim food security. A 
lack of last-mile distribution channels for seed, inputs, and final commodity 
means that the most rural and therefore poorest farmers are required 
to pay transport providers to deliver their grain and are worse off.
According to network theory, low trust and lack of reputation 
results in non-existent, dysfunctional networks with unequal power 
relations (e.g. small-scale farmers have low bargaining power to 
negotiate favourable trade agreements, e.g. pre-financing).
Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) identify three types of value chain upgrading:
– Process: doing certain tasks better (e.g. investment in machinery, 
workforce training, changing layout, new management techniques);
– Product: making a product that is of better quality, more sophisticated, 
or simply carries a better price (e.g. new models, new lines, new materials);
– Functional: acquiring skills in a chain activity that the firm did not 
possess before (e.g. a producer starting to design their own products, 
launching own brands, coordinating their own supply chain, doing their 
own marketing activity or entering new markets).
Given that process upgrading and functional upgrading would result 
in the end product being largely the same product and thus ending 
up in the same monopoly GMB market, product upgrading is the 
only upgrading option that is likely to address the root causes.
Value chain upgrading would afford farmers more agency and 
be less dependent on GMB and national prices. Value chain 
governance is important in the context of understanding which 
upgrading options are open to particular actors (Humphrey 
and Schmitz 2002). Schmitz and Knorringa note that functional 
upgrading is less conducive to hierarchical and captive value 
chains (Schmitz and Knorringa 2000; Bair and Gereffi 2001).
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5. Zimbabwean value chain 
upgrading options
Figure 5.1 presents some of the process and product upgrading options 
which have been selected based on empirical evidence of their viability. All 
options, except option 5, would reach the GMB market and would therefore 
be subject to the value chain governance constraints identified above.
Figure 5.1 Zimbabwean maize value chain 
upgrading options
Source: Author’s own.
5.1 Analysis of upgrading options
1) Planting later
Rains are getting later due to climate change and there is a need to plant 
later but cultural customs play a role in dictating planting times. Additionally, 
later planting, and therefore a late crop harvest, could give farmers a 
competitive advantage as they may be able to ride out the market flooding 
that happens during peak marketing times. However, access to timely 
and technically reliable information on planting times is an issue. This is a 
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relatively high-risk option for potentially low gains. If the GMB does not put 
the price up towards the end of the season and farmers have waited too 
long after the first rains, the gain could be small or worse still, negative.
2) Aggregation silos
Retaining grain for when stock is low and demand is high could enable farmers 
to ride out the market flooding described above. However, the same challenges 
apply as with option one and there are additional technical considerations 
around storage techniques, fumigations, and managing mildew with grain 
silos as well as the financial barrier that is likely to be prohibitive to many.
3) Mechanisation
The planting and shelling of maize is done by hand, which is labour-
intensive (and often done by women). Models around individuals or groups 
of farmers commissioning tractors for land preparation and shelling are 
viable options, but the gains are only worth it during a reliable season. The 
additional social benefits of labour-saving technologies, particularly for 
women who tend to do much of the manual labour, cannot be ignored.
4) Alternative varieties
According to the International Maize and Wheat Improvement Centre 
(CIMMYT), 53 million hectares of improved variety maize was under 
production in 2008 which represents almost half of the total maize under 
production (56 per cent, or 6.7 million hectares, was traditional variety 
recycled seed). It is important to learn from previous effort and if almost 
half of the maize under production in 2008 was improved varieties, this 
should be taken into consideration. Notably, there are some biofortified, 
‘orange maize’ varieties which have improved nutritional value (FAO 2017).
5) Milling for maize meal and/or livestock feed production
The GMB price for millers is often very favourable which makes 
secondary processing an interesting option. The cost and access to 
milling machines might be prohibitive and creative ownership or rental 
use models may need to be explored. Prices for maize meal seem 
to be broadly declining and are quite geographically sensitive, likely 
due to the availability of maize in each province (see Figure 5.2).
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Figure 5.2 Retail prices of maize meal
Source: © FAO/GIEWS Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Tool (2017).
It seems, then, that stock feed production as a value chain upgrading 
option would be a pertinent line of enquiry for further research. The 
maize-cropping calendar is focused on activities in January–June, with 
income recognised in May–July (see Figure 5.3). Poultry production is all 
year round and cattle pen fattening usually takes place around June–
September and net gain per beast can be as much as double (FAO 2017).
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Figure 5.3 Retail prices of maize meal
Source: © FAO/GIEWS Food Price Monitoring and Analysis Tool (2017).
Some considerations are the competitiveness of space, which market 
actors dominate which segments of the market, and which shares of the 
market farmers might effectively penetrate. For example, if the national 
feed brands are expensive in rural locations due to the small volumes and 
high distribution costs, can locally produced alternatives compete in this 
space effectively? A consideration is that the feed formulations may be 
subject to intellectual property rights and may not be readily available.
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Table 5.1 Summary of the challenges associated 
with stock feed production as a value chain 
upgrading strategy
Financial Economic Skills gap Market Political/ 
systemic
Heavy investment for small-scalers 
(dehullers, milling machine, mixers) X
Access to stock feed recipes (may be 
proprietary) X
Skills and knowledge to produce stock 
feeds X
Business and marketing skills to bring 
the stock feeds to market X
Backward and forward market 
linkages associated with bringing the 
stock feeds to market
X
Source: Author’s own.
Although there are challenges associated with this strategy, a quick 
analysis of the barriers (Table 5.1) reveals that they are largely technical 
skills, financial gaps, and market-based issues which are relatively easier 
to influence than the political economy challenges identified in Table 4.1.
This strategy should not be seen as a miracle solution as it may not 
necessarily address the issue of food security and nutrition. However, an 
argument could be made that this strategy feeds into production and 
growth narratives such that small-scalers should increase production so 
that they will be better able to serve markets and better off in turn (Johnston 
and Mellor 1961). Agroecological alternatives would also serve farmers and 
the environment better in the long term, resulting in more resilient livelihoods 
(Altieri 2002). Empirical evidence shows that high-value livestock such as 
cattle often fall into the hands of males in households and that women 
tend to make decisions than benefit all more equitably. As such, cattle pen 
fattening may not result in improved livelihoods. Poultry production could 
address the food security and nutrition aspect of this nexus, but only as 
part of a wider programme promoting access to poultry as a protein source, 
otherwise the production narrative and market forces are likely to prevail.
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The implementation model of a solution could be as important as the 
solution. Humphrey and Schmitz (2002) analyse the merits of clusters 
versus value chains in terms of their governance structures and what 
it means for upgrading. They assert that clusters can foster:
– Strong local governance characterised by cooperation 
between stakeholders and sharing of risk;
– Promotion of incremental upgrading and diffusion of innovation 
within the cluster through ‘local innovation centres’; and,
– Emphasis on collective efficiency within the cluster, rather than 
competition between firms.
Perhaps ‘stock feed clusters’ are a model worth investigating as a means for 
smallholders to reach economies of scale, increasing collective bargaining 
power to access equipment, finance, inputs, and markets. A potentially 
scalable example is an Australian Aid Programme project called Integrating 
Crops and Livestock for Improved Food Security and Livelihoods in Rural 
Zimbabwe (ZimCLIFS), which was working from 2012–17 to ‘strengthen 
synergies in crop-livestock farming systems in four districts of Zimbabwe’ (ILRI 
n.d.). The project was funded by the Australian Aid Programme through the 
Australian Centre for International Agricultural Research (ACIAR) and was 
implemented by the International Livestock Research Institute (lead agency) 
in collaboration with the International Maize and Wheat Improvement 
Center; the International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics; 
Australia’s Commonwealth, Scientific and Industrial Research Organisation 
Ecosystem Sciences; the University of Queensland; Zimbabwean NGOs – 
Community Technology Development Organization and Cluster Agricultural 
Development Services; and several departments within the Zimbabwe 
Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation Development (ACIAR n.d.).
The ZimCLIFS project implemented Innovation Platforms in dryland 
areas as a way of channelling technologies, leveraging local extension 
channels, and introducing fodder crops for pen fattening cattle, and 
provided knowledge on planting and utilising mucuna as a fodder 
crop. This shows how this type of intervention could provide the forward 
linkages for other farmers to crowd in and begin to produce the fodder 
crops to feed the value chain and/or the livestock to offtake the feed.
The results of this project included farmers entering into livestock 
production because they had access to feed and also one 
farmer converting an engine into a crop residue chopper.
Some additional benefits of this extended maize value chain model are that 
it creates the backward linkages for other nutritional crops such as soya, 
which it can rationally be assumed will reach diets. The clusters model can 
leverage existing structures such as village savings and credit cooperatives 
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(SACCOs), capitalising on pre-existing trust in the networks and formalising 
their activities. Economies of scale are more likely to be recognised and 
volumes of feed could reach semi-commercial or commercial scale.
Figure 5.4 indicates what a ‘stock feed cluster’ might look like.
Figure 5.4 Stock feed/extended maize value chain
Note: IP = intellectual property. Source: Author’s own.
Some considerations crucial to the success of this model are cluster 
governance and incentives for individual members, which is contentious 
in many contexts. Lessons should be learned from existing local 
structures and cultural leaders and they should be acknowledged 
and integrated appropriately. Surety of land tenure and availability 
of expansion land to produce fodder crops should be considered.
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6. Conclusion
A value chain governance analysis has revealed that Zimbabwean maize 
farmers are commodity suppliers in a captive value chain, which puts some 
constraints on the meaningful upgrading options available to them. Any 
maize value chain upgrading strategy needs to take into account the 
challenges presented by the prevailing complex political and economic 
context of Zimbabwe, which farmers do not have the authority to influence. 
Upgrading options that result in an end product of raw maize means that 
the government-run GMB will be the sole market for that output, resulting in 
the same value chain governance conditions. As such, extending the value 
chain and entering into secondary processing is the strategy most likely to 
result in farmers being better able to withstand macroeconomic shocks.
Producing a secondary product is, in effect, asking small-scale farmers 
to become business proprietors. Inputs such as training, finance, and 
equipment are required to successfully implement such product lines 
and smallholders may face particular challenges in accessing these 
due to socioeconomic status, financial and geographical barriers, and 
specific disadvantages associated with gender, disability, and age.
Additionally, backward linkages for inputs such as fodder crops and 
nutrients for stock feed production may not be readily accessible 
to small-scalers. Likely barriers in terms of the forward linkages and 
market access to offtake the product might include poor physical 
and non-physical infrastructure for distribution and sales, and 
challenges in negotiating contractual arrangements, for example.
Creating and sustaining external linkages are key to the success of 
upgrading strategies and lessons can be learned from Latin American 
examples (Giuliani, Rabellotti and Van Dijk 2005). Being able to reliably 
satisfy the markets for new product lines and good relationships with 
market actors will be key to remaining competitive in their markets. Forming 
or utilising existing structures to form clusters could provide a buffer to 
some of these start-up barriers. These clusters could, for example, provide 
access to a bigger and more diverse skillset, labour sources, combine 
collateral to access finance, and negotiate supplier agreements.
These local clusters have three significant advantages over national clusters:
– Intimate knowledge of local market dynamics, preferences, 
and buying habits: for example, what quantities farmers 
prefer to buy stock feed in, at which times of the year;
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– Better and cheaper access to locally produced 
ingredients: for example, fodder crops such as soya 
might be grown locally, or even by a sub-cluster;
– Network trust: the clusters are locally embedded, trusted agents 
operating in areas where reputation and trust is crucial to business 
success.
In summary, these clusters will face barriers to entry in addition to 
any common start-up issues such as internal governance challenges 
and learning to create strong external linkages, but if they can be 
overcome, the model and size of the opportunity seems promising.
Annexe A
Figure A1 International maize prices
Source: © FAO (2019), CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.
Figure A2 Retail prices of maize meal in Zimbabwe
Source: © FAO (2019), CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO.
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1. Introduction and background
The emergence of ‘new powers’ or ‘rising states’, such as China and Brazil, 
has dramatically changed the power dynamics in today’s global society 
(Narlikar 2010; Cooper and Alexandroff 2010). Being active as both partners 
and donors now, these emerging economies have increased their influence 
and presence in international development aid discourse over recent years. 
This means that they are no longer a mere recipient of aid, but have become 
a significant provider of foreign development aid (Mawdsley 2012a).
The tendency of emerging donors has caused growing debate among 
researchers over foreign aid policies, ideologies, and governance regimes (ibid.). 
On the one hand, critics are concerned that all the efforts made by traditional 
donors for poverty reduction, aid effectiveness, and good governance may be 
undermined, because of the increasing number of new actors and their lack 
of transparency and different approaches to development (Zimmermann and 
Smith 2011; Manning 2006). In other words, emerging donors are seen as posing 
a threat to the hegemony of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee1 (DAC) 
donors, among which are not China or Brazil. Some of them are even called 
‘rogue donors’ since their approaches to aid appear to only serve their own 
interests but not benefit poorer recipient countries (Naím 2007). Therefore, their 
engagements can also be viewed as a new form of colonialism, in that those 
efforts are directed to resource exploitation and/or new business opportunities 
for the aid providers, leading to over-indebtedness and dependencies 
on the side of the recipients (Scoones, Cabral and Tugendhat 2013).
On the other hand, other researchers more positively interpret this fracturing 
of the Western-dominated aid paradigm. Sato et al. (2010a, 2010b) argue 
that emerging donors and development partners offer recipient countries not 
just wider options of finance and aid, but also new development models and 
approaches to economic growth. These alternatives can be more suitable for 
the betterment of society and productivity improvement in developing country 
contexts, while rebalancing the skewed global power dynamics at the same time.
Thus, recipients can learn the ways in which emerging donors have transformed 
themselves into growing economies from their first-hand experience (Scoones et al. 2013).
The latter perspective, or the new modality of development cooperation that 
stresses the idea of ‘sharing’ between developing countries, in stark contrast 
to the OECD-DAC’s ‘giving’ model, came to be referred to as South–South 
1  The DAC currently consists of 30 member countries that are assessed by the following criteria: 
(1) the existence of appropriate strategies, policies and institutional frameworks that ensure capacity 
to deliver a development cooperation programme, (2) an accepted measure of effort, and (3) the 
existence of a system of performance monitoring and evaluation’ (OECD 2019).
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Cooperation (SSC) (UNOSSC 2019a). In 2011, traditional and non-traditional 
donors gathered at the High Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (HLF4) in Busan, 
South Korea as equal aid providers for the first time, to discuss and align the 
direction of aid provision. This event demonstrated the changing geopolitics 
of the world by admitting that SSC has increasingly been playing a 
significant role in development aid and, therefore, that development finance 
should be more broadly considered (Glennie 2011; Scoones et al. 2013).
However, scholars still carefully see the situation and question whether 
these new actors offer a new paradigm to development aid debates. 
Mawdsley (2012a: 2) argues that the reality will be extremely complex 
– as emerging donors and partners have different histories and adopt 
diverse ideologies as well as practices, there will be ‘a variety of direct 
and indirect impacts, for better and worse, on the lives and livelihoods 
of poorer people and poorer countries around the world’. Amanor (2013) 
also claims that while SSC practices appear to be conceived as an 
innovative development concept, each of them is rather a culmination of 
historical processes that are based on a particular political economy.
Therefore, it is essential to carefully examine the political, social, 
and cultural background and the political economy that forms 
such practices, while asking how interventions are framed and 
whose interests are served (Scoones et al. 2013, 2016).
With this in mind, this paper then seeks to explore the following questions:
1. What is the political economy that frames SSC practices of emerging 
donors?
2. What motivations do emerging donors have for those practices?
3. What are the impacts of SSC on both recipients and providers?
In order to answer these questions, this work focuses on Brazil’s agriculture 
development cooperation with Africa. As will be mentioned later, Brazil 
seeks to be in stark contrast to the conventional Western aid community, 
and approach Southern peers by appealing to its affinity for Africa. In 
particular, Brazil’s technical cooperation with Africa in agriculture has been 
drawing much attention from researchers (e.g. Scoones et al. 2013; Amanor 
2013; Cabral et al. 2013; Chichava et al. 2013). As such, illuminating lessons 
can be learnt from studying the case. In reviewing the literature, Section 
2 outlines the basic concepts of SSC in comparison with North–South 
Cooperation (NSC). Section 3 examines the political economy that frames 
Brazil’s policy on SSC with Africa that has recently been gaining momentum. 
Section 4 then explores the motivation behind Brazil’s particular focus on 
technical cooperation in agriculture as well as the dualistic contradictions 
that it entails. Lastly, Section 5 discusses the impacts of Brazil’s SSC 
practices in Africa on both sides as the concluding part of this paper.
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2. Concepts of SSC
The United Nations Office for South–South Cooperation (UNOSSC 2019b) 
defines SSC as ‘a broad framework of collaboration among countries 
of the South in the political, economic, social, cultural, environmental 
and technical domains’. Being formed on such a basis as a bilateral, 
regional, intraregional, or interregional scheme, SSC can function as a 
multi- directional platform where developing country participants share 
knowledge, skills, expertise, and resources with each other to achieve 
their development goals (ibid.). In 2009, the United Nations General 
Assembly announced the SSC Guiding Principles, which consist of five 
strands – demand driven, respect for national sovereignty, political and 
macroeconomic non-conditionality, spirit of sharing (solidarity), and mutual 
benefit – as illustrated in Table 2.1 (UNGA 2009). The principles can be 
interpreted as a manifestation of solidarity among Southern countries for 
their national wellbeing as well as collective self-reliance, which has been 
growing year by year. According to the United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD) (2018), South–South trade increased from 
US$0.6tn in 1995 to US$4tn in 2016. In the same period, the share of South–
South trade in developing countries’ total exports rose from 42 per cent to 
57 per cent, resulting in 25 per cent of the world’s total trade in 2016 (ibid.).
Table 2.1 South–South Cooperation Guiding Principles
1 Demand driven Decision-making in consultation with partner, but not by 
imposition
Partner, rather than provider, and recipient
2 Respect for national 
sovereignty
Both partner and recipient initiate, organise, and manage 
activities
Interdependence, not ‘new dependencies’
3 Political and macroeconomic 
non-conditionality
Non-interference in domestic affairs
Non-conditionality
4 Spirit of sharing (solidarity) Absence of leaders in development cooperation
Spirit of sharing through capacity building and technology 
transfer
5 Mutual benefit Promote mutual benefit and reject unequal dependent 
relationship
Create higher level of capability and economic opportunity 
for partners
Source: Author’s own, based on UNGA (2009). 
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Meanwhile, UNCCS (2017) describes the structural difference between 
SSC and conventional NSC as being that SSC is based on a spirit of 
‘mutual benefit’ in contrast to NSC’s focus on ‘giving’. More precisely, 
while NSC regards development cooperation as strategy-based 
assistance for a specific social sector (e.g. education, health care, 
governance), SSC largely considers it as demand-driven investment 
in a productive project (e.g. infrastructure construction). In addition, 
NSC strictly separates assistance from non-official practices, whereas 
SSC can combine multiple instruments of assistance. And importantly, 
although NSC imposes policy conditionality on the recipients as 
a precondition for aid provision, SSC does not (see Table 2.2).
Table 2.2 Differences between South–South 
Cooperation and North–South Cooperation
South–South Cooperation North–South Cooperation
Approach Development investment: emphasis 
on cooperation as investment for 
mutual benefit and solidarity
Development assistance: emphasis 
on cooperation as aid/assistance
Relationship 
with other flows
Blending with non-concessional 
flows, hybrid instruments
Greater separation of development 
assistance from non-concessional 
and non-official flows
Modality For a specific purpose (project aid) For a specific sector (programme aid)
Sectoral focus Emphasis on, but not limited to, 
infrastructure and productive sector
Emphasis on, but not limited to, social 
sectors and governance
Identification of 
priorities
Request-based: senior officials 
articulate specific projects for 
cooperation through high-level 
dialogue
Strategy-based: national 
development strategy outlines 
priority areas for donors, built up from 
technical discussions
Policy 
conditionality
Largely avoided Largely practised
Source: UNCCS (2017: 20), reproduced with permission.
Further, Mawdsley (2012b) analyses SSC practices by drawing on the gift 
theory originally proposed by Marcel Mauss (1990). The theory explains that 
the performed gift should come out in a voluntary, disinterested, and free 
manner, even if it is to make a promise to return the favour in future. Through 
the lens of this theory, Mawdsley (2012b: 263) examines claims by emerging 
actors that their development cooperation activities are not derived from 
hierarchical mindsets and logics that traditional Western aid entails. The 
author then suggests that SSC is constructed and embodied around four 
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key claims as Table 2.3 shows: (1) assertion of a shared ‘developing country’ 
identity; (2) expertise in appropriate development; (3) rejection of hierarchical 
‘donor–recipient’ relations; and (4) insistence on mutual opportunity (ibid.).
Table 2.3 Claims made by Southern development 
cooperation actors
1 Shared ‘developing 
country’ identity
Colonial exploitation and post-colonial inequality
Consequent present vulnerability to uneven neoliberal globalisation
2 Expertise in appropriate 
development
Shared experience, developing status, and geographical 
commonalities
Specifically appropriate approaches and technologies
3 Rejection of ‘donor–
recipient’ relations
Clear rejection of hierarchical relations
Articulation of the principles of respect, sovereignty, and 
non-interference
4 Insistence on mutual 
opportunity
Win–win outcomes
Reciprocal opportunities
Source: Mawdsley (2012b).
Apparently, these claims can contribute to reciprocal impacts, by 
underlining the horizontal nature of SSC and making a stark contrast to 
the ways in which Western donors provide development aid. However, 
as Scoones et al. (2013, 2016) and Amanor (2013) highlight, the political 
economy as well as the background that frames emerging donors’ 
practices needs to be carefully examined. A specific case of SSC 
schemes will be studied and discussed in the following sections.
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3. Brazil’s SSC with Africa
Africa has been increasingly a key partner of Brazilian development 
cooperation. Given the history that its SSC policy is traditionally rooted 
in the Latin American region, Brazil is a relatively new development aid 
actor in Africa as contrasted with China (Amanor 2013). Brazil’s SSC with 
Africa was accelerated particularly by former President Lula da Silva’s2 
‘solidarity diplomacy’, including his frequent visits to the continent during 
the 2000s (Cabral et al. 2013). His intimacy with Africa contributed to 
not only the expansion of Brazilian embassies, but also the setting up 
of a variety of technical cooperation programmes as well as credit 
schemes across the continent (Amanor 2013). As a result, although at 
smaller scale than China, Brazil traded with Africa with 400 per cent 
growth between 2002 and 2010, reaching US$20.6m in 2010 (ibid.).
Brazil seeks to highlight the stark contrast between its own stance and 
the conventional Western aid discourse through empathic narratives 
and social imaginaries (Cabral et al. 2013). To legitimate its development 
cooperation strategies for Africa, Brazil stresses similarities between 
the two, its recent technical and research successes, and the wider 
extent to which those technologies can be transferred (Amanor 2013; 
Shankland and Gonçalves 2016). Abdenur (2015) also explains that the 
Brazilian government has put emphasis on solidarity, in that Brazil as 
a former colony is culturally and historically bonded with Africa, and 
compatibility, in that Brazil can share its first-hand experiences in 
solving development challenges that have much in common with those 
of Africa. In other words, Brazil can share more suitable approaches to 
development problems that are drawn from Brazil’s own history, which 
in turn represents both ‘a moral obligation in South–South relations 
and a factor underpinning the country’s political legitimacy in Africa’ 
(Cabral and Shankland 2013: 5). Thus, Brazil purposefully differentiates its 
attitude towards development cooperation with Africa from that of the 
traditional aid community with its broad historical colonial relations.
Although Brazil ostensibly accentuates morality in its development 
cooperation policy, there is no doubt that behind the policy are its 
own geopolitical strategies and economic self- interests, as is the 
case with other aid actors, whether conventional or emerging (Soares 
De Lima and Hirst 2006; Costa Vaz and Inoue 2007). Yet, Brazil’s 
political emphasis on solidarity can help to realise both altruism and 
reciprocity in diplomatic ties with Southern counterparts including 
Africa (Cabral et al. 2013). This political stance contributes to serving 
Brazil’s self-interests in economic growth and geopolitics as well as 
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gaining firm support from cooperation partners that enables the Latin 
American giant to have more power and influence over the global 
governance. Particularly given Africa’s rich resource endowments and 
relatively open political stance on the engagements of emerging 
donors, it is no wonder that Brazilian businesses increasingly see 
the continent as an attractive destination for investment (ibid.).
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4. SSC in Agriculture
Stressing its ecological similarities with Africa, such as the land and climate, 
Brazil focuses on technical cooperation in agriculture. The claim that Brazil’s 
approaches to agriculture development are appropriate for Africa is 
underpinned by the idea that the African savanna has a range of similar 
characteristics to those of the central Brazilian Cerrado belt (Cabral et al. 2013; 
Shankland and Gonçalves 2016). Therefore, the technologies and knowledge 
that have contributed to altering the previously unproductive Cerrado into 
one of the world’s most productive agricultural zones can also be applied to 
the African savanna (ibid.). Between 2003 and 2010, agriculture was the 
largest sector of Brazil’s technical cooperation with Africa, accounting for 
26 per cent (Cabral and Shankland 2013). While Portuguese-speaking 
countries such as Mozambique are still the main technical cooperation 
partners, new beneficiaries, such as Algeria and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo, are joining the group and reflecting the spreading of Brazil’s 
diplomatic network in Africa (ibid.). Thus, agriculture has been the key sector 
of Brazilian technical cooperation with Africa.
Scoones et al. (2013: 4–6) analyse the pragmatic reasons why emerging 
donors, especially Brazil (and China), see agriculture as central to their SSC 
schemes in Africa from five different dimensions, which are: (1) ecological 
similarities, (2) the availability of agricultural land, (3) business opportunities 
(lower costs of land and labour, growing demand for agricultural produce, 
etc.), (4) the wider effects of investment (in infrastructure, finance, research, 
etc.), and (5) an emphasis on large-scale agriculture. Regarding the last 
dimension, African countries are more likely to be interested in larger-
scale, mechanised agriculture over smallholder farming which has 
been losing prominence mainly due to policy neglect (ibid.). Also, this 
tendency towards large-scale farming is backed by private investment, 
soft loans, modern equipment, and technical support from Brazil (ibid.). 
Meanwhile, Africa wants to achieve food sovereignty and enhance 
farming technology as well as crops, and thus, Brazil’s commercial 
interests in agriculture and Africa’s needs seem to match very well.
4.1 Dualism
However, Brazil’s technical cooperation practices in Africa have also reflected 
the country’s domestic political agendas. To simplify it, there are two 
antagonistic political strands in Brazilian agriculture and rural development 
(Cabral et al. 2013). On the one hand, the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock 
and Food Supply mostly supports larger-scale commercial farmers: it 
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promotes and supports agribusiness activities that pursue diverse capital-
intensive forms of commercial agriculture. On the other hand, the Ministry 
of Agrarian Development supports small-scale family farming: it pushes 
the national strategy for rural and social development in poorer areas 
and then runs programmes that provide technical support and credit for 
small-scale farmers. This political division between the two major parties 
has hindered a new policy framework that supports groups of farmers 
who can fill the gap between agribusiness and family farming (ibid.).
Such a polarised political structure within Brazil has caused a disorganised 
segmentation of technical cooperation practices in Africa. There is no 
coherent framework or clear direction for Brazilian agriculture development 
programmes (Cabral and Shankland 2013). As mentioned in the SSC Guiding 
Principles above, the claims of ‘demand driven’ and ‘non- conditionality’ 
may justify Brazil’s fragmented cooperation schemes. However, there are 
as many as over 20 Brazilian agricultural institutions operating in Africa 
that directly engage in technical cooperation activities. While these 
actors provide solutions and address a range of technical challenges, 
their individual views and approaches are framed by different political 
concerns and conflicting interests. This in turn leads to haphazard practices 
between different institutions: some are committed to large-scale 
agribusiness and capital-intensive commercial farming programmes such 
as ProSAVANA,3 whereas others are engaged in small-scale family farms 
by leveraging the use of farming equipment and machinery such as the 
More Food Africa programme4 (Cabral et al. 2013). Such contradictions 
then bring about controversy over which development model to 
privilege, involving both Brazilian and African civil society actors (ibid.).
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5. Discussion and conclusion
The last question of this paper is explored here: what are the impacts of 
SSC on both the provider and recipient side? As mentioned, two major 
agricultural development models – agribusiness and family farming – 
coexist in Brazil’s cooperation schemes for Africa. If this coexistence is to be 
positively interpreted as pluralistic, Africa can reap the complementarity 
and variety of both models and address the conflicting debates over 
agricultural production scale, small versus large. This will then help to 
serve Africa’s interests: enhanced food sovereignty as well as diversified 
farming technology, and subsequent overall development. However, if 
the dualism is to be construed as dichotomous or antagonistic, such 
political division as that which Brazil has been faced with might be 
replicated in an African context as well. Political imbalance may lead 
to an unjust distribution of resources and support between commercial 
farmers and smallholders, aggravating underdevelopment and poverty 
in rural areas. While the Brazilian government claims that both strands 
are essential to Brazil’s agriculture and rural development, coordinating 
mechanisms across the two antagonistic groups have yet to come into 
being (Cabral and Shankland 2013; Pierri 2013; Scoones et al. 2013).
The current situation seems to be moving towards uncertainty and 
complexity. Cabral and Shankland (2013) point out that Brazil’s current 
focus of cooperation practices in Africa lies in technological modernisation 
and increasing productivity rather than supporting small- scale farming 
and rural development, while dismissing its own domestic policy debates 
about agriculture development. This tendency may undermine conventional 
alternative models, such as bottom-up participation or pro-poor 
development, on which Western aid actors have long put emphasis (ibid.).
Meanwhile, Brazilian advocates of alternative ideologies, particularly of 
small-scale family farming, have been triggered to rally and challenge 
increasingly dominant commercial models, forming alliances with African civil 
society organisations (Cabral et al. 2013). For example, La Via Campesina, 
a global movement network for peasants’ rights, supports the union of 
Brazilian and African civil society groups and fights over the land grab by 
the ProSAVANA programme in Mozambique. The organisation condemns 
the dominant stakeholders (the governments of Brazil, Mozambique, and 
Japan) for the ways in which they have framed and implemented the 
programme and also excluded the local stakeholders (La Via Campesina 
2012; Chichava et al. 2013). Such disorder appears to be reflecting 
Brazil’s optimism about the power of technology, over-confidence in the 
transferability of its own experiences in transforming the Cerrado and 
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the neglect of local African contexts. In this sense, Brazil’s development 
cooperation practices in Africa do not seem to have succeeded in 
being in such stark contrast to traditional Western aid discourse.
The rhetoric of SSC sounds plausible, yet, as Mawdsley (2012a) argues, 
the reality may well be more complex. Cabral and Shankland (2013) point 
out that the growing pace at which Brazil’s presence in international 
development aid has expanded does not match the degree to which 
the country has developed its own capacity as an aid provider. By 
stressing the sharing of experiences, Brazil has neglected to develop 
research and practical skills to replicate successful development models 
to other contexts (ibid.). But this cannot be a justification for being in stark 
contrast to the Western aid community. Brazil’s agriculture development 
cooperation with Africa will continue to be framed in complicated 
processes through which actors on both sides, including governments, 
business owners, farmers, and civil society groups, interact with each 
other– the consequences of which, however, are yet to be seen.
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